Donna Harris
Donna is a Behavioural and Experimental Economist who uses interdisciplinary methods that combine psychology, economics, and neuroscience to study individual and group behaviours with policy applications in developing countries
Her current research examines how social identity and social interactions (through observing other’s choices and face-to-face communication) influence people’s decisions and behaviours in a wide range of context. These include resource allocation, charitable giving and social preferences, cooperation, financial learning and financial decisions, decisions involving risk and uncertainty, and cooperation in public goods. She also works on in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination and whether social norm enforcement can be used to deter in-group favouritism. She is also interested in studying corruption, particularly personal connections and nepotism and different policy interventions that could be used to combat corruption.
Donna holds PhD and MPhil in Economics from University of Cambridge, MSc in Economic History from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a BA in Economics from Chulalongkorn University in Thailand. She has been awarded research grants from the British Academy and a joint Post-Doctoral Fellowship from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Medical Research Council (MRC), UK.
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In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups.
January 2019|Journal article|PLoS OneWe study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game in a naturally occuring group setting. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of around 20 recipients each and also to themselves. The groups are supporters of two rival political movements in Thailand and politically neutral subjects. The non-rival out-group acts as a reference point and allows us to measure in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination. A treatment with artificial groups serves as a control. We find both in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination among the naturally occurring groups. In artificial groups, favouritism is observed, but not discrimination. Our results suggest that the two behaviours are not driven by the same motive, and only when groups are in conflict that out-group discrimination is likely to occur.Group Processes, Humans, Politics, Social Discrimination, Social Identification, Thailand -
Peer Advice on Financial Decisions: A Case of the Blind Leading the Blind?
September 2018|Journal article -
Social interactions and the influence of "extremists"
September 2018|Journal article|JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATIONOther-regarding preferences, Social interactions, Preference dynamics, Preference heterogeneity, Social conformity -
Is it a norm to favour your own group?
September 2015|Journal article|EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICSIn-group favouritism, Group identity, Social norms, In-group punishment, Out-group punishment, Third-party punishment
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CSAE Working Paper Series
In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occuring groups
February 2019|Working paper|CSAE Working Paper Series -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Extremists An Experimental Study Of How Social Interactions Change Preferences
March 2016|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesAbstract: We study the effects of social interactions on individuals’ other-regarding preferences. Using a modified dictator game and a structural choice-revealed preference approach, we compare five models of other regarding preferences and, using our preferred specification, we measure an individual’s preferences before and after subjects have interacted face-to-face in a small group. We then examine whether a change in preferences is observed. We find that these interactions do indeed change individuals’ other-regarding preferences and that these effects are highly heterogeneous. In most groups, preferences of individual group members become more homogenous as might be expected, but we also find that subjects’ preferences can converge towards those of a single key individual in the group whose preferences are both extreme and also unchanging. These key individuals often have strongly egoistic preferences and are also more likely to be male. These effects are more prevalent amongst younger subjects than older.Other-regarding preferences, social interactions, preference dynamics, preference heterogeneity, social conformity -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Is it a Norm to Favour Your Own Group?
August 2014|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesThis paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behavour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies.In-group Favouritism, Group Identity, Social Norms, In-group Punishment, Out-group Punishment, Third-party Punishment -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
When to Favour Your Own group? The Threats of Costly Punishments and In-group Favouritism
November 2012|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesUsing a laboratory experiment with minimal groups, we examined the extent to which the threats of costly punishments affect in-group favouritism behaviour. We studied three types of punishment separately: in-group, out-group, and third-party punishments. In line with previous studies, the majority of the allocators favoured their own group by allocating more money to each of the in-group members at the expense of the out-group in the baseline without punishment. In the in-group punishment treatment, we observed a slight increase in in-group favouritism behaviour. On the contrary, when only the out-group could punish the allocators, there was a significant drop in in-group favouritism behaviour as well as an increase in the equal division option. Finally, when faced with an independent third-party punisher the allocators continued to favour their own group. The threat of third-party punishment appeared to have no effect on their decisions. Our paper contributes to the literature on in-group favouritism and the nature of social norms by showing that the decision whether to favour oneIn-group favouritism, Group behaviour, Social identity, Social norm, In-group punishment, Out-group punishment, Third-party punishment, Favour game -
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
In-group favouritism and out-group discimination in naturally occurring groups
July 2012|Working paper|Department of Economics Discussion Paper SeriesWe study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self. Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members. The three groups are supporters of the two rival political movements in Thailand (“yellow shirts” versus “red shirts”) and political neutral subjects. A control treatment with artificial groups (“group A”, “group B”, and “non-affiliated”) is also conducted. We find that allocators strongly favour their own group and discriminate against supporters of the rival party. Despite a strong anti-corruption stance of the yellow-shirt movement members of both political groups are indistinguishable in both favouritism and discrimination. Allocators tend to be rather selfish: on average 45% of the pie is given to Self, despite the large number of recipients.In-group favouritism, Out-group discrimination, Corruption, In-group, Out-group, Political conflict, Experimental design