A UNIFIED APPROACH TO REVEALED PREFERENCE THEORY: THE CASE OF RATIONAL CHOICE

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A Unified Approach to Revealed Preference Theory: The Case of Rational Choice

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Abstract

The theoretical literature on (non-random) choice largely follows the route of Richter (1966) by working in abstract environments and by stipulating that we see all choices of an agent from a given feasible set. On the other hand, empirical work on consumption choice using revealed preference analysis is done following the approach of Afriat (1967), which assumes that we observe only one (and not necessarily all) of the potential choices of an agent. These two approaches are structurally different and they are treated in the literature in isolation from each other. This paper introduces a framework in which both approaches can be formulated in tandem. We prove a rationalizability theorem in this framework that simultaneously generalizes the fundamental results of Afriat and Richter, along with many of their variants.

JEL Classification: D11, D81.
Keywords: Revealed Preference, Rational Choice, Afriat’s Theorem, Richter’s Theorem.

1 INTRODUCTION

As pioneered by Hendrik Houthakker and Paul Samuelson, the classical theory of revealed preference was conducted for consumption choice problems within the class of all budget sets in a given consumption space. In time, this work has been extended, and

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refined, in mainly two ways. The seminal contributions of Arrow (1959) and Richter (1966, 1971) have shifted the focus of decision theorists to studying the consequences of rational decision-making in richer, and more abstract, settings. The vast majority of modern choice theory, be it modeling rational or boundedly rational decision making, is now couched within this framework. On the other hand, another seminal approach was pursued by Afriat (1967) in the context of standard consumption problems, but under the unexceptionably reasonable premise that a researcher will have choice data only for finitely many budget sets in a given consumption space. This approach has proved useful for econometric tests of rationality, and for the construction of utility and demand functions from consumption choice data.\footnote{See Vermeulen (2012) for a nice survey on the theory of revealed preference.}

It is striking that the entire literature on (non-random) choice can be viewed either as following the abstract route of Richter (1966) or the empirically-oriented route of Afriat (1967), with little contact between each other. This is mainly because these two approaches are structurally different. To be precise about this, let us have a look at the fundamental rationalizability theorems of these papers:

**Richter’s Theorem.** Let $X$ be a nonempty set and $\mathcal{A}$ a nonempty collection of nonempty subsets of $X$. A map (choice correspondence) $c$ from $\mathcal{A}$ into $2^X \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ with $c(A) \subseteq A$ for each $A \in \mathcal{A}$ satisfies the congruence axiom if, and only if, there is a complete preference relation (preorder) $\succsim$ on $X$ such that $c(A) = \{x \in A : x \succsim y \text{ for each } y \in A\}$.

**Afriat’s Theorem.** Let $k$ and $n$ be positive integers, and take any $(p^1, x^1), \ldots, (p^k, x^k)$ in $\mathbb{R}^n_+ \times \mathbb{R}^n_+$. Then there is a continuous and strictly increasing (utility) function $u : \mathbb{R}^n_+ \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $u(x^i) \geq u(x)$ for each $x \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$ and $i = 1, \ldots, k$ with $p^i x \leq p^i x^i$ if, and only if, $(p^1, x^1), \ldots, (p^k, x^k)$ obeys cyclical consistency, which means that, for any \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_l\} $\subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, k\}$,

$$
\begin{align*}
p^{t_1} x^{t_1} &\leq p^{t_2} x^{t_2}, \ldots, p^{t_l} x^{t_{l-1}} \leq p^{t_l} x^{t_l} \text{ and } p^{t_l} x^{t_l} \leq p^{t_1} x^{t_1} \\
\end{align*}
$$

imply

$$
\begin{align*}
p^{t_1} x^{t_1} = p^{t_2} x^{t_2}, \ldots, p^{t_l} x^{t_{l-1}} = p^{t_l} x^{t_l} \text{ and } p^{t_l} x^{t_l} = p^{t_1} x^{t_1}. \\
\end{align*}
$$

Even a casual look at these results witnesses a number of important differences. Richter’s Theorem is very abstract. It has the advantage of allowing for any kind of

\footnote{Here we wish to examine only the “structure” of this theorem, so for the present discussion, it is not important what the congruence axiom is. This axiom is defined formally in Section 4.1.}
choice domain. It presumes that all choices of the agent are observed in the case of any choice problem – that is, the entirety of the set \( c(A) \) is known for any \( A \) in \( \mathcal{A} \) – and on the basis of a single axiom on \( c \), delivers a complete preference relation the maximization of which yields all choices of the agent in every choice problem. By contrast, Afriat’s Theorem is fairly concrete. It works only with \( k \) many budget problems for consumption of bundles of \( n \) goods. It presumes that only one choice of the agent is observed in the case of any budget set,\(^3\) – we see the bundle \( x^i \) being chosen in the budget set with prices \( p^i \) and income \( p^i x^i \) – and on the basis of a single axiom on the choices of the agent, delivers a utility function with respect to which the (observed) choices are best within their respective budget sets. Furthermore, this utility function is continuous and strictly increasing, concepts which are not even meaningful in the general alternative space considered in Richter’s Theorem. Comparing the central assumptions, we see that the special structure of \( \mathbb{R}^n \) is used in an essential manner in the definition of cyclical consistency and it is not possible to state a generalization of this property in an environment where the alternative space lacks an inherent order and/or algebraic structure. By contrast, Richter’s Theorem does not need a special mathematical structure on the alternative space \( X \) and the congruence axiom is a purely set-theoretic property.

