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AND PRODUCT LINE PRUNING

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ABSTRACT. Firms selling multiple quality-differentiated products frequently alter their product lines when a competitor enters the market. We present a model of multiproduct monopoly and duopoly using a general “upgrades” approach that yields a powerful analytical framework. We provide a simple theoretical explanation for the common strategies of using “fighting brands” and of product line “pruning.” We also present a general condition that guarantees that a monopolist will forsake market segmentation opportunities and sell but a single product. A number of previously studied issues can be addressed by our model, including inter-temporal price discrimination and “damaged goods.”

1. PRODUCT LINES AND COMPETITION

Incumbent firms often adjust their product lines in response to competition. Sometimes they remove products from the market, thereby “pruning” their product lines. This was one response of Procter & Gamble to private label brands in the early 1990s. At other times, an incumbent responds to competition by expanding its product line, often to include a lower quality good called a “fighting brand.” This happened following AMD’s entry into the market for 386DX microprocessors, when Intel released the 486SX as a companion to its higher-quality 486DX processor.

Key words and phrases. Multiproduct quality competition, fighting brands, product line pruning, focus on quality, price discrimination. JEL Classification D420, D430, L110, L150, L630.

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1 “And in what amounts to virtual apostasy at a company that never gave up on struggling brands, P&G is consolidating some weak products with stronger siblings, while dumping others,” Business Week, July 19, 1993.

2 The “fighting brand” terminology is used in the management literature (Keller 1998, Porter 1980) and by industry participants. In response to new entrants in the credit card business, American Express introduced the Optima card in 1991. Chairman James D. Robinson says (The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1991), “Expect to see Optima as a fighting brand … I think that we’ve got initiatives going in all the areas where there is competitive pressure.”

3 We assess the AMD-Intel case (first highlighted by Deneckere and McAfee 1996b) in Section 6.
Fighting brands are extremely widespread. For instance, AT&T launched Lucky Dog Telephone to help compete against lower-priced “dial around” phone carriers. Brian Adamik of Yankee Group commented, “They’ve introduced a fighting brand in the market that goes after price-sensitive consumers, while allowing AT&T to be their premier brand in the market.” BPL announced that it would introduce a fighting brand in the color television market to take on competition from Chinese and local brands. The head of corporate brand management at BPL noted that its fighting brand would be “a separate brand for the price sensitive low-end CTV market.” And in the Indian market for electric fans, the growth in fringe competition led Usha to introduce a discount fan called the Racer.

Product line pruning is also common. Timex recently announced that it would be removing a number of its lower-priced watches from the Indian wristwatch market in response to growing competition in the low end from Titan while Mitsubishi announced the phasing out of low-end versions of its Trium mobile phones in response to a supply glut in that segment. And after more than a century in the piano business, Kimball International in 1996 discontinued all but its prestigious Bosendorfer model following the capture of the low and middle markets by Japanese and Korean firms.

One feature common to these (and many other) examples is that the increase in competition manifested itself in the low end of the market. Since the incumbent’s decision to either expand or contract its product line amounts to a decision about how to segment the market, these examples suggest that understanding how price discrimination opportunities change with the presence of low end competition might explain the prevalence of both fighting brands and product line pruning. Our main results imply that this is indeed the case.

Consider for instance the IBM LaserPrinter. A single version was initially sold, capable of printing ten pages per minute. The absence of a lower-quality version suggests that the gains from serving the low end of the market were not large enough to justify introducing a substitute product for its high quality unit (which would have limited IBM’s ability to

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4Dial-around carriers allow consumers to bypass their home carriers by dialing a special access code.
5Yankee Group provides industry research and consulting services.
9Kotler (1965) and Quelch and Kenny (1994) emphasize the benefits of regular pruning of product lines. Kotler writes, “As the pace of competition quickens and as consumer tastes become surfeited, the need for pruning company product lines of casualties becomes as great as that for finding replacements.”
12“Piano Industry Off-Key,” Baltimore Sun, February 18, 1996.
13For a more detailed review of this case, see Section 6.
extract surplus from high value users). However, following Hewlett-Packard’s entry into the market with its LaserJet IIP, a lower-quality substitute for IBM’s LaserPrinter, IBM needed to reevaluate its product line strategy. On one hand, Hewlett-Packard’s entry meant that a substitute for IBM’s LaserPrinter was already on the market. Inasmuch as a desire to avoid offering such a substitute restrained IBM in the first place, it might have been sensible to introduce one following Hewlett-Packard’s move. On the other hand, even though a lower-quality substitute would be on the market regardless of IBM’s decision, introducing its own such product would have exacerbated (from IBM’s perspective) the substitution possibilities for consumers. In fact, IBM decided to introduce a fighting brand, the LaserPrinter E, which was identical to its original LaserPrinter except for the fact that its software limited its printing to five rather than ten pages per minute. This suggests that the desire to compete in the newly opened low end market was strong enough that IBM was willing to bear the additional erosion on its high end profits resulting from its own entry into the low end market.

However, as noted above, it is not the case that all firms choose to mimic IBM’s strategy of expanding its product line in response to low end competition; some firms choose to prune their product lines when facing such competition. Therefore, the full explanation of the influence of competition on product line choices is more complicated than suggested by the IBM example. Consider DEC, which until 1996 sold a range of PCs to both home and business customers. By offering lower quality PCs targeted at home users, DEC provided a potential substitute to its business clients, but clearly felt this downside was worth bearing for the opportunity to serve the low end market. In 1996, however, DEC faced increasing competition in the home computer market and responded by exiting that market to focus on its high end desktops and servers. Despite the contrast with IBM’s decision, DEC’s reaction also can be understood in terms of changing opportunities for market segmentation. In particular, DEC’s response suggests competition reduced the available profits in the low end market enough that it became more important to attempt to preserve profits on its high end products by not contributing to a mass of low-priced substitutes. Pruning its product line was the means to accomplish this.

We argue in this paper that it is indeed true that competition’s influence on market segmentation opportunities is crucial in understanding the changing product line decisions of multiproduct firms. Moreover, we show that it is straightforward to understand when either expansion or contraction of a product line will occur. More precisely, we identify demand and competitor characteristics that make either fighting brands or pruning optimal responses to heightened competition. This is important since, while much is known about the optimal product line choice of multiproduct monopolists, relatively little is known about competition between multiproduct firms, and virtually nothing is known...

about the decision of a firm to alter its vertically-differentiated product line (by pruning it or introducing a fighting brand) as a response to the arrival of new competition. (We relate our work to the existing literature in Section[2])

In our analysis we presume that entry by a single firm has occurred in a market originally dominated by a monopolist. The duopolists compete in quantities, each potentially offering a range of quality differentiated products. Whether the incumbent will choose to extend or contract its product line depends closely on the shape of the marginal revenue curves in the market. When marginal revenue is everywhere decreasing, the incumbent never responds to the entrant by expanding its product line. Rather, entry tends to be associated with the pruning of lower quality products from the incumbent’s menu, meaning that it chooses to “focus on quality.” However, when marginal revenue is increasing in some regions, an incumbent may find it optimal to respond to entry through the introduction of a lower quality product.

It might seem that marginal revenue that is increasing in some regions represents an unimportant case. However, there are two important points to keep in mind when evaluating this assumption. First, firms with constant marginal cost certainly do not choose output in regions where marginal revenue is increasing; i.e. in equilibrium firms operate in regions where marginal revenue is decreasing. We are not suggesting, therefore, that marginal revenue will be increasing in a region local to that observed in equilibrium. Second, while everywhere decreasing marginal revenue is a convenient technical assumption, it is in fact incompatible with some very plausible demand structures. For example, as we show in Section[3.2] the existence of a bimodal distribution of consumer preferences, corresponding perhaps to segments of home and business users, readily generates marginal revenue that is increasing in some regions.

The intuition for our results is straightforward. Suppose that marginal revenue is decreasing, so that firms face the typical Cournot incentives to reduce their own output as the output of a rival increases. Consider a simple example in which the incumbent originally marketed both a low and a high quality product, and suppose that the entrant is able to offer only a low quality good. When confronted with positive output by the entrant, the incumbent restricts output in the low quality market. Furthermore, since the total production in the low quality market also adversely effects the price of the high quality good, the incumbent faces additional pressure to lower its own output in the low quality market. This essentially makes the incumbent soft compared to the entrant in that market. If the entrant finds it optimal to produce beyond a certain level, the best course of action for the incumbent is to cede that market to the entrant in an effort to preserve margins on the high quality good — it will prune its product line in order to focus on quality.
As noted above, marginal revenue that is increasing in some regions can be consistent with plausible demand structures, such as the existence of distinct “market segments.” This leads to the possibility that a sufficiently large intrusion by a competitor may lead an incumbent to expand its supply. The intuition for this is simply that as a monopolist the firm might choose not to serve the low end market segment in order to maintain high prices. Once a competitor enters on a large enough scale, however, the possible increase in marginal revenue may encourage the incumbent to expand into that segment along with the entrant.

Strikingly, such an incentive for the incumbent to increase its total supply is what drives the introduction of a fighting brand. To see this, suppose once again that the entrant is able to offer only a low quality good, and also that the incumbent would choose to sell only the high quality good as a monopolist. Following entry, the incumbent may wish to expand its output. But such pressure only applies at the quality level offered by the entrant, since that is the only market in which the entrant is active. Although the incumbent faces competition in the supply of a complete high quality product, it (conceptually) maintains market power in “upgrades” from low to high quality, and hence wishes to restrict their supply. The desires of the incumbent are manifested by the introduction of a low quality fighting brand that allows total output of the incumbent to increase while still exercising market power through the restriction of supply of the high quality good.

Our analysis generates other predictions as well, which are potentially testable. First, fighting brands tend to emerge when the entrant offers only low end products — that is, when there is some asymmetry between the technological capabilities of the incumbent and the entrant. Second, if the incumbent introduces a fighting brand, that brand will be of quality comparable to the lowest quality good of the entrant’s. In other words, any price discriminating behavior by the incumbent takes place at quality levels (weakly) above that of the entrant’s worst product. This result is consistent with much observed behavior. For instance, the IBM LaserPrinter E was slightly faster than the Hewlett-Packard IIP. Third, assuming that marginal revenue is decreasing, an increase in the maximum quality that an entrant can offer (whether due to the termination of a patent, reverse-engineering or some other factor) makes it more likely that the incumbent will choose to exit the lower markets.

Beyond our results on changing product lines, we also provide a more specialized technical result about price discrimination. We demonstrate in a very general model of monopoly nonlinear pricing that there exists a weak and plausible condition that is sufficient to ensure that a firm never offers more than a single product. In the special case of multiplicatively separable preferences, this condition reduces to increasing returns in

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15Some reviews claim that the IBM printer had slightly inferior print quality, and hence we might conclude that the overall quality of the two products was approximately equal. See Section 6 for more details.
the provision of quality. This condition might hold when there are production costs that must be incurred regardless of the final quality choice, as when an automobile manufacturer chooses the final trimline of a vehicle only after first building the basic platform. We believe this result is of some interest because, to our knowledge, such a straightforward condition for extreme “bunching” of consumers has been underexplored.

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we relate our work to earlier literature. Our model is specified in Section 3. We present the general monopoly result in Section 4, and also construct the framework for the case of duopoly when consumers’ preferences are separable. Duopolistic competition is our focus in Section 5. In Section 6 we present some discussion and a number of illustrative case studies, prior to offering concluding remarks.

2. Related Literature

Our work is related to that on product design decisions and price discrimination by firms in imperfectly competitive markets. There are three main branches of interest: monopoly, price-setting competition, and quantity-setting competition. We discuss each of these below.

