Our objective is to engage in innovative research that extends the frontiers of the discipline, deepening our understanding of the operation of modern economies. Research spans almost all the major sub-fields of economics with particular strengths in microeconomic theory, including behavioural economics; econometrics, both micro-econometrics and time series; economic history and development and international economics.

The University of Oxford is ranked 8th in the world and 2nd in Europe in the most recent Tilburg University ranking of Economics departments, based on research contribution for the period between 2012-2016.

In the most recent Research Excellence Framework (REF 2014) to evaluate the research output of UK Universities, Oxford was first in overall research strength in Economics and Econometrics, with more research ranked as ‘world-leading’ than any other participating institution. In a submission of 84 FTE academics, 56% of our research was rated as ‘world-leading’ (4*) and a further 33% rated as ‘internationally excellent’ (3*).

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As one of Europe’s leading Economics departments, Oxford aims to inform and improve the development and implementation of economic and public policy in the UK and around the world. We do this by producing innovative research that extends the frontiers of the discipline and deepens our understanding of the operation of modern economies.

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Working Papers

Authors: H Peyton Young, Mark Paddrik, Sriram Rajan

Nov 2019

A major credit shock can induce large intra-day variation margin payments between counterparties in derivatives markets, which may force some participants to default on their payments. These payment shortfalls become amplified as they cascade through the network of exposures. Using detailed DTCC data we model the full network of exposures, shock-induced payments, initial margin collected, and liquidity buffers for about 900 firms operating in the U.S. credit default swaps market. We estimate the total amount of contagion, the marginal contribution of each firm to contagion, and the number of defaulting firms for a systemic shock to credit spreads. A novel feature of the model is that it allows for a range of behavioral responses to balance sheet stress, including delayed or partial payments. The model provides a framework for analyzing the relative effectiveness of different policy options, such as increasing margin requirements or mandating greater liquidity reserves.

JEL Codes: D85, G23, L1

Keywords: Financial networks, contagion, stress testing, credit default swaps

Individual View

Authors: H Peyton Young, Mark Paddrik

Nov 2019

We propose a general framework for estimating the vulnerability to default by a central counterparty (CCP) in the credit default swaps market. Unlike conventional stress testing approaches, which estimate the ability of a CCP to withstand nonpayment by its two largest counterparties, we study the direct and indirect effects of nonpayment by members and/or their clients through the full network of exposures. We illustrate the approach for the U.S. credit default swaps market under shocks that are similar in magnitude to the Federal Reserve’s stress tests. The analysis indicates that conventional stress testing approaches may underestimate the potential vulnerability of the main CCP for this market.

JEL Codes: D85, G01, G17, L14

Keywords: Credit default swaps, central counterparties, stress testing, systemic risk, financial networks

Individual View

Authors: H Peyton Young, Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Ron Peretz

Nov 2019

New ways of doing things often get started through the actions of a few innovators, then diffuse rapidly as more and more people come into contact with prior adopters in their social network. Much of the literature focuses on the speed of diffusion as a function of the network topology. In practice the topology may not be known with any precision, and it is constantly in flux as links are formed and severed. Here we establish an upper bound on the expected waiting time until a given proportion of the population has adopted that holds independently of the network structure. Kreindler and Young [38, 2014] demonstrated such a bound for regular networks when agents choose between two options: the innovation and the status quo. Our bound holds for directed and undirected networks of arbitrary size and degree distribution, and for multiple competing innovations with different payoffs.

Individual View

Authors: H Peyton Young, Sam Jindani

Nov 2019

Social norms are costly if they are harmful for individuals but they remain in place for long periods of time because deviations are punished by members of the community. Examples include female genital cutting, foot binding, and codes of honour such as duelling. These and many other costly norms are seldom ‘all or nothing’: they are multidimensional and can take many altern¬ative forms. We develop a general theory of norm dynamics that focuses on the intermediate-run behaviour of such systems. Al-though in the (very) long run costly norms tend to die out, in the intermediate run transitions to less costly versions of the norm may occur that significantly retard its ultimate abandonment.

Individual View

Authors: David Ronayne, David P. Myatt

Oct 2019

We propose a two-stage replacement for established “clearinghouse" or “captive and shopper" pricing models: second-stage retail prices are constrained by first-stage list prices. In contrast to the mixed-strategy equilibria of single-stage games, a unique profile of distinct prices is supported by the play of pure strategies along the equilibrium path, and so we predict stable price dispersion. We find novel results in applications to models of sales, product prominence, advertising, and consumer search.

Keywords: price dispersion, clearinghouse models, prominence, advertising, buyer search

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