All in all, the theorems above appear to have fairly different characters, even though, conceptually, they are after the same thing, namely, identifying conditions on one’s choice behavior that would allow us to view this individual “as if” she is maximizing a preference relation (or a utility function).\(^4\) It thus seems desirable to develop a framework in which the approaches of Afriat and Richter toward revealed preference theory can be formulated simultaneously. On the one hand, such a framework would allow for a unified approach to (non-random) revealed preference theory that admits the previous approaches as special cases. On the other hand, it would provide an avenue for bringing together the most desirable parts of these approaches together, thereby paving the way toward more powerful revealed preference theories. In particular, such a framework would let us work with choice environments in which one recognizes the fact that often we observe

\(^3\)This is not entirely correct. While this is how the theorem is utilized in practice, Afriat’s Theorem allows for \( p^i x^i = p^j x^j \) for distinct \( i \) and \( j \), so the data may in principle yield two (or more) choices from a given budget set. It is, however, in the very nature of this theorem that only some choices of the agent is observed in the case of any budget set.

\(^4\)While we single out Richter’s and Afriat’s Theorems in this discussion, we note that these theorems serve as prototypes here. In particular, everything we said so far about the distinction between these theorems remain valid in the case of any of the extensions of Afriat’s Theorem provided in the literature.
only one (or a few) choice(s) of an agent in a given choice situation (a major advantage of Afriat’s theory) without limiting attention only to consumption choice problems (a major advantage of Richter’s theory). The primary objective of the present paper is to provide such a framework.

The framework we propose departs from the previous literature on abstract revealed preference theory in two ways. First, it models the choice behavior of an agent by a set of choice correspondences, instead of a single one. The idea is quite intuitive. Suppose we observe the choice behavior of an agent across a collection, say, \( \mathcal{A} \), of feasible sets. For simplicity, suppose we see exactly one choice of the agent, say \( x_A \), from each feasible set \( A \) in \( \mathcal{A} \). The model identifies this behavior with the set of all choice correspondences (on \( \mathcal{A} \)) that declares \( x_A \) as a potential choice from \( A \), that is, it says that the agent’s “true” choice correspondence \( c \) is one with \( x_A \in c(A) \) for each \( A \) in \( \mathcal{A} \). Notice that this is precisely Afriat’s approach generalized to an arbitrary choice domain. By contrast, Richter’s approach presumes that we are privy to “all” choices of the agent in the case of any feasible set. For instance, it may be the case that we are somehow certain that \( x_A \) is the only choice of the agent from \( A \) for each \( A \) in \( \mathcal{A} \). In that case, the set of all choice correspondences that is consistent with the data becomes a singleton that contains the “true” choice correspondence \( c \) of the agent, where \( \{ x_A \} = c(A) \) for each \( A \) in \( \mathcal{A} \). As this example easily generalizes to the case where the agent may have been observed to make multiple choices from a given feasible set, we thus see that modeling an agent as a set of choice correspondences captures both approaches as special cases. In Richter’s case this set is necessarily a singleton, and in Afriat’s case it is not (except in trivial instances).

This framework is, however, not yet enough to formulate Afriat’s Theorem within, because that theorem relies crucially on an exogenously given order structure. Indeed, without some monotonicity requirement on \( u \), the notion of consistency in Afriat’s Theorem will impose no restrictions on observations since we can allow the agent to be indifferent across all alternatives. This leads to the second novel aspect of the framework we propose here: we assume that the alternative space is a partially ordered set, as opposed to an arbitrary set. This way we keep the standard environment of Richter as a special case (where the partial order is the equality ordering) and include domains, such as \( \mathbb{R}^n \), which have intrinsic order structures.

After going through a few mathematical preliminaries in Section 2, we introduce the

\[5\]While this is a side point for the current paper, it is worth noting here that this framework allows for modeling certain types of interesting choice situations that cannot be captured by either the Afriat or the Richter approaches. An example to this effect is provided in Section 3.4 (see Example 4).
framework we propose formally in Section 3. In that section we also show by examples how this abstract framework admits numerous choice environments that are studied in the previous literature, ranging from Richter-type choice frameworks to Nash bargaining problems and Afriat-type environments, as well as new ones. It is important to note that our framework is an abstract setup that is primed to capture any sort of choice data that one can encounter in theory and practice. As such, it is not geared necessarily toward rational choice theory and it can be used to study any type of boundedly rational choice theory as well. In this paper, however, we focus on developing rational choice theory in the context of this framework with the aim of demonstrating that Richter’s and Afriat’s approaches are in fact branches of the same tree. Indeed, there is a natural way of extending Richter’s congruence axiom to our framework in a way that this axiom recognizes the inherent order structure of the alternative space. We call this extension the \textit{monotone congruence axiom} (Section 4.3). Similarly, the cyclical consistency condition is extended to our setting in a natural manner; we refer to this extension as the \textit{generalized cyclical consistency} (Section 4.4). Our main theorem shows that these (extended) properties have a close formal connection. Furthermore, the monotone congruence axiom yields a representation very much in the spirit of Richter (but now with monotone preference relations) while generalized cyclical consistency yields precisely an Afriat-type representation (but now over an arbitrary choice domain). Therefore, our main theorem (Section 4.5) generalizes Richter’s Theorem and the choice-theoretic content of Afriat’s Theorem simultaneously (see Sections 4.7 and 4.9), but the structure of rationalization we obtain in the latter case is different than Afriat’s classical construction (Section 4.7).