The incentive to engage in second-degree discriminatory behavior has long been recognized. In a classic contribution, Mussa and Rosen (1978) consider the product line decisions of a price discriminating monopolist able to offer a range of products of different qualities. An important insight of this work is that a monopolist may offer inefficiently low qualities, in the sense that the quality level supplied to lower value customers is distorted downward. Inducing such a distortion is optimal as it reduces the substitution possibilities of higher value customers.

One situation in which this downward distortion does not occur is when a firm offers but a single product — the monopolist simple does not supply lower value customers. Stokey (1979) shows that when a monopolist is able to discriminate on the delivery date of a single product, so that products delivered in the future are essentially of lower quality, it may choose to offer only products for sale today. Multiple dates of delivery are chosen only when costs fall sufficiently quickly over time. Salant (1989) considers the conditions under which price discrimination occurs: The marginal production cost must be sufficiently convex in a product’s quality — equivalently, there must be decreasing returns to quality. In contrast, when there are increasing returns to quality, the monopolist will sell a single product at the highest feasible quality level. We obtain similar results with our own analysis (Proposition 1).

16 Other authors offer similar results based upon slightly different specifications. For instance, Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton, and Thisse (1986) described a model in which consumers are distinguished by their income.
While the literature on monopoly price discrimination is obviously important, such work necessarily cannot address the matter of how firms with market power adjust their product lines in response to competition. There are several papers that explore multiproduct competition between firms. Perhaps the most important of these is that of Champsaur and Rochet (1989), who consider the product line competition in prices between two firms in a general model. They allow firms to commit to producing in chosen intervals of quality before competing on prices. They find that firms choose to offer non-overlapping product lines, as this reduces the intensity of price competition. Hence the product line offered by a given firm need not match the product line offered by a monopolist capable of offering the entire range of goods. In particular, the product line of the firm offering high quality goods can contain fewer products than a monopolist would offer. At first, this seems similar to our result on product line pruning. However, this is not the comparison that we are interested in. We wish to ask how an incumbent firm with a fixed technology adjusts its line following entry. In the Champsaur and Rochet (1989) analysis, this corresponds to comparing the product line offering of the high quality firm in monopoly versus duopoly, in each case for a fixed feasible quality interval. Importantly, they show there is no difference in the optimal product line in these two cases; i.e. no pruning occurs. As such, for fixed production opportunities product line pruning does not arise, and fighting brands never arise.

There is nonetheless a sense in which the equilibrium quality gap between the two firms is related to our analysis in Section 5.2. We show that, when marginal revenue is decreasing, the incumbent never introduces a fighting brand. Decreasing marginal revenue ensures that the best response functions are everywhere decreasing. Hence, introducing a fighting brand is not optimal because the best response to entry is for an incumbent to reduce its total supply, which leads to fewer distinct products. Expanding into lower quality markets only negatively affects all prices for the incumbent. This is similar in spirit to the desire of firms which can pre-commit to qualities to avoid head-to-head competition, since firms recognize that so doing will drive prices to marginal cost in a price-setting environment.

In contrast to these contributions, we present a quantity-setting model, as others have. Gal-Or (1983) assumes a symmetric Cournot equilibrium where each firm offers a range of qualities (and states appropriate sufficient conditions for a particular example), obtaining comparative statics as the number of firms increases. In the equilibria she considers, firms levels. They find that, as the income distribution narrows, a monopolist focuses its production on a single quality level.

A number of other authors have offered price-setting models of competition in which firms pre-commit to quality levels. Gabszewicz and Thissen (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) allow firms to precommit to their quality levels, prior to the simultaneous choice of prices. In all of these papers, firms are restricted to a single product and hence they cannot address the issue of product ranges we consider.
do not change their product lines as the level of competition changes\[^{18}\]. De Fraja (1996) offers a quantity setting model with the income-effect utility functions of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). His main result is that any equilibrium is symmetric when firms have identical technologies — we offer a similar result as part of Proposition 6. In contrast to these contributions, we offer a full analysis of equilibrium product lines, and consider a more general specification where one firm potentially is limited in the qualities it can offer. Moreover, none of these papers considers the issue of fighting brands or product line pruning.

Our analysis, and that of many of the authors mentioned above, considers a single dimension of quality where all consumers agree on the ranking of products. Alternative models combine quality provision with horizontal differentiation elements (Gilbert and Matutes 1993, Verboven 1999, Stole 1995). Others allow preferences to differ only along a horizontal dimension (Eaton and Lipsey 1979, Judd 1985) and consider the ability of firms to deter entry by “covering” the markets for certain brands. Brander and Eaton (1984) address product line choices by two firms, assuming that firms are able to commit to products prior to competing on prices. In particular, there are four products, split into “groups” of two. Two products in one group are close substitutes for one another, and less close substitutes for the other two goods, which are in turn close substitutes for one another. They show that an “interlace” equilibrium can exist in which each firm offers one product in each group. The reason is that, if one firm believes the other will occupy one product space in each group, it is certainly wise to avoid competing in those exact product spots, as price competition will drive profits to zero. However, it might be profitable to occupy the “open” product spots within the two groups, if the resulting price competition is not too fierce (as it may not be because distinct products are somewhat differentiated). Note that, if there is no commitment stage in their model, each firm produces all the products and interlace is not an equilibrium. We show that there is no interlace equilibrium in a vertically differentiated industry. In particular, the entrant offers any product the incumbent does, subject only to being physically capable of producing it (we actually prove the contrapositive in Section 5). Heuristically, the entrant has less to lose by offering a product, since it has fewer high quality products and is hence less concerned about negative price consequences associated with increasing the overall level of goods. Hence, if the incumbent wishes to offer a positive supply of some good, the entrant must also wish to do so.

\[^{18}\]She moves on to combine her analysis with that of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) in Gal-Or (1985). In this later paper, however, she restricts to single product provision and decreasing returns to quality.
In short, the existing literature has made great progress in understanding monopoly product design decisions. However, less progress has been made in understanding multiproduct competition, and no one has addressed the matter of changing product lines that we consider.

3. A Market for Quality-Differentiated Products

In this section we lay out the structure of demand and costs. In Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 we describe consumer preferences and the demand side of the market in general. In Section 3.3 we describe different cost structures that we will make use of later on.

3.1. The Demand Side.

Demand is generated from a unit mass of consumers indexed by a type parameter $\theta$. The cumulative distribution function is $F(\theta)$, which has support on $[0, \bar{\theta}]$. On its support, $F(\theta)$ is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable with density $f(\theta)$. A consumer of type $\theta$ who purchases a good of quality $q$ at price $p$ enjoys utility $\theta q - p$. She faces a selection of $n$ products indexed by $i$, where product $i$ is of quality $q_i$ and price $p_i$. We order the goods so that $q_n > q_{n-1} > \cdots > q_1 > 0$. Note that goods differ only with respect to quality, and that all consumers prefer goods of higher quality. Each consumer purchases a single unit of the good $i$ that maximizes $\theta q_i - p_i$, unless this yields negative utility in which case she purchases nothing.

Before deriving the entire system of inverse demand functions under this multiplicative specification, first suppose that only a single good of quality $q > 0$ is being sold, at price $p > 0$. This good would be purchased by all consumers satisfying $\theta \geq p/q$, yielding demand of $z = 1 - F(p/q)$. Similarly, the inverse demand curve satisfies $p = qH(z)$ where:

$$H(z) = \begin{cases} F^{-1}(1-z) & z < 1 \\ 0 & z \geq 1 \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

When $z \leq 1$, $\theta = H(z)$ is the type with a mass of $z$ consumers above her. At a price of $p = \theta q$ it is exactly these $z$ consumers who are willing to buy, with consumer $\theta$ being just indifferent between buying and not. Hence $p = qH(z)$ equilibrates supply and demand. For $z > 1$, supply exceeds the number of willing purchasers and so the only possible equilibrium price is $p = 0$.

As quantities will be the strategic choice variables of firms in our later analysis, and as products are differentiated only with respect to quality in the eyes of consumers, we can

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19This is equivalent to the more general formulation $u(\theta, q) = k(\theta)g(q)$, where $k(\cdot)$ and $g(\cdot)$ are both increasing. We simply redefine a consumer’s type to be $k(\theta)$ and quality to be $g(q)$. When we refer to quality $q$, therefore, we are really considering the (scaled) monetary value of quality, since a consumer $\theta$ is willing to pay $\theta q$ for quality $q$. 
compute the market-clearing prices for the \( n \) products knowing only that industry supply of each product \( i \) is given by \( z_i \). It turns out that the inverse demand function for a single good, based on \( H(z) \) from Equation 1, is central to the general analysis with \( n \) products.

Naturally, we must consider the possibility that \( z_i = 0 \) for some products. However, it is conceptually easier to first derive the inverse demands assuming that \( z_i > 0 \) for each \( i \). We will then explain how to incorporate the possibility that some products are not supplied at all.

When \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i < 1 \) there is partial market coverage: Not all consumers are able to purchase a good. Thus, given a set of supplies \( \{z_i\} \), we require a set of positive prices \( \{p_i\} \) such that exactly \( z_i \) consumers wish to purchase good \( i \). If a lower quality good were priced no lower than a higher quality good, then it would attract no demand. There must, therefore, be a price premium for higher quality. Such higher quality products must be purchased by consumers with higher types: If a consumer \( \theta \) is willing to pay a premium for higher quality, then higher types will strictly wish to do so. Thus the highest \( z_n \) consumers purchase product \( q_n \), and the next \( z_{n-1} \) purchase quality \( q_{n-1} \) and so on. The consumer with \( \sum_{j=1}^{n} z_j \) others above her must be just indifferent between purchasing quality \( q_1 \) and not purchasing at all, so that \( p_1 = q_1 H(\sum_{j=1}^{n} z_j) \). Similarly, the consumer with \( \sum_{j=i}^{n} z_j \) consumers above her must be just indifferent between products \( i \) and \( i-1 \), and so \( p_i = p_{i-1} + (q_i - q_{i-1}) H(\sum_{j=i}^{n} z_j) \). Defining \( q_0 = p_0 = 0 \) for convenience, we obtain:

\[
p_i - p_{i-1} = (q_i - q_{i-1}) H \left( \sum_{j=i}^{n} z_j \right) \quad \text{for} \quad i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \tag{2}
\]

Notice that \( p_i - p_{i-1} \) represents the price of an “upgrade” from quality \( q_{i-1} \) to quality \( q_i \). This observation leads us to consider the cumulative variables defined by \( Z_i = \sum_{j=i}^{n} z_j \). \( Z_i \) is the total supply at quality \( q_i \) and above. We offer the following interpretation. We may suppose that the industry supplies \( Z_1 \) units of a “baseline” product of quality \( q_1 \). There are then supplies of successive “upgrades” to the baseline product in order to achieve qualities above this. For instance a product of quality \( q_2 \) consists of a baseline product at price \( p_1 \), plus an upgrade \( q_2 - q_1 \) priced at \( p_2 - p_1 \). Continuing in this manner, Equation 2 becomes:

\[
p_i - p_{i-1} = (q_i - q_{i-1}) H(Z_i) \tag{3}
\]

Hence the price of upgrade \( i \) depends only on its own supply, and not on the supply of any other upgrades. In contrast, the complete product \( i \) with quality \( q_i \) has a price \( p_i \) that depends on the supplies of all \( n \) products.

Equation 3 also applies when there is complete market coverage, so that \( Z_1 \geq 1 \). If \( Z_1 = 1 \), then \( p_1 \) must equal zero, given our assumptions on \( F(\theta) \). If \( Z_1 > 1 \), then \( p_1 = 0 \) as well, because there is strictly excess supply. Similarly, \( p_i - p_{i-1} = 0 \) for any upgrade \( i \) satisfying
$Z_i \geq 1$. But of course, if this holds then $H(Z_i) = 0$ by definition (see Equation 1) and hence Equation 3 continues to hold.\(^{20}\) Note that, if $Z_{j+1} \geq 1$ then there can be no demand for product $j$. The reason is that the price of the upgrade to product $j + 1$ is zero, so that all consumers will purchase a product at least of quality $j + 1$.

