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## University of Oxford

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### Contact Information

Department of Economics  
Oxford University  
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### Undergraduate Studies:

BA (Hons), *First class*, European Studies with Spanish University of Essex, 2005 – 2009  
(one-year Erasmus Exchange in 2007-08, Economics Department, UPF, Spain)

### Graduate Studies:

University of Oxford  
PhD in Economics  
Thesis Title: "Essays in Limitations to Technology Adoption" October 2011 – expected 2018

University of Oxford  
M.Phil. in Economics October 2009 – July 2011

### References:

Professor Douglas Gollin  
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### Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: Development Economics; Experimental Economics.  
Secondary fields: Game Theory; Environmental Economics.

## Teaching Experience:

Since Fall, 2014	Teaching Fellow: Economics Department, University of Birmingham - lecturer: PG Game Theory course (full-year: 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018), - lecturer: UG Game Theory course (Fall 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017), - lecturer: UG Development Economics course (Spring 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018), - lecturer: UG Environmental Economics course (Fall 2017), - lecturer: UG Behavioural Economics course (Spring 2017), - supervisor: 24 PG dissertations (since 2015), - supervisor: 31 UG extended essays (since 2015).
Fall, 2012	Game Theory (UG), Oxford University, teaching fellow for Dr Peter Eso
Spring, 2013	Econometrics (UG), Oxford University, teaching fellow for Dr Victoria Prowse

## Conference and Seminar Presentations (recent):

2018 <i>(inc. forthcoming)</i>	SAEe (Madrid), SEEDEC (Wageningen), Nuffield Phd/post-doc seminar (Oxford), QEHE Development Seminar (Oxford), Economics Internal Seminar (Birmingham),
2017	CEAR Conference on Risk and Risky Behaviour (Copenhagen), SEEDEC (Norwich), IMEBESS (Florence), PhD Workshop: Experimental Development Economics (2017).
2016	QEHE Development Seminar (Oxford), Economics Internal Seminar (Birmingham).

## Professional Activities:

2018	Book reviewer, Game Theory for the Social Sciences (by Jose Luis Ferreira),
2016	Book reviewer, Game Theory (by Indrahit Ray),
2012	GIZ Germany, short-term consultant,
2011	Imaflora Brazil. Short-term consultant.

## Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2017	Birmingham Business School Research and Innovation Fund (£3200), PI (jointly with Michalis Drouvelis and Donna Harris),
2016	Birmingham Business School Teaching Innovation Fund (£2500),
2014	Oxford University Departmental Teaching Associate Award,
2014	CSAE Grant for Experiments in Ghana (£2700),
2009-2013	Economic and Social Research Council Full Doctoral Scholarship (fees & £64000),
2011	British Petroleum Scholarship for OUIIP in Brazil (£3200),
2005-2009	Fahrenheit Scholarship (City of Gdansk, Poland).

**Research Papers:**

“Behavioural Factors and Technology Adoption: Experimental Evidence from Cocoa Farming in Ghana”  
*(Job Market Paper)*

This paper investigates the effect of trust and of an ambiguous environment on fertiliser investments under index insurance. These two behavioural factors were studied by means of a framed field experiment conducted with Ghanaian cocoa farmers. The subjects had an option to invest in a package of fertiliser bundled with index insurance with a positive level of basis risk. The returns depended both on the subjects’ investment choices and a stochastic weather realization. The key ingredient of the study was that for different subjects, the nature of the basis risk was framed differently. Substantially fewer subjects adopted fertiliser when possible losses of fertiliser investment were framed as resulting from the insurer’s failure to meet its contract obligations, compared with an alternative in which the losses were framed as resulting from a mismatch between their own weather realizations and those on which the index insurance was based. A large negative effect on fertiliser investments was also found in treatments with either a small or large ambiguity regarding the exact level of basis risk. Both negative treatment effects were strongly significant. This may suggest that technologies with which farmers are relatively more experienced are more likely to be adopted under index insurance schemes. The overall experimental findings provide evidence that trust and ambiguity may be significant factors other than basis risk, limiting the effectiveness of index insurance in promoting agricultural innovation.

“Returns to New Technology and Comparative Advantage”

*(submitted)*

In this paper, I investigate whether returns to fertiliser in cocoa farming are high and whether farmers’ adoption decisions can be explained by comparative advantage. I use data from Ghana to measure the returns to fertiliser by means of static and dynamic panel models of homogeneous returns to fertiliser, as well as a correlated random model of heterogeneous technology, which allows for farmer-specific comparative advantage. The estimated returns in different models are positive, high and strongly significant statistically. The effect of the comparative advantage on technology adoption decisions is found to be statistically significant.

**Research Paper(s) in Progress:**

“Gender Differences in Social Comparisons” (with Michalis Drouvelis and Donna Harris)

Social comparisons are ubiquitous across many domains of economic and social life, affecting individuals’ judgments and attitudes towards others. In this paper, we examine the interplay between gender and social comparisons in individuals’ earned income (from a real effort task) and cooperative behaviour in a one-shot social dilemma game. Our main findings indicate that the effects of social comparisons are gender sensitive: women are more responsive to social comparisons. We find that women are significantly more likely to increase their earned income when social comparisons are present compared to men. However, when we allow for social comparisons women become less pro-social. We discuss potential mechanisms for the observed effects. Overall, our findings shed new light on the heterogeneous effects of social comparisons that may have important implications for institutional design based on social information.