Our main theorem is, however, of “rationalization by a preference relation” form, and unlike Afriat’s Theorem, it is not of “rationalization by a utility function” form. The latter form obtains in Afriat’s Theorem due to the special structure of the alternative space $\mathbb{R}^n$ and the assumption that the collection of feasible sets under consideration is finite. In Section 5, we show that if we make this finiteness assumption in our framework and posit that the alternative space satisfies fairly general (topological) conditions, then our main theorem can be stated in terms of continuous and monotonic utility functions. Consequently, we admit Afriat’s Theorem (as stated above) as a special case and also provide a continuous version of Richter’s Theorem.

These results attest to the unifying structure of the revealed preference framework we propose here. We hope that this framework will also facilitate the development of
the recent literature on boundedly rational choice theory, especially in extensions that explicitly account for issues of data availability.

2 PRELIMINARIES

The primary tool of analysis in this paper is order theory. The present section catalogues the definitions of all the order-theoretic notions that we utilize throughout the present work. As these notions are largely standard, this section is mainly for the reader who may need a clarification about them in the main body of the paper.

2.1 Order-Theoretic Nomenclature. Let $X$ be a nonempty set, and denote the diagonal of $X \times X$ by $\Delta_X$, that is, $\Delta_X := \{(x, x) : x \in X\}$. By a binary relation on $X$, we mean any nonempty subset of $X \times X$. For any binary relation $R$ on $X$, we adopt the usual convention of writing $x \mathrel{R} y$ instead of $(x, y) \in R$. (Thus, $x \mathrel{\Delta_X} y$ iff $x = y$ for any $x, y \in X$.) Similarly, for any $x \in X$ and subset $A$ of $X$, by $x \mathrel{R} A$ we mean $x \mathrel{R} y$ for every $y \in A$, and interpret the expression $A \mathrel{R} x$ analogously. Moreover, for any binary relations $R$ and $S$ on $X$, we simply write $x \mathrel{R} y S z$ to mean $x \mathrel{R} y$ and $y \mathrel{S} z$, and so on. For any subset $A$ of $X$, the decreasing closure of $A$ with respect to $R$ is defined as $A^{\downarrow, R} := \{x \in X : y \mathrel{R} x$ for some $y \in A\}$, but when $R$ is apparent from the context, we may denote this set simply as $A^{\downarrow}$. The increasing closure of $A$ is defined dually. By convention, $x^{\downarrow} := \{x\}^{\downarrow}$ and $x^{\uparrow} := \{x\}^{\uparrow}$ for any $x$ in $X$.

The inverse of a binary relation $R$ on $X$ is itself such a binary relation defined as $R^{-1} := \{(y, x) : x \mathrel{R} y\}$. The composition of two binary relations $R$ and $R'$ on $X$ is defined as $R \circ R' := \{(x, y) \in X \times X : x \mathrel{R} z R' y$ for some $z \in X\}$. In turn, we let $R^{\downarrow} := R$ and $R^n := R \circ R^{n-1}$ for any integer $n > 1$; here $R^n$ is said to be the $n$th iterate of $R$.

The asymmetric part of a binary relation $R$ on $X$ is defined as $P_R := R \setminus R^{-1}$ and the symmetric part of $R$ is $I_R := R \cap R^{-1}$. We say that a binary relation $R$ on $X$ extends another such binary relation $S$ if $S \subseteq R$ and $P_S \subseteq P_R$. For any nonempty subset $A$ of $X$, the set of all maximal elements with respect to $R$ is denoted as $\text{MAX}(A, R)$, that is, $\text{MAX}(A, R) := \{x \in A : y \mathrel{P_R} x$ for no $y \in A\}$. Similarly, the set of all maximum elements with respect to $R$ is denoted as $\text{max}(A, R)$, that is, $\text{max}(A, R) := \{x \in A : x \mathrel{R} y$ for all $y \in A\}$. We also define $\text{MIN}(A, R) := \text{MAX}(A, R^{-1})$ and $\text{min}(A, R) := \text{max}(A, R^{-1})$.

A binary relation $R$ on $X$ is said to be reflexive if $\Delta_X \subseteq R$, antisymmetric if $R \cap R^{-1} \subseteq \Delta_X$, transitive if $R \circ R \subseteq R$, and complete if $R \cup R^{-1} = X \times X$. The transitive closure of $R$, denoted by $\text{tran}(R)$, is the smallest transitive relation on $X$ that contains $R$, and is
given by \( \text{tran}(R) := R \cup R^2 \cup \cdots \). In other words, \( x \text{ tran}(R) y \) iff we can find a positive integer \( k \) and \( x_0, \ldots, x_k \in X \) such that \( x = x_0 R x_1 R \cdots R x_k = y \).

If \( R \) is reflexive and transitive, we refer to it as a preorder on \( X \). (In particular, \( \text{tran}(R) \) is a preorder on \( X \) for any reflexive binary relation \( R \) on \( X \).) If \( R \) is an antisymmetric preorder, we call it a partial order on \( X \). Throughout the paper, a generic preorder is denoted as \( \succeq \), with \( \succ \) acting as the asymmetric part of \( \succeq \). Finally, we say that \( R \) is acyclic if \( \Delta_X \cap R^n = \emptyset \) for every positive integer \( n \). It is readily verified that transitivity of a binary relation implies its acyclicity, but not conversely.