It turns out that defining prices in the manner just described easily allows us to address the possibility that some products are in zero supply. To see how, suppose that $\{z_i\}$ satisfies only that $z_i \geq 0$, and define the prices $\{p_i\}$ and cumulative variables $\{Z_i\}$ exactly as above. Note that a product $i$ is in positive supply if $Z_i - Z_{i+1} > 0$, at least if we define $Z_{n+1} = 0$, while a product is in zero supply if $Z_i - Z_{i+1} = 0$. If $j$ is the first product in positive supply then there are a total of $Z_j = \sum_{i=j}^n z_i$ products on the market. If the prices defined above are correct in this case, it must be that consumer $\theta = H(Z_j)$ is just indifferent between buying good $j$ and not. The price of good $j$ can be obtained by adding up the incremental prices given by the right-hand side of Equation 3. Making use of the fact that for $k < j$ we have $Z_k = Z_j$, we obtain

$$p_j = p_j - p_0 = \sum_{i=1}^j (p_i - p_{i-1}) = \sum_{i=1}^j (q_i - q_{i-1})H(Z_i) = H(Z_j) \sum_{i=1}^j (q_i - q_{i-1}) = q_j H(Z_j)$$

Hence, a consumer with type $\theta = H(Z_j)$ is indeed indifferent between buying good $j$ and not buying at all. The only subtlety is that she is also indifferent between buying goods $k < j$ and not at the prices defined, but these are not in positive supply. Hence, we adopt the convention that when a consumer is indifferent between several products she purchases the one of highest quality. We have only dealt with the first good in positive supply, but a similar process can be applied recursively. With some more work, it can be shown that the process just described can be extended to consistently define demand for all possible supply configurations. Hence, given the convention that a consumer purchases the highest quality good to which she is indifferent, the prices defined above are correct for all circumstances.

### 3.2. Demand Segments and the Shape of Marginal Revenue.

Equation 3 reveals that the shape of inverse demand for all $n$ products is tied to the function $H(z)$, which is itself the inverse demand curve for a single good of quality $q = 1$. A standard “textbook” assumption would be to suppose that $H(z)$ exhibits decreasing marginal revenue.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\)Our assumption that the lower bound of $F(\theta)$ is zero ensures that all prices will be positive in equilibrium, so that the market is not fully covered. We still must address the possibility that some prices are zero, as we do here.

\(^{21}\)The assumption of decreasing marginal revenue is also a convenient sufficient condition for many existence and uniqueness results in oligopoly. For instance, combining decreasing marginal revenue with weakly convex marginal costs ensures that a single product Cournot game has a unique and symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium — see, for instance, Vives (1999, Ch. 4).
These figures illustrate the specification of Example 1. The parameters chosen are $\theta_H = 3$ and $\theta_L = 1$ for the centers of two “market segments,” $\sigma_H^2 = \sigma_L^2 = 0.3$ for the variance in each segment and $\alpha = 0.4$ for the relative weight on the higher segment. The sharp drop in inverse demand (and corresponding negative marginal revenue) near $z = 0.4$ corresponds to the division between the two segments.

**Definition 1.** Decreasing marginal revenue: $H(x + y) + xH'(x + y)$ decreasing in $y$ for all $x$.

This states that if a firm is producing $x$ units, then the marginal revenue of the final unit is decreasing in the output $y$ of the rest of the industry. If marginal revenue satisfies this definition, then it can be shown that the marginal revenue of a firm also is decreasing in its own output.

Decreasing marginal revenue is a property exhibited by many demand curves. Nonetheless, there are some very plausible specifications that are inconsistent with marginal revenue being everywhere decreasing. We illustrate this with an example.

**Example 1.** $\theta$ is drawn from a mixture of two normal distributions with means $\theta_H > \theta_L$ and variances $\sigma_H^2$ and $\sigma_L^2$. The former is chosen with probability $\alpha$. Types $\theta \leq 0$ do not purchase.

Example 1 is a stylized representation of a market where demand is drawn from two separate sources, as shown in Figure 1(a). For instance, when consumers are drawn...
from home and business sectors, the specification of Example 1 may be appropriate.\(^{23}\)

Note that in this example, marginal revenue is not decreasing everywhere (Figure 1(b)).

Our discussion of product lines and competition (Section 1) suggests that firms are able to identify different “segments” of market demand. For instance, upon the introduction of Lucky Dog Telephone, AT&T vice-president Howard E. McNally commented that “[w]hat we want to do with this brand is attract a different group of people.” In the context of a formal model, this comment suggests that the density \(f(\theta)\) may well be multimodal, with each mode corresponding to a different segment of consumers.

In Section 5 we show that the presence or absence of decreasing marginal revenue critically affects the product ranges offered by competing duopolists. As we wish to take both possibilities seriously, we make two more points here. First, even if marginal revenue is increasing in some regions, firms will always choose output in the region where it is decreasing, in the textbook manner.\(^{24}\) Thus, incorporating marginal revenue that is increasing in some regions is simply a way to admit other demand structures, such as Example 1.

To build to our second point, note that the monotonicity of marginal revenue is also related to the price sensitivity of consumers. For a single good of quality \(q = 1\), the price elasticity of demand \(\varepsilon(z)\) satisfies:

\[
1 \varepsilon(z) = -\frac{d \log H(z)}{d \log z} = -\frac{H'(z)z}{H(z)} \Rightarrow H(z) + zH'(z) = H(z) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon(z)}\right)
\]

Since \(H(z)\) is an inverse demand function, it is automatically decreasing in \(z\). This means that if marginal revenue is both positive and increasing in a region (as in Example 1), then it must be the case that \(\varepsilon(z)\) is increasing in \(z\) in that region. In other words, an expansion in \(z\) toward the “low end” of the market naturally results in an increase in the price elasticity of demand. This is consistent with our example of BPL in Section 1, where an expansion to the low end of the market resulted in greater price sensitivity.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\)Many firms explicitly direct these categories of consumers toward different product lines. The personal computer manufacturer Dell divides its website into Consumer and Business products. In the former division it offers Dimension desktops and Inspiron laptops, whereas in the latter it offers Optiplex desktops and Latitude laptops.

\(^{24}\)We will assume constant marginal costs of production within a quality level.

\(^{25}\)Both marginal revenue and the price elasticity of demand are closely related to the hazard rate of \(F(\theta)\):

\[
H(z) + zH'(z) = \theta - \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \quad \text{and} \quad \varepsilon(z) = \frac{\theta f(\theta)}{1 - F(\theta)} \quad \text{where} \quad \theta = H(z)
\]

If the hazard rate \(f(\theta)/(1 - F(\theta))\) is increasing in \(\theta\), then both marginal revenue and the price elasticity of demand are decreasing in \(z\). This is inconsistent with Example 1 and with greater price sensitivity upon an expansion to serve the low end of a market. Whereas the monotonicity of hazard rate is a convenient assumption, and holds for many common unimodal distributions (including the uniform, normal etc.) it cannot hold if we wish to model the presence of multiple demand segments as in Example 1.
3.3. The Cost Side: Increasing and Decreasing Returns to Quality.

We assume that any firm capable of producing a product of quality \( q_i \) has access to the same production technology. Precisely, within a particular quality level \( q_i \), there are constant marginal costs of production \( c_i > 0 \). There are no fixed costs of production.

Costs may be related to quality in a number of different ways. For instance, we say that the production cost \( c_i \) exhibits “decreasing returns” if both the average cost of quality \( \frac{c_i}{q_i} \) and the marginal cost of quality \( \left( \frac{c_{i+1} - c_i}{q_{i+1} - q_i} \right) \) are increasing for all \( i \). Of course, if the marginal cost of quality exceeds the average cost, then the average cost of quality is clearly increasing. Hence, defining \( c_0 = 0 \),

\[
\frac{c_1}{q_1} = \frac{c_1 - c_0}{q_1 - q_0} < \frac{c_2 - c_1}{q_2 - q_1} < \cdots < \frac{c_n - c_{n-1}}{q_n - q_{n-1}} \Rightarrow \frac{c_1}{q_1} < \frac{c_2}{q_2} < \cdots < \frac{c_n}{q_n}
\]

This simply says that if the marginal cost of quality is increasing for all \( i \), it is necessarily true that the average cost of quality is increasing.

Likewise, the average cost of quality is decreasing when the marginal cost of quality is less than the average cost; that is, when \( \left( \frac{c_{i+1} - c_i}{q_{i+1} - q_i} \right) < \frac{c_i}{q_i} \). When the average cost of quality is decreasing, we say there are “increasing returns” to quality.

A production technology may easily exhibit both increasing and decreasing returns. For instance, suppose that any product, irrespective of quality, has an unavoidable marginal “build cost” of \( c > 0 \). In addition, the production cost increases with quality according to the strictly increasing and convex function \( c(q) \) satisfying \( c(0) = 0 \). Hence:

\[
c_i = c + c(q_i) \Rightarrow \frac{c_i}{q_i} = \frac{c + c(q_i)}{q_i}
\]

For \( i > 1 \), the convexity of \( c(q) \) ensures that the marginal cost of quality is increasing. For small \( q \), however, the average cost of quality \( \frac{c_i}{q_i} \) is decreasing, and exhibits the classic “U-shape” familiar from undergraduate textbooks: There are first increasing, and then decreasing returns to quality. Motivated by this example, we categorize different cases of interest as follows.

Definition 2. There are increasing returns to quality where \( \frac{c_i}{q_i} \) is decreasing for all \( i \). There are decreasing returns to quality where both \( \frac{c_i}{q_i} \) and \( \left( \frac{c_{i+1} - c_i}{q_{i+1} - q_i} \right) \) are increasing for all \( i \). The production technology is U-shaped if, for some \( k \), the average cost of quality is decreasing for \( i \leq k \) and the marginal and average costs of quality are increasing for \( i > k \):

\[
\frac{C_1}{q_1} > \frac{C_2}{q_2} > \cdots > \frac{C_{k-1}}{q_{k-1}} > \frac{C_k}{q_k} < \frac{C_{k+1} - C_k}{q_{k+1} - q_k} < \cdots < \frac{C_{n-1} - C_{n-2}}{q_{n-1} - q_{n-2}} < \frac{C_n - C_{n-1}}{q_n - q_{n-1}}
\]

Thus the only asymmetry between firms will be in the range of qualities that they are able to produce. Allowing the marginal cost of production to vary across firms does not substantially change our analysis. With some straightforward modifications, the bulk of our results continue to hold, in particular those regarding product line pruning and fighting brands.
**In this case** \( k \) **is the product that minimizes the average cost of quality.**

Notice that U-shaped costs of quality incorporate increasing and decreasing returns as special cases. The former occurs when \( k = n \) and the latter occurs when \( k = 1 \).

Inspection of the production technology in objective terms is not typically enough to determine the returns to quality; consumer preferences are part of this definition. For example, suppose that the product in question is a microprocessor, and that increases in clockspeed correspond to increased quality. A consumer with type \( \theta \) is willing to pay up to \( \theta q \) for a processor of quality \( q \). Thus \( q \) indexes the monetary value of the microprocessor, and not necessarily its physical clockspeed.\(^{27}\) In some cases, however, we can immediately identify the structure of costs. Such is the case with damaged goods (Deneckere and McAfee 1996b), where a firm obtains a low quality product by intentionally “crimping” a higher quality variant, since in that case a product of lower quality costs more, so that the returns to quality must be increasing.

4. **Monopoly**

In this section we derive the optimal product lines for a monopolist. We first consider the case of multiplicative preferences, which serves as a point of comparison when we introduce competition in Section 5. Following that, we briefly consider the monopolist’s product line choices with more general preferences.

