Alan Beggs
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Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games
October 2015|Journal article|JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICSBayesian games, Monotone strategies, Robustness, Uniqueness, Index theory, Regularity -
Learning in monotone Bayesian games
January 2015|Journal article|Journal of Dynamics and Games© 2015, American Institute of Mathematical Sciences. This paper studies learning in monotone Bayesian games with onedimensional types and finitely many actions. Players switch between actions at a set of thresholds. A learning algorithm under which players adjust their strategies in the direction of better ones using payoffs received at similar signals to their current thresholds is examined. Convergence to equilibrium is shown in the case of supermodular games and potential games. -
Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games
January 2013|Journal article|B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICSBayesian games, global games, uniqueness, copulas, risk dominance -
Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions
September 2009|Journal article|The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics<jats:p>This paper considers a simple adaptive learning rule in Bayesian games with binary actions where players employ threshold strategies. Global convergence results are given for supermodular games and potential games. If there is a unique equilibrium, players' strategies converge almost surely to it. Even if there is not, in potential games and in the two-player case in supermodular games, any limit point of the learning process must be an equilibrium. In particular, if equilibria are isolated, the learning process converges to one of them almost surely.</jats:p>
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Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Reference Points and Learning
November 2015|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesAbstract This paper studies learning when agents evaluate outcomes in comparison to a reference point. It shows that certain models of reinforcement learning lead toclasses of recursive preferences.Reference points, Reinforcement Learning, Recursive Preferences -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Sensitivity Analysis of Boundary Equilibria
October 2015|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesAbstract This paper studies the sensitivity of economic equilibria to perturbations when the implicit function theorem cannot be applied on account of the presence of boundaries. It presents results from the mathematical programming literature which provide conditions under which equilibria are robust to perturbation and are locally unique Lipschitz-continuous functions of parameters. Economic applications include search equilibrium, Cournot equilibrium and general equilibrium.Sensitivity analysis, Implicit function theorem, Equilibria, Variational inequalities, Boundaries -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Learning in Monotone Bayesian Games
January 2015|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesThis paper studies learning in monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional types and finitely many actions. Players switch between actions at a set of thresholds. A learning algorithm under which players adjust their strategies in the direction of better ones using payoffs received at similar signals to their current thresholds is examined. Convergence to equilibrium is shown in the case of supermodular games and potential games.bayesian games, monotone strategies, learning, stochastic approximation, supermodular games -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games
April 2012|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesThis paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.Bayesian games, Global games, Uniqueness, Copulas, Risk dominance -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games
December 2011|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesThis paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types. It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stability.Bayesian games, Monotone strategies, Index theory, Stability, Uniequeness, Regularity
