Willemien Kets

Willemien Kets
Associate Professor in Economics
Queen's College
willemien.kets@economics.ox.ac.uk

My research interests include game theory, behavioral economics, culture and identity, bounded rationality, and experimental economics. Please see my personal site for details.

 

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  • A Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity

    August 2020
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    Journal article
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    The Review of Economic Studies

  • A belief-based theory of homophily

    May 2019
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    Journal article
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    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
    Homophily, Culture, Theory of mind, Strategic uncertainty, Coordination

  • Robust multiplicity with a grain of naivete

    January 2018
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    Journal article
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    THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
    Robustness, games with incomplete information, rationalizability, finite depth of reasoning, higher-order beliefs, level-k models, global games, refinements

  • When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?

    October 2016
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    Journal article
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    Games
    © 2016 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. However, how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained in another if and only if the former can be mapped into the other using a generalized type morphism. Hence, every generalized type morphism is a hierarchy morphism and vice versa. Importantly, generalized type morphisms do not make reference to belief hierarchies. We use our results to characterize the conditions under which types generate the same belief hierarchy.

  • Ambiguous language and common priors

    March 2015
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    Journal article
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    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
    Ambiguous language, Common prior, Agree to disagree, Harsanyi doctrine
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  • Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series

    A Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity

    July 2020
    |
    Working paper
    |
    Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
  • Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series

    A Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity

    July 2020
    |
    Working paper
    |
    Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
  • SSRN Electronic Journal

    A Belief-Based Theory of Homophily

    September 2016
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    Working paper
    social and economic networks, homophily, segregation, Theory of Mind

  • Challenging Conformity: A Case for Diversity

    September 2016
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    Working paper
    diversity, game theory, belief formation, coordination failures, Theory of Mind

  • Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Playin Games with Incomplete Information

    February 2014
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    Working paper
    The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967- 1968) so that players can have a nite depth of reasoning. We do this restricting the set of events that a player of a finite depth can reason about. This approach allows us to extend the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept to environments with players with a nite depth of reasoning. We demonstrate that the standard approach of modeling beliefs with Harsanyi type spaces fails to capture the equilibrium behavior of players with a nite depth, at least in some games. Consequently, the standard approach cannot be used to describe the equilibrium behavior of players with a finite depth in general.
    Bounded rationality, higher-order beliefs, finite depth of reasoning, games with incomplete information, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium JEL Classification: C700, C720, D800, D830
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