4.1. **Monopoly with Multiplicative Preferences.**

With \( n \) different goods available, the monopolist’s profit on product \( i \) is simply \( z_i(p_i - c_i) \). The monopolist then chooses \( z_i \geq 0 \) to maximize total profits \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i(p_i - c_i) \) across all products. It is equivalent, and much easier in the end, for the monopolist instead to choose a range of upgrade supplies \( \{Z_i\} \). These must respect the constraint \( Z_i \leq Z_{i-1} \) — for instance, an upgrade to quality \( q_2 \) may only be sold to consumers who purchase the baseline product \( q_1 \). Using this formulation, the monopolist’s problem becomes:

\[
\max \sum_{i=1}^{n} Z_i \left[ (q_i - q_{i-1})H(Z_i) - (c_i - c_{i-1}) \right] \quad \text{subject to} \quad Z_i \leq Z_{i-1} \quad \text{for each } i > 1
\]

Observe that the \( i \)th element of the summation involves only the term \( Z_i \). In fact:

\[
Z_i \left[ (q_i - q_{i-1})H(Z_i) - (c_i - c_{i-1}) \right] \propto Z_i \left[ H(Z_i) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right]
\]

The last term is equivalent to the profit from selling a single good of quality \( q = 1 \) with a marginal production cost of \( (c_i - c_{i-1})/(q_i - q_{i-1}) \). If it were not for the constraint \( Z_i \leq Z_{i-1} \),

\(^{27}\)More precisely, changes in \( q \) are an essential part of Definition 2. With multiplicatively separable preferences, changes in \( q \) represent common changes in the proportional willingness to pay of all consumers.
then the monopolist could maximize the objective function termwise. Neglecting this
monotonicity constraint, the solution \( \{Z^*_i\} \) would satisfy
\[
H(Z^*_i) + Z^*_i H'(Z^*_i) = \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}}
\] (5)
The “upgrade” reformulation reveals the simple economics of second-degree price dis-
 crimination: The monopolist sets marginal cost (of increased quality) equal to marginal
revenue in the market for each upgrade.

Alas, this approach ignores the monotonicity constraint \( Z_i \leq Z_{i-1} \). Imposing this con-
straint sheds light on the product range offered by the monopolist. The simplest case
is one of decreasing returns to \( q_i \), so that \( (c_i - c_{i-1})/(q_i - q_{i-1}) \) is strictly increasing in \( i \)
for all \( i \geq 1 \). The unconstrained solutions to Equation 5 naturally satisfy \( Z^*_i < Z^*_{i-1} \) and
hence \( z_i = Z_i - Z_{i-1} > 0 \). Simply put, when there are decreasing returns to quality, the
monopolist offers the full range of potential product qualities.

In contrast, when there are increasing returns to quality provision, the monotonicity con-
straints bind. For simplicity, consider the case of \( n = 2 \). Increasing returns to quality
implies that \( c_2/q_2 < c_1/q_1 \), or equivalently \( (c_2 - c_1)/(q_2 - q_1) < c_1/q_1 \). Suppose that the
monopolist finds it optimal to offer two distinct products, so that \( Z^*_1 > Z^*_2 \). Then it must
be the case that:
\[
Z^*_1 H(Z^*_1) - Z^*_2 H(Z^*_2) \geq \frac{c_1}{q_1} (Z^*_1 - Z^*_2) > \frac{c_2 - c_1}{q_2 - q_1} (Z^*_1 - Z^*_2)
\]
The first inequality makes use of Expression 4, and says that the monopolist does not wish
to lower supplies of the baseline product to \( Z^*_2 \), which it may do without violation of the
monotonicity constraint. The second inequality follows from increasing returns to quality,
keeping in mind that \( c_0 = q_0 = 0 \). Combining, the resulting strict inequality says that the
monopolist would strictly benefit by raising the supply of the upgrade \( q_2 - q_1 \) from \( Z^*_2 \) to
\( Z^*_1 \). Thus the original supplies cannot have been optimal, and we have a contradiction.
Thus, the firm must optimally sell a single quality level.

This argument naturally extends to the case of general \( n \). In fact, if there are increasing
returns to quality everywhere, then a monopolist will wish to set \( Z^*_1 = Z^*_2 = \cdots = Z^*_n \), and
hence will offer only the highest quality product \( q_n \). We summarize our results in the
following proposition 28

**Proposition 1.** If the production technology is U-shaped (Definition 2) with minimum average
cost for product \( k \), then a monopolist offers in positive supply exactly the \( n - k + 1 \) products of
highest quality. In terms of upgrades, \( Z^*_1 = Z^*_2 = \cdots = Z^*_k > Z^*_{k+1} > \cdots > Z^*_n \).

28The proofs to this and subsequent results are given in the Appendix.
Proposition demonstrates the crucial role that the shape of average and marginal costs of quality play in a monopolist’s product selection decision. In the region where average cost is decreasing, it sells a single product. It is optimal to segment the market with multiple products exactly in the region where average cost and marginal cost are increasing.

4.2. Monopoly with General Payoffs.

Here we briefly consider more general preferences, before returning to the multiplicative specification for the remainder of the paper. With multiplicative preferences and increasing returns to quality, we have seen that price discrimination does not take place. We ask, therefore, what properties of preferences lead to price discrimination using multiple products. To answer this question, we suppose that a consumer of type $\theta$ purchasing a good of quality $q$ at price $p$ enjoys utility $u(\theta, q) - p$, where $u(\theta, q)$ is strictly increasing in its arguments, continuously differentiable, and satisfies $u(\theta, 0) = u(0, q) = 0$. Consumers purchase a single unit of the utility-maximizing product so long as this yields non-negative utility. A first property we need is for this function to satisfy the familiar sorting condition: For $q_2 > q_1$, $u(\theta, q_2) - u(\theta, q_1)$ must be increasing in $\theta$. Equivalently, the function $u(\theta, q)$ is supermodular in $\theta$ and $q$. This ensures that higher types will purchase higher qualities. Furthermore, the upgrade formulation of the inverse demand functions continues to hold. For $n = 2$:

$$p_1 = u(H(Z_1), q_1) \quad \text{and} \quad p_2 = p_1 + [u(H(Z_2), q_2) - u(H(Z_2), q_1)]$$

The sorting condition ensures that price discrimination is feasible. It does not, however, imply that such discrimination is optimal. To elicit an appropriate condition for optimality, suppose that the monopolist supplies two distinct products, so that $Z_1^* > Z_2^*$. For simplicity of exposition, we suppose that $c_1 = c_2 = 0$, so that there are increasing returns to quality. It must be the case that:

$$Z_1^* u(H(Z_1^*), q_1) \geq Z_2^* u(H(Z_2^*), q_1)$$

$$Z_1^* [u(H(Z_1^*), q_2) - u(H(Z_1^*), q_1)] \leq Z_2^* [u(H(Z_2^*), q_2) - u(H(Z_2^*), q_1)]$$

The first inequality says that the monopolist does not wish to reduce supplies of the baseline product. The second inequality says that the monopolist does not wish to expand supplies of the upgrade. Combining we obtain:

$$\frac{u(H(Z_1^*), q_2)}{u(H(Z_1^*), q_1)} \leq \frac{u(H(Z_2^*), q_2)}{u(H(Z_2^*), q_1)}$$

---

29 A differentiable function $u(\theta, q)$ is supermodular if $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial \theta \partial q} \geq 0$, and log supermodular (when positive) if $\frac{\partial^2 \log u}{\partial \theta \partial q} \geq 0$.

30 In the formal specification of our model we assume that marginal production costs are strictly positive. When marginal production costs are zero all of our monopoly results continue to hold.
Since $H(Z^*_2) > H(Z^*_1)$, this says that $u(\theta, q_2)/u(\theta, q_1)$ must be increasing in $\theta$, so that higher types prefer higher qualities proportionally more than lower types. Mathematically, the utility function $u(\theta, q)$ must be log supermodular in the $\theta$ and $q$, at least over the range of price discrimination. Of course, this means that log submodularity (which means that $u(\theta, q_2)/u(\theta, q_1)$ is decreasing in $\theta$) is sufficient to ensure that no price discrimination takes place. Incorporating costs, and allowing for $n$ products, we obtain the following.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose that a monopolist finds it optimal to offer distinct product lines. Then the surplus $u(\theta, q) - c(q)$ must be log supermodular over some range.

To apply this proposition, suppose that all qualities may be produced at an identical constant marginal cost of $c > 0$. This seems to be an appropriate specification for the case of the IBM LaserPrinter. For multiplicative utility, the surplus function satisfies $u(\theta, q) - c(q) = \theta q - c$. By inspection, $(\theta q_2 - c)/(\theta q_1 - c)$ is strictly decreasing in $\theta$, and hence the surplus is log submodular. The monopolist will offer only the higher quality product. Moving back to the general specification, $u(\theta, q)$ must be strictly supermodular to overcome this.

### 5. Duopoly

Here we consider a simple quantity-setting duopoly model. Broadly, our goal is to characterize the equilibrium product lines under a variety of conditions. We allow for both decreasing and non-monotone marginal revenue, and also consider equilibria for environments in which the entrant and incumbent have either symmetric or asymmetric technological capabilities.

Our leading results are as follows. When marginal revenue is decreasing, fighting brands never emerge as optimal weapons in response to entry. To the contrary, we show that increases in the entrant’s technological prowess tend to induce product line pruning of the lower quality products from the incumbent’s line.

However, moving away from the assumption of decreasing marginal revenue reveals that fighting brands can emerge as effective tools to maintain profitability for the incumbent. This tends to happen when the total output of the incumbent expands following entry. Moreover, the incumbent never offers goods of lower quality than the entrant. Thus, when competition does lead the incumbent to expand its product line, it chooses to maintain at least a weak quality advantage.

Our analysis is arranged as follows. First, we set up the framework for analysis and present several results that hold irrespective of the shape of marginal revenue. Next, we address the case in which marginal revenue is everywhere decreasing. Finally, we
expand our analysis to incorporate the possibility of non-monotonic marginal revenue, and consider again the bimodal type distribution described in Example 1.

5.1. Duopoly Framework and General Results.

The $n$ products are supplied by two firms. Our interpretation is that one is the incumbent and the other an entrant. They supply $x_i$ and $y_i$ units of good $i$ respectively, yielding a total supply of $x_i + y_i$. The two firms simultaneously choose quantities. The incumbent is able to produce the entire range of qualities. The entrant, however, is limited to products of quality $q_m$ and below for some $m \leq n$, and so $y_i = 0$ for $i$ satisfying $m < i \leq n$.[31] As in Section 3, we define the upgrade quantities as follows:

$$X_i = \sum_{j=i}^{n} x_j, \quad Y_i = \sum_{j=i}^{m} y_j$$

where of course $Y_i = 0$ for $i > m$. The upgrade supplies satisfy $X_i \leq X_{i-1}$ and $Y_i \leq Y_{i-1}$. Employing Equation 3, these yield profits for the incumbent and entrant of:

$$\pi_I = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (q_i - q_{i-1}) X_i \left( H(X_i + Y_i) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right)$$

$$\pi_E = \sum_{i=1}^{m} (q_i - q_{i-1}) Y_i \left( H(X_i + Y_i) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right)$$

As in the monopoly case, these are convenient forms. The $i$th term of each objective function depends only on $X_i$ and $Y_i$. Each firm chooses its supplies to maximize its objective function, subject to the monotonicity constraints on $\{X_i\}$ and $\{Y_i\}$. We seek pure strategy Nash equilibria in these quantities and use $\{X_i^*\}$ and $\{Y_i^*\}$ to denote the equilibrium supplies. Notice that absent the monotonicity constraints we would be able to seek separate Cournot equilibria in the supply of each upgrade. The monotonicity constraints have to be satisfied, however, and they allow us to ascertain the relationships between the product lines of the two firms.

