Inès Moreno De Barreda
Associate Professor in Economics
St Peter's College
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Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: Media Power Via Correlation of News Content
January 2018|Journal article -
Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
September 2015|Journal article|Theory and Decision© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York. We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of a partition function and a solution. Given a preference profile, a partition is selected and as many units of the good as the number of coalitions in the partition are allocated, where each unit is shared among all agents belonging to the same coalition according to the solution. A rule is stable at a preference profile if no agent strictly prefers to leave his coalition to join another coalition and all members of the receiving coalition want to admit him. We show that the proportional solution and all sequential dictator solutions admit stable partition functions. We also show that stability is a strong requirement that becomes easily incompatible with other desirable properties like efficiency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness. -
The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
July 2014|Journal article|Economica -
Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
May 2014|Journal article|Economics Letters
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Theoretical Economics
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
November 2019|Working paper|Theoretical EconomicsCopyright © 2019 The Authors. This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver, and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium that fully reveals the state, there exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), i.e., one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition—the local deterrence condition—that relates the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver—the min rule—that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists. -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk
January 2019|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesThis paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders’ bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium which fully reveals the state (a FRE), there exists a robust FRE, i.e. one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition, the Local Deterrence Condition, relating the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver, the Min Rule, that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists. Revised January 2019Cheap talk, information transmission, multisender, full revelation, robustness
