

October 2017

A. Stefano Caria
stefanocaria.com
stefano.caria@qeh.ox.ac.uk

University of Oxford

Placement Officer: Johannes Abeler, johannes.abeler@economics.ox.ac.uk, +44 1865 281440
Graduate Administrator: Julie Minns, julie.minns@economics.ox.ac.uk, +44 1865 281162

Contact Information

Queen Elizabeth House,
3 Mansfield Rd,
OX1 3TB, Oxford, UK.
Phone: +44 (0) 7427 629899.

Personal Information

Citizenship: Italian.

Current and Previous Employment

University of Oxford, Postdoctoral Researcher (Departmental Lecturer) in Development Economics, Department of International Development and Centre for the Study of African Economies.

ODI Fellowship, Ethiopia, Ministry of Agriculture, 2009-11.

Graduate Studies

University of Oxford, D.Phil. (PhD) in Economics, 2011-2015.

University of Oxford, M.Phil. in Economics (Distinction and Prize for Best Thesis), 2007-2009.

Undergraduate Studies

University of Oxford, B.A. in Politics, Philosophy and Economics (First Class Honors), 2003-2006.

References

Professor Christopher Woodruff
Department of International Development
University of Oxford
christopher.woodruff@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Professor Marcel Fafchamps
Freeman Spogli Institute
Stanford University
fafchamp@stanford.edu

Professor Douglas Gollin
Department of International Development
University of Oxford
douglas.gollin@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Fields

Primary: Development economics, Applied microeconomics.

Secondary: Labor economics, Experimental and Behavioral economics.

Publications and R&Rs

Can People Share Information Efficiently?

with Marcel Fafchamps

R&R Economic Journal

Expectations, Network Centrality and Public Goods: Experimental Evidence from India.

with Marcel Fafchamps

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Forthcoming.

Does the Risk of Poverty Reduce Happiness?

with Paolo Falco

Economic Development and Cultural Change, Forthcoming.

Research Papers

The Selection of Talent: Experimental and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia.

with Girum Abebe and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina

JOB MARKET PAPER

We study how search frictions in the labour market affect firms' ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. The effect is driven by high-ability, low-income jobseekers. A second intervention that doubles the wage offer generates an increase in applicant quality of similar size. These findings are consistent with a model in which talented low-income jobseekers face high application costs and credit constraints. We structurally estimate this model and find that the cost of making an application is large (on average 9-13 percent of the monthly wage), and that 30 percent of individuals are unable to pay this cost because of credit constraints. For the average firm in this market, we find that the application incentive has an internal rate of return of 11 percent, substantially higher than the return of the wage increase. However, in a second experiment, we show that local firm managers underestimate these positive impacts, explaining why the use of application incentives is limited. Our findings highlight that subsidising job applications can reduce inefficiencies in the allocation of talent.

Anonymity or Distance? Job Search and Labour Market Exclusion in a Growing African City.

with Girum Abebe, Paolo Falco, Marcel Fafchamps, Simon Franklin, Simon Quinn

Under review

Do obstacles to job search contribute to labour market exclusion in developing countries? To answer this question, we contrast two very different interventions, designed to alleviate spatial and informational constraints for unemployed youth in a congested African city: a transport subsidy and a job-application workshop. Both treatments have large positive effects on the probability of finding stable and formal jobs. Neither treatment has a significant average effect on the overall probability of employment, but we detect a sizeable increase in earnings and employment rates among the most disadvantaged jobseekers. Our results highlight the importance of job-search constraints as mechanisms for exclusion of the most disadvantaged. They also show that, if targeted well, low-cost interventions can have large impacts, improving equity in the labour market.

Job Fairs. Matching Firms and Unemployed Youth in a Field Experiment.

with Girum Abebe, Paolo Falco, Marcel Fafchamps, Simon Franklin, Simon Quinn and Forhad Shilpi

Do matching frictions affect youth employment in developing countries? This paper studies a randomized controlled trial of job fairs in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The job fairs match firms with a representative sample of young jobseekers. The meetings at the fairs create very few jobs: one for approximately 10 firms that attended. The paper explores reasons for this, and finds significant evidence for mismatched expectations: about wages, firms' requirements, and the average quality of jobseekers. There is evidence of belief updating in the aftermath of the fair. This changes behavior: both workers and firms invest more in formal job search after the fairs.

Do Employers Trust Workers too Little? An Experimental Study of Trust in the Labour Market.

with Paolo Falco

We conduct a field experiment to investigate employers' trust in workers. A sample of real entrepreneurs and workers from urban Ghana are respectively assigned to the roles of employers and employees in the experiment. Employers have the option to hire (trust) an employee, who can in turn choose whether to exert effort (trustworthiness) in a real-effort task with monetary payoffs. We elicit employers and employees' expectations about each other's choices and randomly provide information on previous behaviour. We find that employers significantly underestimate workers' effort. This reduces hiring and profits. We also find that expectations respond to negative signals, but are inelastic with respect to positive news.

Choosing Connections: Evidence from a Link-Formation Experiment in Urban Ethiopia.

Risk Attitudes and Information Networks Among Cocoa Farmers in Ghana.

Lecturing and Teaching Experience

- 2014-present *Lecturer*, Econometrics, MSc in Economics for Development, University of Oxford.
- 2015-2016 *Lecturer*, Development economics, M.Phil. in Economics, University of Oxford.
- 2014-present *Thesis supervisor* in Development Economics.
- 2012-2014 *Teaching assistant*, Microeconomics, Christ Church College, University of Oxford.

Grants

- 2017 IGC and Oxford Martin School, "Understanding Industrial Parks" (with Girum Abebe, Stefan Dercon and Simon Quinn). Principal Investigator, 175,000£.
- 2016 John Fell Fund, "An Experimental Study of the Demand for Information among Firm Managers in Ethiopia". Principal Investigator, 7,500£.
- 2015 IGC, "Do managers use financial incentives effectively? Evidence from a field experiment in urban Ethiopia" (with Girum Abebe). Principal Investigator, 95,000£.
- 2014 DfID-IZA and IGC, "Assisting Job Search in Low-Employment Communities" (with Girum Abebe, Paolo Falco, Marcel Fafchamps Simon Franklin, Simon Quinn). Co-investigator, 300,000£.

Seminar and Conference Presentations (including scheduled)

2018: Paris School of Economics.

2017: NEUDC (Tufts), IGC/CEPR Labour Conference (LSE), IFS (London), Queen Mary University, Nottingham University, Impact Evaluation Conference (University of Mannheim), OxDev, Reading University, SEEDEC (University of East Anglia), OECD, Royal Economic Society (Bristol University), Ethiopian Economic Association Conference, CSAE conference, SAEe (Barcelona), Econometric Society Winter Meetings (Barcelona).

2016 NEUDC (MIT), Annual World Bank Conference on Africa, Clermont-Ferrand (Workshop on “Learning for adoption” organized by Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet), NIBS (Nottingham), LACEA-LAMES, Ethiopian Economic Association Conference, OxDev, CSAE conference.

2015 NEUDC (Brown), SEEDEC Conference (CERGE-EI, Prague), DIW (Berlin), Wageningen University, CSAE conference; GSE Summer Forum Barcelona, Royal Economic Society (Manchester).

Refereeing

Journal of Development Economics.

Other Academic Activities

2015-2017 Convenor, CSAE weekly seminar, University of Oxford.

Honors and Scholarships

+3 ESRC full award studentship to pursue doctoral studies.

George Webb Medley Prize 2009 for the best M.Phil. Thesis.