Since the incumbent is active in all the upgrade markets while the entrant may not be, we might expect that the total production of the incumbent exceeds that of the entrant at and above any quality level. This is indeed the case.

We only consider pure strategy Nash equilibria throughout our entire paper.

**Proposition 3.** Any (pure strategy) equilibrium entails $X_i^* \geq Y_i^*$ for each $i$. If $m = n$ then $X_i^* = Y_i^*$ for each $i$.

[31] We could allow for a more general specification of technological capabilities, so that, for example, the entrant is able to produce some goods that the incumbent cannot. With some straightforward modifications, the bulk of our results continue to hold, in particular those regarding product line pruning and fighting brands.
Note that the incumbent need not produce more of any single quality level. Rather, the total supply at and above any particular quality level is greater for the incumbent. Furthermore, in the absence of any strict quality advantage any (pure strategy) equilibrium must be symmetric. We can push this analysis slightly further using the techniques of Proposition 3 to obtain the following.

**Proposition 4.** A product \( i \leq m \) is supplied by the incumbent only if it is supplied by the entrant.

This says that the incumbent will not be active in any market that the entrant is not active in, save potentially for those that the entrant is not technologically capable of serving. One implication of this is that the incumbent will never choose to offer products that are of quality inferior to that of the entrant’s lowest quality product.

The results so far are useful, but do not succeed in characterizing the precise nature of the equilibrium product lines. To proceed further, we consider separately the cases of decreasing (Section 5.2) and non-monotonic marginal revenue (Section 5.3).

### 5.2. Decreasing Marginal Revenue and Product Line Pruning.

When marginal revenue is decreasing and returns to quality are increasing, a monopolist supplies only the highest feasible quality (Proposition 4). The entry of a competitor does not alter this.

**Proposition 5.** With increasing returns to quality and decreasing marginal revenue (Definitions 1–2), both firms offer a single, highest available quality product. In terms of the upgrade supplies:

\[
X_1^* = \cdots = X_n^* = X^* \quad \text{and} \quad Y_1^* = \cdots = Y_m^* = Y^*.
\]

Proposition 5 says that the incumbent offers only product \( n \) and the entrant offers only product \( m \). If \( m = n \), we have a pair of symmetric duopolists selling a single product. In contrast, if \( m < n \), the incumbent has a technological advantage. The profit equations reduce to:

\[
\pi_I = X \left( q_mH(X + Y) - c_m \right) + X \left( (q_n - q_m)H(X) - (c_n - c_m) \right)
\]

\[
\pi_E = Y \left( q_mH(X + Y) - c_m \right)
\]

Heuristically, the incumbent has stronger incentives to produce because it is selling a higher quality product that is produced at lower average cost. The equilibrium therefore should exhibit \( X^* > Y^* \).

**Proposition 6.** Suppose marginal revenue is decreasing and there are increasing returns to quality. If \( m = n \), the firms operate as symmetric duopolists. If \( m < n \), the output level of the incumbent exceeds that of the entrant, so that \( X^* > Y^* \). In this case, \( X^* \) is increasing in \( q_n \) and decreasing in \( q_m \), whereas \( Y^* \) is decreasing in \( q_n \) and increasing in \( q_m \). There is a unique and symmetric pure strategy equilibrium to this game.
Proposition 5 implies that when marginal revenue is decreasing and returns to quality are increasing, the emergence of competition cannot provide an explanation for the introduction of an additional product. The reason is that we know from Proposition 1 that a monopolist facing increasing returns to quality also would sell a single product of quality $q_n$. The optimal strategy for the incumbent is to accept the decline in prices and continue selling only the high quality good. We might suspect that, had the monopolist been selling multiple products, entry would induce the incumbent to remove certain products in an attempt to maintain margins on the higher quality goods.

To see that pruning can occur in this case, suppose that the average cost of quality is U-shaped (Definition 2). We know from Proposition 1 that the monopolist would offer distinct products in the range where average cost is increasing. If entry occurs in this case, the incumbent will tend to (weakly) reduce the number of products offered. The following Lemma is a first step in proving this.

**Lemma 1.** If the production technology is U-shaped (Definition 2) with minimum average cost for product $k$, then the incumbent produces no more distinct goods than it did as a monopolist. Each firm offers no more than $n - k + 1$ products, and if it sells $h$ products, they are the $h$ highest quality that it can produce.

There are no fighting brands, even with a general U-shaped cost structure. This result places an upper bound on how many products an incumbent will offer. It is possible to say more, however, and characterize precisely the product lines of firms in equilibrium, at least when the entrant is constrained to offer products of relatively low quality (i.e. products in the range where the average cost of quality is decreasing). As will be shown, it is sufficient to determine the lowest quality product offered by the incumbent. This is straightforward since, in equilibrium, it is as if the incumbent were competing with a single product against the entrant’s single product and also selling certain upgrades in independent markets. Conceptually, the only question is which product the incumbent wields against the entrant.

Suppose that the incumbent’s lowest quality product is $r$ in equilibrium. From Lemma 1, we know that $r \geq k$. To satisfy the appropriate monotonicity constraint, it must be the case that the monopoly supply of such upgrades is below the incumbent’s duopoly supply of product $r$. Define $X^\dagger_{rm}$ and $Y^\dagger_{rm}$ to be the equilibrium outputs of the incumbent and entrant when they are forced to offer single products of quality $q_r$ and $q_m$ respectively. The objective functions for this restricted game are given by Equations 6 and 7, changing the $n$ to $r$ for the incumbent. Given that marginal revenue is decreasing, it turns out that there is a unique equilibrium to such a game (Vives 1999, p. 47). Now, we can also consider the unrestricted monopoly supplies of upgrade products $Z^\dagger_i$, for $i \geq k$. Increasing marginal costs of quality for $i > k$ ensure that this sequence is decreasing, and
satisfies $Z_i^+ = Z_i^*$, where $Z_i^*$ is the output of upgrade $i$ that a monopolist would choose, for $i > k$ (from the proof of Proposition 1). The following lemma indicates that the sequences $\{Z_i^+\}_{r=k}^n$ and $\{X_{rm}^+\}_{r=k}^n$ satisfy a single crossing property.

**Lemma 2.** Fixing $m$, define the set $R = \{r : Z_i^+ \geq X_{rm}^+ > Z_{r+1}^+, r \geq k\}$. If there is no such value then define $R = \{n\}$. The set $R$ contains a single element $\tau$ for each $m$.

We will now show that there is a real sense in which $\tau$ determines the state of competition in the industry. In equilibrium, $\tau$ is the only product of the incumbent that is in direct competition with the entrant, and beyond this quality level the incumbent exercises unrestricted monopoly power over upgrades to quality.

**Proposition 7.** Suppose that the production technology is U-shaped (Definition 2) with minimum average cost for product $k$, and that marginal revenue is decreasing. Also suppose that the entrant’s maximal quality is $m \leq k$. In equilibrium the incumbent produces distinct products $\tau, \tau + 1, \ldots, n$, while the entrant produces only product $m$. Furthermore, $X_{\tau m}^+ = X_1^+ = \cdots = X_{\tau}^+$, and for $i > \tau$, the incumbent produces the same quantity of upgrades as if she were a monopolist, so that $X_i^+ = Z_i^* = Z_i^+$. Finally, the output of the entrant is $Y_{\tau m}^+$.

When unrestricted duopoly levels of low quality upgrades fall beneath monopoly levels of higher quality upgrades, the equilibrium reaction is for the incumbent to remove its lower quality goods from the market. The equilibrium in the industry can therefore be determined by identifying the product $\tau$ such that, if the incumbent wields only this product against the entrant, the resulting duopoly supply for the incumbent is just large enough for the monopoly supply of upgrade $\tau + 1$ to be strictly feasible.

Even though the incumbent is a monopolist in all markets for quality upgrades greater than $q_m$ (the entrant’s highest quality), the monotonicity constraint on upgrade outputs must still be obeyed. Hence, in equilibrium, the market power of the incumbent is potentially more restricted. In particular, it is restricted to upgrades to quality levels greater than that of product $\tau$.

This result also suggests that entrants who are able to produce goods of higher quality will capture more of the market for low quality goods, forcing the incumbent out of those markets. As we now show, this is indeed the case. So long as the incumbent is constrained to offer goods of quality less than $q_m$, increases in the quality of the incumbent’s product tend to lead to the further elimination of lower quality products by the incumbent.

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32 Notice that the incumbent faces competition in the supply of the high quality product itself. It is only the upgrade component of this product corresponding to increased quality over which it holds market power.
Proposition 8. When marginal revenue is decreasing, the equilibrium number of products offered by the incumbent is decreasing in \( m \), so long as \( m \leq k \). More precisely, \( \bar{r} \) is a (weakly) increasing function of \( m \) in the region \( m \leq k \).

When \( m \leq k \) the entrant will offer only a single product. In equilibrium, it is as if the incumbent were competing only with a single product itself. This result says that the incumbent finds it optimal to use a higher quality product in response to a higher quality entrant.

Note that in the region \( m > k \) the logic of Proposition 8 does not hold. There are two reasons. First, even if the entrant continued to sell but a single good, the effective marginal cost of that product would be increasing with \( m > k \). This would tend to lower the entrant’s output and raise the incumbent’s, which might well lead to the re-introduction of a previously removed brand (the highest quality product would be brought back first). Second, the entrant itself will likely not choose to offer only a single product. Increasing average cost means that choosing to sell a second product, for example, raises the cost of that good and therefore further lowers the entrant’s output.

Thus, while entry itself cannot lead the incumbent to expand its product line under the assumption of decreasing marginal revenue, pronounced increases in the entrant’s technological possibilities can have this effect. In particular, only when the maximal quality of the entrant passes the threshold \( k \) where average cost begins increasing can the incumbent possibly introduce new products. However, these are always goods that were sold as a monopolist.

In contrast, when marginal revenue is non-monotonic, the incumbent might choose to sell products in the face of competition that it would not sell as a monopolist. We now examine this case.

5.3. Non-Monotonic Marginal Revenue and Fighting Brands.

In Section 3, we argued that the presence of multiple sources of demand might generate a multi-modal distribution for \( \theta \) and non-monotonic marginal revenue. This leads to the possibility that the incumbent may find it optimal to increase its own output for a sufficiently large incursion by the entrant.

We illustrate this by considering the Cournot reaction functions for a single product of quality \( q = 1 \) and marginal cost \( c = 0 \) generated by Example 1 (see Figure 2(a)). As a monopolist, a firm restricts output to serve only the upper market segment, centered at \( \theta_H \). That is, the monopoly output is \( Z^* = 0.377 \), and we can see from Figure 1(b) that this corresponds to serving only the higher segment of the underlying distribution of consumers. A small incursion by a competitor results in a contraction of output in the standard way.
These are reaction functions for the a Cournot duopoly selling a single good manufactured at zero marginal cost. Both configurations involve $\theta_L = 1$. The demand specification is taken from Example 1, and for Figure 2(a) is identical to that used in Figures 1(a) and 1(b).

- The reaction function is initially decreasing. If the incursion is sufficiently large, however, then the incumbent will wish to expand output and serve the lower market segment (the one around $\theta_L$). This results in a single jump upward in the reaction function, which decreases smoothly again thereafter. Inspecting Figure 2(a), notice that the symmetric duopoly quantity satisfies $X^* = Y^* = 0.437$. In other words, the incursion of a competitor prompts the incumbent to expand its supply beyond the monopoly quantity.