For any preorder \( \succeq \) on \( X \), a complete preorder on \( X \) that extends \( \succeq \) is said to be a completion of \( \succeq \). It is a set-theoretical fact that every preorder on a nonempty set admits a completion. This result, which is based on the Axiom of Choice, is known as Szpilrajn’s Theorem.\(^6\)

Given any preordered set \( (X, \succsim) \), a function \( f : X \to \mathbb{R} \) is said to be increasing with respect to \( \succsim \) if \( f(x) \geq f(y) \) holds for every \( x, y \in X \) with \( x \succsim y \). If, in addition, \( f(x) > f(y) \) holds for every \( x, y \in X \) with \( x \succ y \), we say that \( f \) is strictly increasing with respect to \( \succsim \).

Finally, given a poset \( (X, \succeq) \) and a subset \( A \) of \( X \), we denote by \( \bigvee A \) the unique element of \( \min(\{x \in X : x \succeq A\}, \succeq) \), provided that this set is nonempty (and hence a singleton). Analogously, \( \bigwedge A \) is the unique element of \( \max(\{x \in X : A \succeq x\}, \succeq) \), provided that this set is nonempty. If \( \bigvee A \) exists for every nonempty finite \( A \subseteq X \), then \( (X, \succeq) \) is said to be a \( \lor \)-semilattice, and if \( \bigvee A \) exists for every \( A \subseteq X \), then \( (X, \succeq) \) is said to be a complete \( \lor \)-semilattice. If \( (X, \succeq^{-1}) \) is a \( \lor \)-semilattice, we say that \( (X, \succeq) \) is a \( \land \)-semilattice.

2.2 Topological Nomenclature. Let \( (X, \succeq) \) be a preordered set such that \( X \) is a topological space. We say that \( \succeq \) is a continuous preorder on \( X \) if it is a closed subset of \( X \times X \) (relative to the product topology).\(^7\) We note that the closure of a preorder on \( X \) (in \( X \times X \)) need not be transitive, nor is the transitive closure of a closed binary

\(^6\)Szpilrajn (1938) has proved this result for partial orders, but the result easily generalizes to the case of preorders; see Corollary 1 in Chapter 1 of Ok (2007).

\(^7\)While there are other notions of continuity for a preorder (for instance, openness of its strict part on \( X \)), this terminology is adopted quite widely in the literature. See, for instance, Evren and Ok (2011) and references cited therein.
relation on \( X \) in general continuous. One needs additional conditions to ensure such inheritance properties to hold (Ok and Riella (2013)).

Given a continuous preorder \( \succeq \) on \( X \), the topological conditions on \( X \) that would ensure the existence of a continuous real map on \( X \) that is strictly increasing with respect to \( \succeq \) are well-studied in the mathematical literature. In particular, it is known that such a function exists if \( X \) is a locally compact and separable metric space. This is Levin’s Theorem.\(^8\)

Notational Convention. Throughout this paper, we write \([k]\) to denote the set \(\{1, \ldots, k\}\) for any positive integer \(k\).

3 CHOICE ENVIRONMENTS AND CHOICE DATA

3.1 Choice Environments. By a choice environment, we mean an ordered pair \(((X, \geq), \mathcal{A})\), where \((X, \geq)\) is a poset and \(\mathcal{A}\) is a nonempty collection of nonempty subsets of \(X\). Here we interpret \(X\) as the grand set of all choice alternatives, that is, the consumption set. We think of \(\geq\) as an exogeneously given domination relation on \(X\), and view the statement \(x \geq y\) as saying that \(x\) is an unambiguously better alternative than \(y\) for any individual. (If the environment one wishes to study lacks such a dominance relation, we may set \(\geq\) as \(\triangle_X\) so that \(x \geq y\) holds iff \(x = y\).\(^9\)) Finally, \(\mathcal{A}\) is interpreted as the set of all feasible sets from which a decision maker is observed to make a choice. For instance, if the data at hand is so limited that we have recorded the choice(s) of an agent in the context of a single feasible set \(A \subseteq X\), we would set \(\mathcal{A} = \{A\}\). At the other extreme, if we have somehow managed to keep track of the choices of the agent from every possible feasible set \(A \subseteq X\) (as sometimes is possible in the controlled environments of laboratory experiments), we would set \(\mathcal{A} = 2^X \setminus \{\emptyset\}\).

3.2 Choice Correspondences and Choice Data. Given a nonempty set \(X\) and a nonempty subset \(\mathcal{A}\) of \(2^X \setminus \{\emptyset\}\), by a choice correspondence on \(\mathcal{A}\), we mean a map \(c : \mathcal{A} \to 2^X\) such that \(c(A)\) is a nonempty subset of \(A\) for each \(A \in \mathcal{A}\). We denote the family of all choice correspondences on \(\mathcal{A}\) by \(\mathcal{C}_{(X, \mathcal{A})}\).

\(^8\)See Levin (1983), where this result is proved in the more general case where \(X\) is a locally compact, \(\sigma\)-compact and second countable Hausdorff space.

\(^9\)Every result we report in this paper remains valid, if \(\geq\) is an arbitrary preorder (with no substantial change in the proofs). We take \((X, \geq)\) as a poset, instead of a preordered set, only to simplify the exposition, and because the natural dominance relations that arise in the applications we consider here are all partial orders.
There is a natural way of ordering the choice correspondences on $A$. Consider the binary relation $\sqsupseteq$ on $\mathcal{C}(X, A)$ defined as

$$c \sqsupseteq d \text{ iff } c(A) \supseteq d(A) \text{ for every } A \in A.$$ 

Clearly, $(\mathcal{C}(X, A), \sqsupseteq)$ is a poset. It is also plain that this poset is a complete $\lor$-semilattice, but it is not an $\land$-semilattice unless all members of $A$ are singleton subsets of $X$.

