Our objective is to engage in innovative research that extends the frontiers of the discipline, deepening our understanding of the operation of modern economies. Research spans almost all the major sub-fields of economics with particular strengths in microeconomic theory, including behavioural economics; econometrics, both micro-econometrics and time series; economic history and development and international economics.

The University of Oxford is ranked 8th in the world and 2nd in Europe in the most recent Tilburg University ranking of Economics departments, based on research contribution for the period between 2012-2016.

In the most recent Research Excellence Framework (REF 2014) to evaluate the research output of UK Universities, Oxford was first in overall research strength in Economics and Econometrics, with more research ranked as ‘world-leading’ than any other participating institution. In a submission of 84 FTE academics, 56% of our research was rated as ‘world-leading’ (4*) and a further 33% rated as ‘internationally excellent’ (3*).

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Policy and Impact

As one of Europe’s leading Economics departments, Oxford aims to inform and improve the development and implementation of economic and public policy in the UK and around the world. We do this by producing innovative research that extends the frontiers of the discipline and deepens our understanding of the operation of modern economies.

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Working Papers

Authors: Stephen Broadberry, Leigh Gardner

Mar 2019

Estimates of GDP per capita are provided on an annual basis for eight Sub-Saharan African economies for the period since 1885. Although the growth experienced in most of SSA since the mid-1990s has had historical precedents, there have also been episodes of negative growth or “shrinking”, so that long run progress has been limited. Despite some heterogeneity across countries, this must be seen as a disappointing performance for the region as a whole, given the possibilities of catch-up growth. Avoiding episodes of shrinking needs to be given a higher priority in understanding the transition to sustained economic growth.

Individual View

This paper investigates how counterterrorism that targets terrorist leaders, and thereby undermines control within terrorist organizations, affects terrorist attacks. The pa¬per exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) ‘hitting’ and ‘missing’ terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that ter¬rorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone ‘hit’ on their leader, compared to after a ‘miss’. This increase amounts to 29 terrorist attacks (43%) worldwide per group in the six months after a drone strike. Game theory provides sev¬eral explanations for the observed effect. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups, and the impact of drone hits on the timing, type and target of attacks, attacks by affiliated terrorist groups, infighting and group splintering, indicates that aggravated problems of control (principal-agent and collective action problems) explain these results better than alternative theoretical mechanisms.

JEL Codes: D74, F5, O10

Keywords: Terrorism, Targeted Leader Killing, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

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Authors: David Ronayne, Greg Taylor

Mar 2019

Abstract

We study strategic interactions in markets where firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s relative size influences market outcomes. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, such seemingly procompetitive developments can raise prices and reduce consumer surplus by weakening between-channel competition. We also use the model to study relevant active policy issues including price clauses, integrated ownership structures, and access to consumers’ purchase data.

Revised March 2019

JEL Codes: JEL D43, D83, L11, M3

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Authors: Guido Ascari, Timo Haber

Mar 2019

This paper proposes a minimal test of two basic empirical predictions that ag-gregate data should exhibit if sticky prices were the key transmission mechanism of monetary policy, as implied by the benchmark DSGE-New Keynesian models. First, large monetary policy shocks should yield proportionally larger initial re-sponses of the price level and smaller real effects on output. Second, in a high trend inflation regime, prices should be more flexible, and thus the real effects of monetary policy shocks should be smaller and the response of the price level larger. Our analysis provides some statistically significant evidence in favor of a sticky price theory of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy shocks.

JEL Codes: E30, E52, C22

Keywords: Sticky prices, local projections, smooth transition function, time-dependent pricing, state-dependent pricing

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Authors: Harold Carter

Feb 2019

Social intervention by governments in liberal democracies faces two major problems. The first is that it tends to reward the majority at the expense of the weak; there is no agreed way to trade-off the claims of different groups on a limited pool of resources, so it comes down to political muscle. The second is that support for intervention depends on a continuing flow of new resources, to fix each new problem while still preserving the interests of existing clients – and as a result, subsidies and controls multiply, despite the fact that they often pursue conflicting goals. In the early days of the British welfare state these dilemmas were resolved by shared assumptions that were fundamentally illiberal, excluding some groups altogether and enabling a clear pecking order amongst the rest. By the end of the century these narratives had largely been rejected. What happened was not a collapse in the fact of collective provision (which continued to grow) but a collapse in the narrative by which it was understood. Unable to resist popular pressure to spend more, governments were also unable to build the public confidence necessary to persuade taxpayers to pay for what they wanted. The easiest course of action was to give in to vested interests; to fund as much as possible by borrowing, on and off the balance sheet; and once the money started to run out, to give in to the most powerful groups, and to pay proportionately less attention to the less vocal.

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