Vexatious claims: Challenging the case for employment tribunal fees

Symplectic ID
635346
Source
Ora (Hyrax)
This is the preferred source?
1
Last Synced with Symplectic
Saturday, 12 September, 2026 - 13:02
DOI
10.1111/1468-2230.12264
Publication Date
Thursday, 27 April, 2017
First Page
412
Last Page
442
Authors
Adams, ACG
Prassl, JFB
Authors list has been truncated
0
Editors list has been truncated
Abstract
Since July 2013, recourse to Employment Tribunals in the United Kingdom has attracted fees of up to £1,200 for single claimants. The impact of this reform has been dramatic: within a year, claims dropped by nearly 80%. In this paper, we challenge the legality of the fee regime as introduced, suggesting that it is in clear violation of domestic and international norms, including Article 6(1) ECHR and the EU principle of effective judicial protection. Drawing on rational choice theory and empirical evidence, we argue that the resulting payoff structures, negative for the majority of successful claimants, strike at the very essence of these rights. The measures are furthermore disproportionate in light of the Government’s stated policy aims: fees have failed to transfer costs away from taxpayers, have failed to encourage early dispute resolution, and have failed to deter vexatious litigants. The only vexatious claims, we find, appear to be those which motivated the reforms in the first place.
Publisher
Wiley
ISSN
1468-2230
Journal Title
Modern Law Review
Volume
80
Issue
3
ID at Source
uuid_6be9cf48-35b2-460b-b604-92327b272a26
Publication Status
Published
Open access
Publication Date - Display month part?
Publication Date - Display day part?
SSO preference
ORIE1838,orie1838