In the present paper, by a choice correspondence on a choice environment $((X, \geq), A)$, we simply mean an element of $\mathcal{C}(X, A)$. (Notice that this notion does not depend on the preorder $\geq$.) In turn, we refer to any nonempty collection $C$ of choice correspondences on $((X, \geq), A)$ as a choice data on $((X, \geq), A)$. By way of interpretation, we may think of $C$ as a means of summarizing the choices of a given decision maker across all feasible sets in $A$ in the sense that $C$ is precisely the set of all choice correspondences on $((X, \geq), A)$ that are compatible with the (observed) choices of that agent.

### 3.3 Revealed Preference Frameworks

By a revealed preference (RP) framework, we mean an ordered triplet

$$((X, \geq), A, C),$$

where $((X, \geq), A)$ is a choice environment and $C$ is a choice data on $((X, \geq), A)$. We note that this model is quite general, and it departs from how revealed preference theory is usually formulated in the literature mainly in two ways. First, it features the notion of an unambiguous ordering of the alternatives (in terms of some form of a domination relation). Second, and more important, this model takes as a primitive not one choice correspondence, but potentially a multiplicity of them. The following subsection aims to demonstrate the advantages of this modeling strategy by means of several examples.

### 3.4 Examples

In a large class of models of revealed preference, one takes as primitives a finite alternative set $X$ and a choice correspondence $c$ on $2^X \setminus \{\emptyset\}$. (This is, for instance, precisely the model studied by Arrow (1959), and is one of the most commonly adopted choice frameworks in the recent literature on boundedly rational choice.) Especially when $X$ is not finite, however, it is also commonplace to posit that we can observe one’s choice behavior only in the context of certain types of feasible sets.

**Example 1.** *(Richter-Type RP Frameworks)* Let $X$ be any nonempty set, $A$ any nonempty collection of nonempty subsets of $X$, and $c$ a choice correspondence on $A$. Then, $((X, \triangle_X), A, \{c\})$ is an RP framework that corresponds to the choice model of
Richter (1966). The interpretation of the model is that one is able to observe all elements deemed choosable by the decision maker from any given element of $A$. No exogeneous order (or otherwise) structure on the consumption set $X$ is postulated. Most of the revealed preference analyses conducted in the literature on choice theory work with instances of this model.

**Example 2. (Ordered Richter-Type RP Frameworks)** A slight modification of the previous model obtains if we endow $X$ with a nontrivial partial order $\geq$, leading us to the RP framework $((X, \geq), A, \{c\})$. Many classical choice models are obtained as special cases of this framework. We give two illustrations:

a. **(Classical Consumption Choice Problems)** Let $n$ be a positive integer. Take $X$ as $\mathbb{R}_+^n$, $\geq$ as the standard (coordinatewise) ordering of $n$-vectors, and suppose that $A \subseteq \{B(p, I) : (p, I) \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_+\}$, where $B(p, I)$ is the budget set at prices $p$ and income $I$, that is, $B(p, I) := \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n : px \leq I\}$ for every positive $(n+1)$-vector $(p, I)$. The RP framework $((X, \geq), A, \{c\})$ then corresponds to the classical consumption choice model.

b. **(Nash Bargaining Problems)** Where $n$ is a positive integer, take $X$ as $\mathbb{R}_+^n$, $\geq$ as the standard (coordinatewise) ordering of $n$-vectors, and put $A$ as the set of all compact and convex subsets of $X$ that contain the origin $0$ in their interior. The RP framework $((X, \geq), A, \{c\})$ then corresponds to classical $n$-person cooperative bargaining model. (In this model, elements of $X$ are interpreted as the utility profiles of the involved individuals, and $0$ is the (normalized) utility profile that corresponds to the disagreement outcome.) When $c$ is single-valued, for instance, this model reduces to the one considered by Nash (1950) and a large fraction of the literature on axiomatic bargaining theory. If we relax the convexity requirement, we obtain the model of non-convex collective choice problems (cf. Ok and Zhou (1999)).

The choice models considered in the previous two examples presume that we can observe all choices of an individual in the case of every one of the feasible sets. (Put differently, these models posit that they are given the “true” choice correspondence of the decision-maker in its entirety.) This comprehensiveness assumption is, however, often not met in the empirical studies on revealed preference in which the researcher has one data point (per individual) for each feasible set. This has led many authors to consider models in which one is privy to only one choice of an individual in a given feasible set.

**Example 3. (Afriat-Type RP Frameworks)** Consider a choice environment of the form
\((X, \succeq, \mathcal{A})\), where \(\mathcal{A}\) is a nonempty finite subset of \(2^X \setminus \{\emptyset\}\), and take any single-valued choice correspondence \(c\) on \(\mathcal{A}\). A particularly interesting RP framework is then obtained as \(((X, \succeq), \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C})\), where

\[\mathcal{C} := \{C \in \mathcal{C}(X, \mathcal{A}) : C \supseteq c\}\].