The simple observation allows us to offer a novel explanation for the introduction of fighting brands. Suppose that the incumbent holds a strict quality advantage over the entrant, so that $n > m$, and that as a monopolist she would only sell quality $q_n$. The incumbent retains monopoly power over the upgrade from $q_m$ to $q_n$ and the (unconstrained) monopoly supply of this upgrade is, of course, unaffected by the competitor’s presence. If this monopoly supply lies below the duopoly supply of the product of quality $q_m$, then we have $X^*_m > X^*_n$ in equilibrium— the incumbent will offer an incomplete supply of this upgrade. That is, a fighting brand of lower quality will emerge.

In other words, when marginal revenue is non-monotonic, the competitor’s presence may force an expansion of the incumbent’s supply of qualities up to $q_m$. However, this pressure to expand output is not operative on upgrades to higher quality levels and hence the
incumbent finds it optimal to increase its total output (across all goods) while still utilizing its market power for high quality by restricting its supply. This manifests itself a fighting brand whereby the incumbent can compete for new customers (whom he would not have served as a monopolist) while protecting the markup on its high quality products.

More formally, we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 9.** Consider the restricted duopoly game in which each firm can offer only up to quality level \( q_m \), for some \( m < n \). Fix an equilibrium of this game, with quantities for upgrade \( m \) of \( X_m^* = Y_m^* \). Suppose that:

\[
X_m^* > \max_{m<i\leq n} \left\{ \arg \max_X \left[ X \left( H(X) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right) \right] \right\}
\]

Then there is an equilibrium when \( n > m \) in which the incumbent offers multiple products. In particular, the incumbent sells product \( m \), so that \( X_{m+1}^* < X_m^* \).

To understand how this proposition relates to fighting brands, suppose that in the absence of competition the incumbent would not sell product \( m \). We know from Proposition 1, for example, that this would be the case if the average cost of quality were decreasing for product \( m \), as in Definition 2. When the hypotheses of Proposition 9 are satisfied, however, product \( m \) emerges as a fighting brand 33.

An alternative viewpoint is as follows. We might consider expanding our model to allow for the possibility that a firm could innovate, allowing it to produce goods of higher qualities. We might ask whether the innovating firm would continue to sell its old product. To address this possibility, suppose that each firm is initially able to offer only quality levels at or below \( q_m \)—that is, even the incumbent cannot produce the highest quality products. Proposition 6 ensures that any pure strategy equilibrium is symmetric, and hence \( X_m^* = Y_m^* \). Imagine now that the incumbent firm benefits from a successful product innovation, which permits it to offer all products up to quality \( q_n \). If the condition of Proposition 9 is satisfied, then the unconstrained supplies of upgrades \( m+1, \ldots, n \) lie below \( X_m^* \). In this case, the incumbent will sell not only products that it has newly developed, but also its older, lower quality products.

We now present two concrete examples of fighting brands. In both cases, the intuition that we wish to convey is as described above: when entry leads an incumbent to expand total output, it may be optimal to introduce a new product of lower quality than the existing products.

First assume that the incumbent has two products, both of which can be produced at zero cost, with qualities \( q_1 = 1 \) and \( q_2 = 2 \). The reaction functions in Figure 2(a) immediately

33In fact, it is possible that other products of qualities exceeding \( q_m \) also emerge as fighting brands.
reveal the possibility of a fighting brand. To see this, note that unconstrained monopoly supply of each upgrade is given by the best response of the incumbent to a zero supply by the entrant, and is equal to 0.377 for each upgrade. Hence, a monopolist would set $Z_1^* = Z_2^* = 0.377$, in effect selling only the high quality good.

Now suppose that entry occurs by an entrant only capable of producing good 1. Figure 2(a) reveals that, if each firm were to only sell product 1, there would be an equilibrium in which each firm produces 0.437. Since $Z_2^* < 0.437$, we can apply Proposition 9 and say that there is an equilibrium in which the incumbent responds to entry by raising its output of upgrade 1, resulting in an increase in total output. In particular, the output of product 2 remains constant, but the incumbent raises its output of product one from zero to $0.06 = 0.437 - 0.377$.

Our second example is given by a discrete version of the bimodal Example 1, which corresponds to letting the standard deviations of the two normal distributions fall to zero, so that $\sigma_H = \sigma_L = 0$.

**Example 2.** There is a mass $\alpha$ of types $\theta_H$ and a mass $1 - \alpha$ of types $\theta_L$, with $\theta_H > \theta_L$. Two qualities $q_2 > q_1$ are both produced at zero cost.

Proposition 1 is valid in this discrete model, as inspection of its proof reveals. Since the production cost for both quality levels is zero, there are increasing returns to quality and so a monopolist will wish to offer only the high quality product. It is optimal to restrict supply and sell only to the high types when $\alpha > \theta_L/\theta_H$.

Consider next a pair of duopolists each offering a single product $q_1$. In a symmetric equilibrium, they serve either the entire market at a price of $\theta_L q_1$ or restrict to the fraction $\alpha$ of high types at a price $\theta_H q_1$. When $\alpha < 1/2$, there is a symmetric equilibrium in which the entire market is served. The reason is that, if one firm is selling 0.5 units, the other firm cannot raise the price even it were to drop its output to zero. Hence it would be best off also selling 0.5 units.

Therefore, when $\theta_L/\theta_H < \alpha < 1/2$ is satisfied, we can find an equilibrium in which the incumbent releases a fighting brand. In particular, entry leads the incumbent to expand its output of upgrade $X_1$ from $\alpha$ to 0.5, while keeping its output of upgrade $X_2$ constant.

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34 We defined increasing returns to quality as decreasing $c_i/q_i$, which clearly is constant if $c_i = 0$ for all $i$. However, inspecting the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that in fact a monopolist would also sell only the highest quality good when all costs are zero.

35 There are multiple equilibria as a result of the discrete types. We focus on the symmetric one, since in the continuous type version of this example, equilibrium outputs would be symmetric. We are also ignoring equilibria in which there is strictly excess supply, even though zero marginal costs imply that equilibria in which each firm is flooding the market with its own output may exist (albeit in weakly dominated strategies).
at $\alpha$. As a result, the incumbent introduces the low quality product as a fighting brand, in supply $0.5 - \alpha$.

Proposition 9 assumes that the incumbent has a quality advantage of the entrant. In fact, fighting brands may arise when the incumbent and entrant have identical technological capabilities. When marginal revenue is non-monotonic, a Cournot quantity-setting game may well have multiple equilibria. It is possible, therefore, for two firms to coordinate on one equilibrium in the market for a baseline product and a second equilibrium in the market for an upgrade. This idea is illustrated in Figure 2(b). When costs are zero, the payoff functions in the baseline and upgrade market for two quality levels are proportional to each other. Hence it is possible for the duopolists to play the low output equilibrium in the upgrade market and the high output equilibrium in the baseline market.

6. Discussion

We have pointed to price discrimination based reasons for a firm to expand or contract its product line in the face of entry. Thus we find novel theoretical support for both the use of fighting brands and the practice of pruning product lines in order to focus on quality, two commonly observed strategies. Moreover, we have shown how the shape of marginal revenue plays a critical role.

We now turn to a number of empirical examples that help to illustrate our ideas.


The Intel 80486SX microprocessor and the IBM LaserPrinter 4019E are examples of fighting brands in the computer hardware industry. Both of these examples feature prominently in the work of Deneckere and McAfee (1996b), and some of their analysis fits within our framework. They analyze the phenomenon of damaged goods where a firm intentionally (and perhaps at some cost) damages a high quality good, hence enabling price discrimination. They offer two models. The first employs multiple type dimensions, and generates relatively weak conditions for the damaged goods phenomenon. The second considers a single type dimension, and the authors show that a condition that is equivalent to log supermodularity of preferences is needed to generate the equilibrium damaging of goods. They comment on the strict nature of their condition.

36There is a growing empirical marketing literature on product line and brand name decisions of firms. For example, Putsis Sr and Bayus (2001) investigate product line expansions and contractions in the personal computer industry in the years 1981–1992. They jointly considers the empirical determinants both of the decision to change a product line, and the magnitudes of such changes. Among other results, they find that a firm is more likely to prune its product line when the number of new products in the industry is higher.
Reviewing the examples in more detail is worthwhile. In early 1991 Intel released the 80486SX microprocessor. This chip was a modified version of the earlier 80486, subsequently renamed 80486DX. The sole difference was the omission of an internal floating point mathematics co-processor, yielding an initial pricing point of $258 relative to the 486DX price of $588. Interestingly, the industry literature recognized that the 486SX was a damaged version of the 486DX:

“In a move aimed at replacing the 386DX as the midrange processor of choice, Intel has launched the 486SX … the 486SX is simply a 486 without the floating-point unit. In fact, the initial silicon includes the FPU, but it has been disabled.” (Slater 1991)

Interestingly, the release of the 486SX followed the entry of Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) into the 386DX market (Pastore 1991). The 486SX was therefore a fighting brand. Slater (1991) agreed, predicting that “AMD … may be forced to lower 386DX prices significantly to maintain momentum in that market.” It would appear that the presence of competition may have influenced Intel’s decision to expand its product line.

The release of the IBM LaserPrinter 4019E provides a similar example. As mentioned in Section 1, this device was a slower version of the IBM 4019 (5ppm versus 10ppm). The only reason it was slower was that the controller card made it so. Deneckere and McAfee (1996a) describe the effect of its introduction:

“The effect of the introduction of the LaserPrinter E was severe price competition in the low end of the laser printer market, which in turn eroded the profits on the high end of the market dominated by the IBM LaserPrinter, because the low end became more attractive to consumers.”

The relationship of product damaging (interpreted here as a fighting brand) to the presence of competition was recognized by Deneckere and McAfee (1996b). They view this as a puzzle, noting that:

“At least two of the damaged goods, the Intel 486SX and the IBM LaserPrinter E, appear to have been introduced in response to competition by another producer. This is difficult to explain, particularly in the LaserPrinter case.”

In both of these cases, entry by a lower quality entrant induced the introduction (by the incumbent) of a new product that was inferior to the incumbent’s but (at least weakly)

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37 The 80386DX/SX series was an earlier generation of x86 architecture microprocessors that omitted the internal cache feature of the 486 series. AMD previously manufactured 386 generation processors under licence. Following lengthy litigation they were able to continue to produce the design independently. See, for instance, Lavin (1991).
superior to the entrant’s. This exactly reflects our results in Section 5. We arrive at the following explanation for, say, the IBM case. Initially, IBM was content to serve only high-value business customers with the LaserPrinter. The entry of the HP LaserJet IIP forced it to serve home and low value business users. Nevertheless, it retained monopoly power on a quality increase from 5ppm to 10ppm, and wished to deliver this quality premium only to high value customers. Hence it introduced the crimped LaserPrinter E to execute this strategy.

6.2. Airlines.

The airline market has long been of interest to industrial economists. Furthermore, air travel is often used as a canonical example of second-degree price discrimination. The UK carrier British Airways (BA) provides examples of expansion and contraction in its product line. BA’s previous CEO Robert Ayling engaged in an explicit strategy of reducing the economy class capacity on long-haul routes, and expanding the business class and first class provision. In other words, BA chose to focus on quality:

“Now the focus has moved to presenting products that Mr Ayling hopes will attract higher numbers of premium customers, the executives and travellers willing to pay higher prices for premium services and facilities. If the plan works there will be little space left for the passengers wanting to travel on deeply discounted economy class tickets.”

Interestingly, however, BA adopted a different strategy in the European short-haul market, including the market for UK domestic flights. It introduced a fighting brand: the “no frills” subsidiary Go.

A possible explanation for this stems from March 1995 with the incorporation of the easyJet airline by Stelios Haji-Ioannou, the son of a Greek shipping magnate. easyJet operates from airports in the United Kingdom on a no frills basis, similar to that of Southwest Airlines in the United States. In common with other operators of this kind, it offers a ticketless service devoid of in-flight meals and other non-essential features.

