First impression biases in the performing arts: taste-based discrimination and the value of blind auditioning

I develop a game-theoretic framework to study the repercussions of an evaluator's bias against a specific group of applicants. The evaluator decides upfront between holding an informed or a blind audition. In the latter, the evaluator learns neither the applicant's ability nor the gender. I show that, above a threshold bias, the evaluator prefers a blind audition to provide high effort incentives exclusively for high-ability applicants. Consequently, committing to no information can be beneficial for the evaluator. I also show that a highly biased evaluator's preferences align with those of a highly able female. The introduction of performance uncertainty may lead to market failure or may render informed auditions more profitable, rationalising ability-targeting interventions. My results can explain why blind auditions have increased the probability of women being hired via taste-based discrimination and challenge explanations grounded in sta¬tistical discrimination.