\(\mathcal{C}\) thus equals \(c^+\), the increasing closure of \(\{c\}\) with respect to \(\supseteq\). The interpretation is that (i) we observe the choice behavior of the agent in case of only finitely many choice problems; and (ii) we see only a single choice of the agent in each problem that she faces. Part (i) is captured by the model through the finiteness of \(\mathcal{A}\). In turn, part (ii) is captured by setting \(c\) to correspond to the observed choice of the agent (that is, \(c(A)\) is what we see that the decision maker chooses from \(A\) for each \(A \in \mathcal{A}\)). In particular, due to the limited nature of our observations, we do not know if the agent was perhaps indifferent, or indecisive, between her choice from \(A\) and some other alternatives in \(A \in \mathcal{A}\). Consequently, the framework uses the choice data \(\mathcal{C}\) to model the choice behavior of the agent, thereby formulating her choice behavior in a coarser way. Put precisely, it presumes that the “true” choice correspondence of the agent may be any one choice correspondence \(C\) on \(\mathcal{A}\) which is consistent with \(c\) in the sense that the unique element of \(c(A)\) is contained in \(C(A)\) for each \(A \in \mathcal{A}\). Again, many classical choice models are obtained as special cases of this framework.

a. (Afriat’s Model of Consumption Choice Problems) Let \(n\) be a positive integer. In the classical framework of Afriat (1967), the consumption set is modeled as \(\mathbb{R}^n_+\) and viewed as partially ordered by the coordinatewise ordering \(\succeq\). The primitive of the model is a finite collection of price vectors and the choice(s) of the agent at those prices. Formally, we are given a nonempty finite subset \(P\) of \(\mathbb{R}^n_+\), and a map \(x\) that assigns to every \(p \in P\) a nonempty finite subset \(x(p)\) of \(\mathbb{R}^n_+\) such that \(py = pz\) for every \(y\) and \(z\) in \(x(p)\). We interpret \(P\) as a set of price profiles, and for each \(p\) in \(P\), think of \(x(p)\) as the set of the bundles that the individual was observed to choose from the budget set \(B(p, px(p))\). (Here, by a slight abuse of notation, by \(px(p)\) we mean \(py\) for any \(y \in x(p)\).) This model is captured by the RP framework above by setting \(((X, \succeq)\).
as $\mathbb{R}_+^n$ (with the usual ordering), $\mathcal{A}$ as $\{B(p, px(p)) : p \in P\}$, and $c$ as mapping each $B(p, px(p))$ to $x(p)$. The choice data of the model is thus

$$C := \{C \in \mathcal{C}(X, \mathcal{A}) : x(p) \subseteq C(B(p, px(p))) \text{ for each } p \in P\},$$

that is, the collection of all choice correspondences on $\mathcal{A}$ that is consistent with $x$ being a part of the choice correspondence of the individual.

b. *(The Forges-Minelli Model of Consumption Choice Problems)* The applicability of the Afriat model is strained by the fact that it is concerned only with linear budget sets. To deal with nonlinearities that may arise from price floors/ceilings, price differentiation that may depend on quantity thresholds, and other considerations, many authors have considered Afriat type models with nonlinear budget sets (cf. Matzkin (1991) and Chavas and Cox (1993)). Such cases too are readily modeled by means of the revealed preference framework of the present example. For instance, given any two positive integers $n$ and $k$, Forges and Minelli (2009) take as a primitive a finite collection of ordered pairs, say, $(g^1, x^1), \ldots, (g^k, x^k)$, where $g^i$ is a strictly increasing and continuous real map on $\mathbb{R}_+^n$ with $g^i(x^i) = 0$ for each $i \in [k]$. They interpret this data as the situation in which we observe a given decision maker choosing the bundle $x^i$ from the generalized budget set $B^i(g^i) := \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n : g^i(x) \leq 0\}$ for each $i \in [k]$. This setup is then captured by the revealed preference framework $((\mathbb{R}_+^n, \geq), \mathcal{A}, \mathbb{C})$ where $\mathcal{A} := \{B^i(g^i) : i \in [k]\}$ and $\mathbb{C}$ is the set of all choice correspondences $C$ on $\mathcal{A}$ such that $x^i \in C(B(g^i))$ for each $i \in [k]$.

The examples above accord with viewing the choice data of an agent as the collection of all choice correspondences that are compatible with her observed choices. There are, however, instances where we may get partial information about the potential choices of an agent even though we do not observe them exactly. This situation too can be modeled by using our RP framework technology. We illustrate this in our next example, even though such models will not be investigated in this paper.

**Example 4.** Consider a choice environment of the form $((X, \geq), \mathcal{A})$, and let us suppose that the agent is supposed to finalize her choice in a second period, but today she is able to commit to choosing something (tomorrow) from a subset of a given feasible set. To formalize this scenario, let us fix a correspondence $d : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow 2^X \backslash \{\emptyset\}$ such that $d(A) \subseteq A$ for each $A \in \mathcal{A}$. For each $A$, the interpretation of $d(A)$ is that the agent commits, today, to not choosing anything (tomorrow) from $A \backslash d(A)$. Given that we observe the commitment decisions of the agent, that is, $d$, it is natural to model the final choices of
the agent (which we do not observe) by means of the choice data

$$\mathbb{C} := \{C \in \mathcal{C}(X,A) : d \supseteq C\}.$$  

(Notice that, mathematically, this choice data is the dual opposite of the one we have considered in Example 3; it is the decreasing closure of \{d\} with respect to \(\supseteq\).) For, in the present scenario, all we know about the choice of the agent from a feasible set \(A\) is that this choice being contained within \(d(A)\).

