Our objective is to engage in innovative research that extends the frontiers of the discipline, deepening our understanding of the operation of modern economies. Research spans almost all the major sub-fields of economics with particular strengths in microeconomic theory, including behavioural economics; econometrics, both micro-econometrics and time series; economic history and development and international economics.

The University of Oxford is ranked 8th in the world and 2nd in Europe in the most recent Tilburg University ranking of Economics departments, based on research contribution for the period between 2012-2016.

In the most recent Research Excellence Framework (REF 2014) to evaluate the research output of UK Universities, Oxford was first in overall research strength in Economics and Econometrics, with more research ranked as ‘world-leading’ than any other participating institution. In a submission of 84 FTE academics, 56% of our research was rated as ‘world-leading’ (4*) and a further 33% rated as ‘internationally excellent’ (3*).

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Policy and Impact

As one of Europe’s leading Economics departments, Oxford aims to inform and improve the development and implementation of economic and public policy in the UK and around the world. We do this by producing innovative research that extends the frontiers of the discipline and deepens our understanding of the operation of modern economies.

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Working Papers

Authors: Pawel Adrjan, and Brian Bell

Apr 2018

Abstract

How do wages respond to firm-level idiosyncratic cost shocks? We create a unique dataset that links longitudinal data on workers’ compensation to the unexpected costs that UK firms have been forced to pay to plug large deficits in their legacy defined benefit pension plans. We show that firms are able to share the burden of such costs when a significant share of their workers are current or former members of the plan. We also investigate how compensation responds to the closure of defined benefit plans to future benefit accrual. We find that firms are able to use such closures to effectively reduce total compensation of workers who are plan members. These results point to significant frictions in the labour market, which we show are a direct result of the pension arrangement that workers have. Closing schemes has an implicit cost for firms since it reduces the frictions that workers face.

JEL Codes: J31, J32, G32

Keywords: Wages, Pensions, Frictions

Individual View

Authors: Pawel Dziewulski

Apr 2018

Abstract

Critical cost-efficiency index (or CCEI), proposed in Afriat (1972, 1973) and Varian (1990), is the most commonly used measure of revealed preference violations. By representing consumer preference with interval orders, as in Fishburn (1970), we show that this index is equivalent to a particular notion of the just-noticeable difference, i.e., a measure of dissimilarity between alternatives that is sufficient for the agent to tell them apart. Therefore, CCEI can be interpreted as the consumer's cognitive inability to discriminate among options. This characterisation sheds new light on the existing empirical findings.

JEL Codes: C14, C60, C61, D11, D12

Keywords: utility maximisation, generalised axiom of revealed preference, critical cost-efficiency index, interval order, just-noticeable difference

Individual View

Authors: Peter Neary, Giovanni Maggi, Monika Mrázová

Mar 2018

Abstract

Red-tape barriers (RTBs) are an important source of trade costs, but have received little scholarly attention. Here we take a first step toward a theory of RTBs, and show that their implications are very different from those of more traditional trade barriers. Our model highlights that RTBs have important impacts on the extensive margin of trade, and yields rich predictions on how changes in the political-economic environment and product characteristics affect RTBs. Taking into account the endogenous response of RTBs is crucial to understanding the impact of reductions in tariffs and natural trade costs on the extensive and intensive margins of trade, as well as on welfare. Moreover, the availability of RTBs affects in important ways the tariff commitments that are specified in a trade agreement.

JEL Codes: F13, D7, F55

Keywords: International trade policy; Non-Tari Measures; Political economy; Red tape barriers; Trade agreements

Individual View

Authors: Sara Horrell, Jane Humphries

Mar 2018

 

 

JEL Codes: N330

Keywords: Children’s work and pay; Labour Markets; Demography; Britain, long-run

Individual View

Authors: Martin Ellison, Andreas Tischbirek

Feb 2018

Abstract

A novel decomposition highlights the scope for information to in uence the term structure of interest rates. Based on the law of total covariance, we show that real term premia in macroeconomic models contain a component that depends on covariances of realised stochastic discount factors and a component that depends on covariances of expectations of those stochastic discount factors. The impact of different informational assumptions can then be identified by looking at their effect on the second, expectational, component. If agents have full information about technology in a simple macro-finance model then the conditional covariance of expectations is low, which contributes to the real term premia implied by the model being at least an order of magnitude too small, a result that is unchanged if some components of technology are unobservable or observed with noise. To generate realistic term premia, we draw on the beauty contest literature by differentiating between private and public information and introducing the possibility of strategic complementarities in the formation of expectations. A quantitative version of the model is found to explain a significant proportion of observed term premia when estimated using data on expectations of productivity growth from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.

JEL Codes: E40, E43, E70, G12

Keywords: Yield Curve, Term Premia, Information Friction, Beauty Contest, Asset Pricing

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