We study bank runs using a novel historical cross-country dataset that covers 184 countries
over the past 200 years and combines a new narrative chronology with statistical indicators of
bank deposit withdrawals. We document the following facts: (i) the unconditional likelihood
of a bank run is 1.2% and that of significant deposit withdrawals 12.7%; (ii)systemic bank runs,
i.e. those that are accompanied by deposit withdrawals, are associated with substantially
larger output losses than non-systemic runs or deposit contractions alone; (iii) bank runs
are contractionary even when they are not triggered by fundamental causes, banks are wellcapitalized, and there is no evidence of a crisis or widespread failures in the banking sector;
(iv) in historical and contemporary episodes, depositors tend to run on highly leveraged
banks, causing a credit crunch, and a reallocation of deposits across banks; and (v) liability
guarantees are associated with lower output losses after systemic runs, while having a lender
of last resort or deposit insurance reduces the probability of a run becoming systemic. Taken
together, our findings highlight a key role for sudden bank liability disruptions over and
above other sources of financial fragility.