4 RATIONALIZABILITY OF CHOICE DATA (with arbitrary data sets)

4.1 Rationalizability of Choice Correspondences. Let \(X\) be a nonempty set and \(A\) a nonempty subset of \(2^X\backslash\{\emptyset\}\). A choice correspondence \(c\) on \(A\) is said to be rationalizable if there is a complete preorder \(\succsim\) on \(X\) such that

$$c(A) = \max(A, \succsim) \quad \text{for every } A \in \mathcal{A}. \quad (1)$$

In his seminal paper, Richter (1966) has provided a characterization of such choice correspondences by means of what he dubbed the “congruence axiom.” To state this property, let us define the binary relation \(R(c)\) on \(X\) by

$$x \ R(c) \ y \quad \text{if and only if} \quad (x, y) \in c(A) \times A \quad \text{for some } A \in \mathcal{A}.$$  

This relation, introduced first by Samuelson (1938) in the special case of consumption problems, is often called the direct revealed preference relation induced by \(c\) in the literature, while the transitive closure of \(R(c)\) is referred to as the revealed preference relation induced by \(c\). Then, given \(X\) and \(A\), a choice correspondence \(c\) on \(A\) is said to satisfy the congruence axiom if

$$x \ \text{trans}(R(c)) \ y \quad \text{and} \quad y \in c(A) \implies x \in c(A)$$

for every \(A \in \mathcal{A}\) that contains \(x\). As noted in the Introduction, Richter’s Theorem says that a choice correspondence \(c\) on \(A\) is rationalizable iff it satisfies the congruence axiom.

4.2 Monotonic Rationalizability of Choice Data. The notion of rationalizability readily extends to the more general context of RP frameworks. Where \(((X, \geq), A, \mathbb{C})\) is an RP framework, we say that the choice data \(\mathbb{C}\) is rationalizable if at least one \(c\) in \(\mathbb{C}\) is a rationalizable choice correspondence on \(A\). However, this concept does not at all depend on the partial order \(\geq\). Given the interpretation of \(\geq\) as a dominance
relation, it is natural to require the “rationalizability” take place by means of preference relations that are consistent with $\succeq$. (For instance, in the context of commodity choice where $(X, \succeq)$ is $\mathbb{R}^n$ (with the coordinatewise ordering), it is natural to require one’s preferences that are derived from choice data to be consistent with this ordering, thereby reflecting the sentiment that “more is better.”) This leads us to the notion of monotonic rationalizability: The choice data $C$ is **monotonically rationalizable** if there is a $c \in C$ and a complete preorder $\succsim$ on $X$ such that (1) holds and $\succsim$ extends $\succeq$. 12 Obviously, in the context of any Richter-type RP framework (Example 1), the notions of rationalizability and monotonic rationalizability coincide.

### 4.3 The Monotone Congruence Axiom.

Richter’s congruence axiom is readily translated into the context of RP frameworks, but this axiom needs to be strengthened to deliver a characterization of monotonic rationalizability. Where $((X, \succeq), A, C)$ is an RP framework, we say that the choice data $C$ satisfies the **monotone congruence axiom** if there is a $c \in C$ such that

\[
x \ \text{tran}(R(c) \cup \succeq) \ y \quad \text{and} \quad y \in c(A) \quad \text{imply} \quad x \in c(A)
\]

for every $A \in A$ that contains $x$, and

\[
x \ \text{tran}(R(c) \cup \succeq) \ y \quad \text{implies} \quad \text{not} \ y > x.
\]

Clearly, in the context of any Richter-type RP framework, this axiom reduces to the congruence axiom. Furthermore, given Richter’s theorem, a natural conjecture is that a choice data $C$ on $A$ is monotonically rationalizable iff it satisfies the monotone congruence axiom. That this conjecture is true will be proved in Section 4.6 as an immediate consequence of the main theorem of this paper.

### 4.4 Generalized Cyclical Consistency.

Consider the RP framework we have formalized in Example 3.a, where we are given a nonempty finite subset $P$ of $\mathbb{R}_+^n$, and a map $x$ that assigns to every $p \in P$ a nonempty finite subset $x(p)$ of $\mathbb{R}_+^n$ such that $py = pz$ for every $y$ and $z$ in $x(p)$. In this context, Afriat (1967) characterizes rational decision making by means of his famous **cyclical consistency axiom**, which may be stated as follows: For every positive integer $k$, $p^1, ..., p^k \in P$ and $x^1 \in x(p^1), ..., x^k \in x(p^k)$,

\[
p^2x^1 \leq p^2x^2, ..., p^kx^{k-1} \leq p^kx^k \quad \text{and} \quad p^1x^k \leq p^1x^1
\]

**Reminder.** $\succsim$ extends $\succeq$ iff $\succ \subseteq \succ$, where $> \text{ and } >$ are asymmetric parts of $\succeq$ and $\succsim$, respectively.
imply
\[ p^2x^1 = p^2x^2, \ldots, p^kx^{k-1} = p^kx^k \text{ and } p^1x^k = p^1x^1. \]

This axiom is also commonly known in its equivalent formulation (due to Varian (1982)) as the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP).

Let \(((X, \geq), A)\) be any choice environment. We can easily extend this property to the context of a choice correspondence \(c\) on \(((X, \geq), A)\). We say that \(c\) satisfies generalized cyclical consistency if \(c(A) \subseteq \text{MAX}(A, \geq)\) for each \(A \in A\), and for every \(k \in \mathbb{N}, A_1, \ldots, A_k \in A\), and \(x_1 \in c(A_1), \ldots, x_k \in c(A_k)\),

\[ x_1 \in A^1_2, \ldots, x_{k-1} \in A^1_k \text{ and } x_k \in A^1_1 \]

imply
\[ x_1 \in \text{MAX}(A^1_2, \geq), \ldots, x_{k-1} \in \text{MAX}(A^1_k, \geq) \text{ and } x_k \in \text{MAX}(A^1_1, \geq). \]

The first requirement of this property, that is, \(c(A) \subseteq \text{MAX}(A, \geq)\) for each \(A \in A\), is implicit in Afriat’s modeling where every choice problem is of the form \(B(p, I)\) where \(p\) is a price vector and \(I = py\) with \(y\) being the consumption bundle that corresponds to the choice of the agent at prices \(p\). The second requirement is a straightforward reflection of Afriat’s cyclical consistency axiom.