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40 This behavior has also been seen in other markets. Haugh and Hazledine (1999) describe events in the Trans-Tasman air travel market. Following the entry of a former charter airline Kiwi International, Air New Zealand launched a no frills subsidiary Freedom Air as a fighting brand in this market.

41 The no frills market has also seen the success of Ryanair. These carriers tend to use secondary airports, such as Luton and Stansted for London flights, rather than the mainstream Heathrow and Gatwick. Arguably, the better connection opportunities at these latter airports are the main component of increased quality for full service carriers.
Following the establishment of easyJet, BA entered the same market through its subsidiary airline Go. Media reports at the time suggested that BA had predatory intentions. Was the entry of Go a predatory move by British Airways? If so, it has failed, as easyJet has continued to expand in the no frills market. Our analysis offers an alternative explanation for this event. It is possible that BA was initially reluctant to enter this market segment, due to the anticipated negative effect on its core operations. However, following the creation of easyJet, this segment was opened up and BA thus found it profitable to enter.

Our explanation for the expansion of product lines using fighting brands may find some support in the empirical literature. Borenstein and Rose (1993) find that routes with increased price dispersion are associated with lower competition. They argue that their empirical findings are consistent with a variant of the Borenstein (1985) model of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets. That model incorporated horizontal as well as vertical differentiation. Stavins (1996) is careful to distinguish between price dispersion and discrimination, and accounts for the varying quality of tickets, using ticket restrictions such as advance purchase requirements. She confirms, however, that dispersion (or discrimination in her work) is higher in more competitive markets. We note that our model is also consistent with this data. When separate market segments are distinguishable, and hence marginal revenue is non-monotonic, the presence of an entrant may result in the release of a fighting brand, and hence increased discrimination.

6.3. The Market for Watches.

In 1998 Timex and Titan ended a joint venture in the Indian market for wristwatches. The original purpose of the joint venture was to capture economies of scale in retail and distribution, also to split the market for watches. Titan was to serve the high end of the market, and Timex the low end.

Timex and Titan together were able to dominate much of the market in India. However, the alliance proved unstable in part because each felt the other was cannibalizing sales by offering products not in line with the original demarcation of the market. With the termination of the joint venture, each firm moved aggressively. Timex launched the high

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44 In a similar vein Gale and Holmes (1993) offer a model of advance-purchase discounts, where consumers are horizontally differentiated according to their preferred departure time.
46 “The joint venture did extremely well, leveraging the strengths of both partners. While Titan chalked up a market share of 60 per cent in the premium segment, Timex literally monopolised the low-end of the market,” *The Economic Times*, June 28, 2000.
end Vista brand, while Titan introduced the Sonata brand in the under Rs 1000 price range.

The Sonata was immensely successful, quickly becoming the second best-selling watch brand in India, following the parent brand Titan. But, in 2001, Timex announced that it would exit the low end watch market in India by phasing out most of its under Rs 1000 watches. Its new strategy would be to focus on becoming a trendier “sports and technology brand,” targeting its watches at the Rs 1000-5000 range.

Since both Timex and Titan are capable of producing watches across a very broad quality range, it might seem that the exit of Timex from the low end market is inconsistent with Proposition 3, which states that firms with identical technologies should offer products in the same range. Even if we imagine that Titan has an advantage in the high end, our Proposition 4 seemingly implies that Titan should not sell products of lower quality than Timex. However, in this situation it seems likely that, in fact, Titan was at a variable cost advantage in the low end segment. The reasons are as follows. Under the terms of the original joint venture, Titan (which is based in India) was in charge of all distribution for both Timex and Titan watches. Following the termination of the relationship, Timex had to establish its own channels. It initially fought to maintain its position in the low end market, but this was complicated by the fact that the low end market is concentrated in many smaller urban and rural areas, which might have made it more costly for Timex to distribute there compared to Titan, which already had an established network.

The possibility that Titan has an edge in distribution is attested to by Titan vice chairman and managing director Xerxes Desai, who says that “a strong grip on distribution” has contributed to the success of Titan. If true, this potentially reconciles the asymmetric product offerings of Timex and Titan, since in the market for basic low end watches Titan would produce more baseline upgrades in equilibrium than Timex. Hence, it could well be the case that Timex would prune its product line following the entry of Titan in that segment, and that Titan would maintain a presence there following the end of the joint venture and exit of Timex from the segment.


Fighting brands and product line pruning are pervasive and widespread as responses to intensified competition. We have proposed an integrated model of multiproduct quality competition, analysis of which potentially explains both of these phenomena. In particular, we considered the product line response of an incumbent to entry by another multiproduct firm.

The equilibrium product lines of firms were derived under a variety of conditions. Our analysis shows that whether a firm will choose to expand or contract its product line depends on whether marginal revenue is everywhere decreasing or not.

When marginal revenue is everywhere decreasing, entry induces a restriction in the output of the incumbent’s low quality products. This reaction is magnified by the fact that it is total industry production in the lower markets that reduces prices in the higher markets. Thus, entry can lead naturally to the incumbent’s exit from the lower markets, thereby pruning its line of products. In this case, there is a real sense in which the incumbent uses but a single product to compete against the entrant, while enjoying unrestricted monopoly power in the markets for upgrades to higher quality. Identifying which product the incumbent will use against the entrant in equilibrium essentially determines the entire equilibrium structure of the industry.

When marginal revenue is increasing in some regions, it may be optimal for the incumbent to expand output in response to entry. If this is the case, the incumbent may decide to expand into the lower market by using a low quality fighting brand, thereby allowing the firm to be competitive in the lower market while preserving margins on the high quality good. This is possible when the incumbent maintains a technological advantage over the entrant, since it therefore continues to hold market power over higher quality upgrades. We showed that if the incumbent does offer new products it will never operate at quality levels inferior to those of the entrant. We also argued in Section 3 that demand structures exhibiting increasing marginal revenue in some regions are not pathological. In particular, simple bimodal consumer type distributions naturally can generate non-monotonicity in marginal revenue.

From a technical standpoint, a general “upgrades” approach has been presented that yields a powerful analytical framework. We also provided a new condition on costs and preferences that determines when a monopolist would choose to pursue market segmentation opportunities.

Finally, while we have performed no substantive empirical analysis, we have presented examples from numerous industries that seem to resonate well with our theory. Our theory of fighting brands and product line pruning provides one explanation for the observed product line expansions and contractions in these industries.

**APPENDIX A. OMITTED PROOFS**

*Proof of Proposition 1.* Suppose that the lowest quality product \( i \) supplied by the monopolist satisfies \( i < k \). It must be the case that \( Z_1^* = Z_2^* = \cdots = Z_i^* > Z_{i+1}^* \). Product \( i \) is
therefore the “baseline” product. Following the argument given in the text:

\[ Z_i^* H(Z_i^*) - Z_{i+1}^* H(Z_{i+1}^*) \leq \frac{c_i}{q_i} (Z_i^* - Z_{i+1}^*) > \frac{c_{i+1} - c_i}{q_{i+1} - q_i} (Z_i^* - Z_{i+1}^*) \]

The first inequality says that the monopolist does not wish to lower supplies of the baseline product to \( Z_{i+1}^* \). The second inequality follows from the fact that \( i < k \). But this means that it would be better to raise the supply of the upgrade \( i+1 \) to \( Z_i^* \), and hence the original configuration was not optimal. We conclude that \( Z_i^* = Z_{i+1}^* = \cdots = Z_k^* \). Consider the monopolist’s problem with the relaxed constraint that \( Z_i^* = Z_2^* = \cdots = Z_n^* \). Increasing average and marginal costs imply that the quality-normalized costs (i.e. \( (c_{i+1} - c_i)/(q_{i+1} - q_i) \)) are increasing for \( i \geq k \). Hence, ignoring the monotonicity condition we immediately see that \( Z_k^* > Z_{k+1}^* > \cdots > Z_n^* \). Since this relaxed solution satisfies the monotonicity constraint, it solves the maximization problem. 

Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose that the monopolist offers distinct product lines and that product \( i \) is the lowest quality product offered, so that \( Z_1^* = Z_2^* = \cdots = Z_i^* > Z_{i+1}^* \). As in the proof of Proposition 1, product \( i \) is effectively the baseline product, and hence we may relabel it as \( i = 1 \). The argument given in the text, upon the inclusion of costs, yields the required proof. See Appendix B for a complete proof. 

Proof of Proposition 3 If \( n > m \) then this lemma is true by assumption for all \( i > m \). For \( i \leq m \) such that \( X_i^* = X_{i+1}^* \) and \( Y_i^* = Y_{i+1}^* \), amalgamate neighboring products by viewing upgrades \( i \) and \( i+1 \) as a combined upgrade. Following this, suppose that the Lemma does not hold for some \( i < m \). Take the lowest such \( i \), so that \( Y_i^* > X_i^* \). Either \( i = 1 \), or \( i > 1 \) and \( X_{i-1}^* \geq Y_{i-1}^* \geq Y_i^* > X_i^* \). In either case, the upward monotonicity constraint on the incumbent is not locally binding. The incumbent cannot have a strict incentive to locally raise \( X_i \), and thus has a weak incentive to lower it. This implies that the entrant must have a strict incentive to lower \( Y_i \):

\[ H(X_i^* + Y_i^*) + Y_i^* H'(X_i^* + Y_i^*) < H(X_i^* + Y_i^*) + X_i^* H'(X_i^* + Y_i^*) \leq \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \]

The first inequality follows from \( Y_i^* > X_i^* \) and \( H'(X_i^* + Y_i^*) < 0 \), and the second from the weak incentive for the incumbent to lower \( X_i \). Since there is an incentive for the entrant to lower \( Y_i \), the monotonicity constraint must bind and hence \( Y_i^* = Y_{i+1}^* > X_{i+1}^* \). We have amalgamated all identically supplied neighboring products and therefore we know that \( X_i^* > X_{i+1}^* \). Turning to product \( i+1 \), the upward monotonicity constraint on the incumbent is not locally binding, and we may repeat our argument until we conclude that the entrant has a strict incentive to lower \( Y_m \). But there is no constraint on downward movement of \( Y_m \), and thus we have a contradiction. 

