Alexei Parakhonyak

Alexei Parakhonyak
Associate Professor in Economics
Lincoln College
01865 271091
aleksei.parakhonyak@economics.ox.ac.uk

  • Shopping malls, platforms and consumer search

    May 2018
    |
    Journal article
    |
    International Journal of Industrial Organization

  • Non-reservation price equilibria and consumer search

    November 2017
    |
    Journal article
    |
    Journal of Economic Theory

  • Non‐Reservation Price Equilibrium and Search without Priors

    May 2015
    |
    Journal article
    |
    The Economic Journal

  • Drugs, guns, and targeted competition

    September 2014
    |
    Journal article
    |
    Games and Economic Behavior

  • Oligopolistic Competition and Search Without Priors

    May 2014
    |
    Journal article
    |
    The Economic Journal
More

  • Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series

    Inducing Herding with Capacity Constraints

    October 2016
    |
    Working paper
    |
    Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
    This paper shows that a rm may benefit from restricting capacity so as to trigger herding behavior from consumers, in situations where such behavior is otherwise unlikely. We consider a setting with social learning, where consumers observe sales from previous cohorts and update beliefs about product quality before making their purchase. A capacity constraint directly limits sales but also results in coarser information: upon observing a sellout, consumers attach positive probability to all levels of demand that exceed the constraint. The resulting discrete jump in beliefs following a sellout benefits the firm, and can make it optimal to restrict capacity.
    Capacity Constraints, Herding, Informational Cascades
  • Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series

    Shopping Malls, Platforms and Consumer Search

    October 2016
    |
    Working paper
    |
    Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
    Abstract: We consider a general model of a market for differentiated goods, in which firms are located in marketplaces: shopping malls or platforms. There are search frictions between the marketplaces, but not within them. Marketplaces differ in their size. We show that consumers prefer to start their search from the largest marketplace and continue in the descending order of their size. We show that the descending search order is the only search order which can be a part of an equilibrium for any market cofiguration. Despite charging lower prices, firms at larger marketplaces earn higher profits, and under free entry all firms cluster at one place. If a marketplace determines the price of entry, the equilibrium marketplace size depends negatively on search costs.
    Shopping Malls, Consumer Search, Platforms
More