Proof of Proposition 4 Use an identical approach to Proposition 3 — see Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 5. Use an identical approach to Proposition 1—see Appendix B. □

Proof of Proposition 6. When \( m = n \) the result is obvious. For \( m < n \), and when both marginal revenue and returns to quality are decreasing, the reaction functions are continuously decreasing with absolute slope of less than 1. Under these standard conditions the incumbent’s reaction function intersects the entrant’s from above and there is a unique equilibrium (Vives 1999, p. 47). The incumbent’s reaction function is an outward shift of the inverse of the entrant’s reaction function. This ensures that \( X^* > Y^* \). Finally, note that an increase in \( q_n \) pushes the incumbent’s reaction function outward. To see this, note that we may replace \( \pi_I \) from Equation 6 by \( \tilde{\pi}_I \) where:

\[
\tilde{\pi}_I = X \left[ \left( 1 - \frac{q_m}{q_n} \right) H(X) + \frac{q_m}{q_n} H(X + Y) - \frac{c_n}{q_n} \right]
\]

Hence a marginal expansion in quantity yields:

\[
\frac{\partial \tilde{\pi}_I}{\partial X} = \left( 1 - \frac{q_m}{q_n} \right) (H(X) + XH'(X)) + \frac{q_m}{q_n} (H(X + Y) + XH'(X + Y)) - \frac{c_n}{q_n}
\]

This is increasing in \( q_n \) (due to decreasing marginal revenue and returns to quality), pushing the incumbent’s reaction function outwards. Similar operations using \( q_m \) yield the desired results. □

Proof of Lemma 1. The logic of Proposition 5 reveals immediately that \( X^*_1 = X^*_2 = \cdots = X^*_k \) and that for \( r = \min[m, k] \), the entrant’s output profile satisfies \( Y^*_1 = \cdots = Y^*_r \). The result follows. □

Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not, so that both \( s > r \) are members of the set \( R \). It follows that \( X^*_{rm} > Z^*_{r+1} = X^*_1 \), so that \( X^*_{rm} > X^*_1 \). In other words, an increase in the incumbent’s quality level results in a drop in its output. Write \( \pi_{Ir}(X, Y) \) for the incumbent’s profit with quality \( r \), and similarly for quality \( s \). Observe that:

\[
\frac{\partial \pi_{Is}(X_{sm}, Y_{sm})}{\partial X} = \frac{\partial \pi_{Ir}(X_{sm}, Y_{sm})}{\partial X} + (q_s - q_r) \left[ H(X_{sm}) - \frac{c_s - c_r}{q_s - q_r} + X_{sm} H'(X_{sm}) \right]
\]

\[
\geq \frac{\partial \pi_{Ir}(X_{sm}, Y_{sm})}{\partial X} + (q_s - q_r) \left[ H(X_{sm}) - \frac{c_s - c_{s-1}}{q_s - q_{s-1}} + X_{sm} H'(X_{sm}) \right]
\]

The first inequality follows from the assumption that marginal cost is increasing beyond \( k \). The second follows from the fact that \( Z^*_{r+1} \geq X^*_{1m} \), and hence \( X^*_{1m} \) is below the profit-maximizing supply of upgrade \( s \). This means that the reaction function with quality \( q_r \) must lie weakly below that for quality \( q_s \), evaluated at \( X^*_{sm} \). But this of course means that the equilibrium incumbent supply of quality \( q_2 \) must satisfy \( X^*_{rm} \leq X^*_{sm} \), and we have reached a contradiction. □
Proof of Proposition 7. By assumption \( m \leq k \), and hence \( Y_1^* = \cdots = Y_m^* \) and \( X_1^* = \cdots = X_k^* \) from Lemma 1. Suppose that for \( r \geq k \) we have \( X_r^* > X_{r+1}^* \). A local increase in \( X_{r+1} \) must (weakly) lower profits on upgrade \( r+1 \). The upgrade profit functions are concave, and hence \( X_r^* \geq Z_{r+1}^* \) where \( Z_{r+1}^* \) is the unrestricted monopoly supply of this upgrade. Of course, if this inequality holds then it must be optimal to set \( X_i^* = Z_{r+1}^* \) for all \( i > r \). Hence \( r \) must satisfy \( Z_r^* \geq X_{r+1}^* > Z_{r+1}^* \), or equivalently \( r = \tau \). □

Proof of Proposition 8. Take \( \tau \) and observe that by definition \( X_{im}^* - Z_{i+1}^* \leq 0 \) for all \( i \) such that \( k \leq i \leq \tau - 1 \). Now suppose the entrant can offer good \( m+1 \leq k \). The effective marginal cost of the entrant is lower in the hypothetical game where it sells only product \( m+1 \) and the incumbent sells only some good \( i \). Now, decreasing marginal revenue together with constant marginal costs is sufficient to imply that the resulting hypothetical outputs of the incumbent are lower when the entrant sells good \( m+1 \), given that the incumbent’s reaction curves intersect the entrant’s curve from above. That is, \( X_{i(m+1)}^* \leq X_{im}^* \) for all \( i \). This obviously implies that \( X_{i(m+1)}^* - Z_{i+1}^* \leq 0 \) for all \( i \) such that \( k \leq i \leq \tau - 1 \), which proves the result. □

Proof of Proposition 9. Throughout we assume that all of our maximization problems have a unique solution. Generically this will be the case, but the proof can be easily modified to allow multiple maxima. For \( m < i \leq n \) suppose that the set of upgrade supplies \( \{X_j^*\} \) solve the problem:

\[
\max_{X} \sum_{i=m+1}^{n} (q_i - q_{i-1})X_i \left( H(X_i) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right) \quad \text{subject to} \quad X_{m+1} \geq \cdots \geq X_n
\]

If \( X_{m+1}^* < X_m^* \), then this yields an equilibrium. The incumbent achieves the unconstrained maximum profits on upgrades above product \( m \). His profits on upgrades \( m \) and below are maximized, since we began with an equilibrium of the original restricted duopoly game. Similarly, the entrant is maximizing given the supplies of the incumbent. To verify the Proposition we need only check:

\[
X_{m+1}^* \leq \overline{X} = \max_{m < i \leq n} \left\{ \arg \max_{X} \left[ X \left( H(X) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right) \right] \right\}
\]

The proof follows a similar approach to our other results — see Appendix B. □

REFERENCES

JOHNSON AND MYATT


**Appendix B. Omitted Proofs — For Electronic Publication**

*Proof of Proposition 2.* Suppose that the monopolist offers distinct product lines and that product $i$ is the lowest quality product offered, so that $Z^*_1 = Z^*_2 = \cdots = Z^*_i > Z^*_{i+1}$. As in the proof of Proposition 1, product $i$ is effectively the baseline product, and hence we may relabel it as $i = 1$. Having done so, we must have $0 < Z^*_2 < Z^*_1$. if multiple products are offered. With the inclusion of costs, it must be the case that:

\[
Z^*_1 [u(H(Z^*_1), q_1) - c_1] \geq Z^*_2 [u(H(Z^*_2), q_1) - c_1] \\
Z^*_1 [u(H(Z^*_1), q_2) - c_2] - [u(H(Z^*_1), q_1) - c_1] \leq Z^*_2 [u(H(Z^*_2), q_2) - c_2] - [u(H(Z^*_2), q_1) - c_1]
\]
We wish to combine these equalities in the manner performed in the main text. Before doing so, we check the signs of the various expressions. We know that \( u(H(Z_i^1), q_1) - c_1 \geq 0 \). If it were not, then there would be a strict incentive to lower \( Z_1 \). But, since \( H(Z_i^1) < H(Z_2^1) \) this means that the right hand side of the first inequality is strictly positive, and hence so is the left hand side. Similarly, we know that the right hand side of the second inequality is weakly positive, since otherwise there would be a strict incentive to lower \( Z_2 \). This means that we can safely divide the second inequality by the first to obtain:

\[
\frac{u(H(Z_i^1), q_2) - c_2}{u(H(Z_i^1), q_1) - c_1} \leq \frac{u(H(Z_i^2), q_2) - c_2}{u(H(Z_i^2), q_1) - c_1}
\]

But this means that the social surplus is log supermodular over the relevant range. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 4** Begin once again by amalgamating any identically supplied neighboring products, as in the proof of Proposition 3. Consider the lowest quality product \( i \leq m \) that is sold by the incumbent but not the entrant. This must satisfy \( X_i^* > X_{i+1}^* \) and \( Y_i^* = Y_{i+1}^* \). Furthermore, from Proposition 3 we know that \( X_{i+1}^* \geq Y_{i+1}^* \) and hence \( X_i^* > Y_i^* \). The downward local monotonicity constraint on \( X_i \) is not binding, and hence the incumbent must have a weak incentive to raise \( X_i \). But this means that the entrant must have a strict incentive to raise \( Y_i \):

\[
H(X_i^* + Y_i^*) + Y_i^* H'(X_i^* + Y_i^*) > H(X_i^* + Y_i^*) + X_i^* H'(X_i^* + Y_i^*)
\]

The strict inequality follows from \( X_i^* > Y_i^* \) and \( H'(X_i^* + Y_i^*) < 0 \). Since there is a strict incentive to raise \( Y_i \), the monotonicity constraint must be binding, and hence \( Y_{i-1}^* = Y_i^* \). We have amalgamated all identically supplied neighboring products, and hence it must be the case that \( X_{i-1}^* > X_i^* \). Hence product \( i - 1 \) is sold by the incumbent but not the entrant. This contradicts our original supposition that product \( i \) was the lowest such product. Hence if a product \( i \leq m \) is sold by the incumbent, it is also sold by the entrant. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 5** Suppose that we have a pair \( \{X_i^*\} \) and \( \{Y_i^*\} \) such that more than one product is offered by at least one firm. For any \( i \) such that \( X_i^* = X_{i-1}^* \) and \( Y_i^* = Y_{i-1}^* \), without loss of generality amalgamate neighboring upgrades, viewing \( i \) and \( i - 1 \) as a combined product. With this amalgamation, suppose that \( m > 1 \). It must be that either \( X_i^* > X_2^* \) or \( Y_1^* > Y_2^* \). If the former holds, it must be the case that production of \( X_i^* \) yields weakly higher profits from the baseline product than \( X_2^* \). From increasing returns to quality, we have \( (c_2 - c_1)/(q_2 - q_1) < c_1/q_1 \). Furthermore, marginal revenue is decreasing,
and \( Y_2^* \leq Y_1^* \). Combining these observations

\[
X_1^* H(X_1^* + Y_2^*) - X_2^* H(X_2^* + Y_2^*) \geq X_1^* H(X_1^* + Y_1^*) - X_2^* H(X_2^* + Y_1^*) \geq \frac{c_1}{q_1} (X_1^* - X_2^*) > \frac{c_2 - c_1}{q_2 - q_1} (X_1^* - X_2^*)
\]

It follows that the incumbent firm would gain profits on upgrade \( i = 2 \) by raising supply from \( X_2^* \) to \( X_1^* \). We have a contradiction. An identical argument holds if \( Y_1^* > Y_2^* \). We can conclude that \( X_i^* = X_{i-1}^* \) and \( Y_i^* = X_{i-1}^* \) for \( 1 < i \leq m \). Thus neither incumbent nor entrant offer any quality below \( q_m \), and we may set \( m = 1 \) without loss. Suppose now that \( n > m = 1 \), and consider the incumbent’s supply of upgrades \( i > 1 \). By an identical argument to that given above, and indeed following Proposition 1, we can be sure that the incumbent will supply equal quantities of each upgrade. Again using decreasing marginal revenue and increasing returns to quality, along with \( Y_1^* \geq 0 \) we can ensure that \( X_1^* = X_2^* \), again by an identical argument to that given above. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 9.** For \( m < i \leq n \) the set of upgrade supplies \( \{X_j^*\} \) solves the problem:

\[
\max \sum_{i=m+1}^{n} \left( q_i - q_{i-1} \right) X_i \left( H(X_i) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right) \quad \text{subject to} \quad X_{m+1} \geq \cdots \geq X_n
\]

To complete the proof of Proposition 9 we need to show that:

\[
X_{m+1}^* \leq \bar{X} = \max_{m < i \leq n} \left\{ \arg\max_X X \left( H(X) - \frac{c_i - c_{i-1}}{q_i - q_{i-1}} \right) \right\}
\]

Notice that \( \bar{X} \) is the maximum unconstrained supply of an upgrade and hence must correspond to the upgrade with the lowest quality-adjusted marginal cost \((c_i - c_{i-1})/(q_i - q_{i-1})\). Suppose that the inequality does not hold, so that \( X_{m+1}^* > \bar{X} \). It may be the case that \( X_{n}^* > \bar{X} \). If this is so, then \( X_{n} \) may be lowered to \( \bar{X} \). This is optimal when the marginal cost is at its lowest, and hence must be optimal for upgrade \( n \), and hence we have a contradiction. Alternatively, it may be the case that for some \( i \) satisfying \( m < i < n \) we have \( X_i^* > \bar{X} \). The incumbent is again unconstrained in lowering the supply of upgrade \( i \) to \( \bar{X} \). Again, it is optimal to do so since it is optimal to do so when \((c_i - c_{i-1})/(q_i - q_{i-1})\) is at its lowest. We have another contradiction, and must conclude that \( X_{m+1}^* \leq \bar{X} \). \( \square \)