It is not obvious if the generalized cyclical consistency property can yield a general rationalizability theorem along the lines of Afriat’s Theorem, especially since Afriat’s analysis makes substantial use of the linear structure of \(\mathbb{R}^n\), which makes it inapplicable in our general context. It is also not clear how, if at all, this property relates to the monotone congruence axiom. These issues will be clarified next.

4.5 Characterizations of Rationalizability. The structures of the general cyclical consistency property and the monotone congruence axiom are different at a basic level. In particular, the first one applies to a single choice correspondence on \(A\), while the second to a collection \(C\) of choice correspondences on \(A\). (The properties do not become identical when the latter collection is singleton.) However, there is in fact a close connection between these properties: In any RP framework, a choice correspondence satisfies the general cyclical consistency iff the increasing closure of \(c\) with respect to \(\sqsubseteq\), that is, \(c^\uparrow\), satisfies the monotone congruence axiom. As the former property yields a

\[ A^1_i := \{x \in X : y \geq x \text{ for some } y \in A_i\} \text{ for each } i \in [k]. \]
rational representation in the sense of Afriat and the latter in the sense of Richter, this fact yields, in turn, a connection that ties these two notions of rationalizability together. The following is, then, the main theorem of this paper.

**The Rationalizability Theorem I.** Let \((X, \geq, \mathcal{A})\) be a choice environment and \(c\) a choice correspondence on \(\mathcal{A}\). Then, the following are equivalent:

a. \(c^\uparrow\) satisfies the monotone congruence axiom;

b. \(c^\uparrow\) is monotonically rationalizable;

c. \(c\) satisfies generalized cyclical consistency;

d. There is a complete preorder \(\succeq\) on \(X\) that extends both \(\succeq := \text{tran}(R(c) \cup \geq)\) and \(\geq\), and that satisfies
\[
c(A) \subseteq \max(A, \succeq) \quad \text{for every } A \in \mathcal{A};
\] (4)

e. There is a complete preorder \(\succeq\) on \(X\) that extends \(\geq\) and that satisfies (4).

As we will make it precise in the following two sections, this theorem generalizes the Richter- and Afriat-type approaches to revealed preference theory simultaneously. As such, it unifies these two approaches, and demonstrates that, unlike their initial appearance, and how they are treated in the literature, each of these approaches are in fact special cases of a more general viewpoint.

### 4.6 The Monotone Version of Richter’s Theorem

As a corollary of the Rationalizability Theorem I, we next obtain a fairly substantial generalization of Richter’s Theorem.

**Proposition 1.** Let \((X, \geq, \mathcal{A}, C)\) be an RP framework. Then, \(C\) is monotonically rationalizable if, and only if, it satisfies the monotone congruence axiom.

**Proof.** We omit the straightforward proof of the “only if” part of this assertion. To prove its “if” part, take any element \(c\) of \(C\) that satisfies (2) and (3). Then, \(c^\uparrow\) satisfies the monotone congruence axiom, so, by the Rationalizability Theorem I, there is a complete preorder \(\succeq\) on \(X\) that extends both \(\succeq' := \text{tran}(R(c) \cup \geq)\) and \(\geq\), and that satisfies (4). Fix an arbitrary \(A \in \mathcal{A}\), and take any \(y\) in \(\max(A, \succeq)\). Then, for an arbitrarily picked \(x \in c(A)\), we have \(x \succeq' y\). As \(y \succeq x\) and \(\succeq\) extends \(\succeq'\), however, we cannot have \(x \succ' y\). It follows that we also have \(y \succeq' x\), and using (2) yields \(y \in c(A)\). Conclusion: \(c(A) = \max(A, \succeq)\).

In the context of the ordered Richter-type RP framework \(((X, \geq), \mathcal{A}, \{c\})\) that we introduced in Example 3, Proposition 1 says that \(\{c\}\) obeys the monotone congruence
axiom if and only if it is monotonically rationalizable. In particular, we recover Richter’s Theorem as a special case by setting $\geq = \triangle_X$. Note also that if $\{c\}$ obeys the monotone congruence axiom then $c$ obeys generalized cyclical consistency (but the converse is not generally true). Indeed, if $\{c\}$ satisfies the monotone congruence axiom, then it is monotonically rationalizable. This in turn implies that (4) holds, and Rationalizability Theorem I guarantees that $c$ obeys generalized cyclical consistency.

**Example 2.a. [Continued]** Consider the RP-framework $((X, \geq), \mathcal{A}, \{c\})$ we introduced in Example 2.a, which corresponds to the classical consumption choice model. In this framework, $c$ is said to satisfy the **budget identity** if $x \in c(B(p, I))$ implies $px = I$ for every $B(p, I) \in \mathcal{A}$. Now, note that $x R(c) y$ means here that there is a budget set $B(p, I)$ in $\mathcal{A}$ such that $x \in c(B(p, I))$ and $py \leq I$. Consequently, if $x \in c(B(p, I))$ for some $B(p, I) \in \mathcal{A}$, then $x R(c) y$ for all $y \in \mathbb{R}^+_n$ such that $x \geq y$. Given this observation, it is easy to check that a choice correspondence $c$ obeys the monotone congruence axiom if, and only if, it obeys the congruence axiom and the budget identity. In view of Proposition 1, therefore, we conclude: In the context of Example 2.a, a demand correspondence $c$ on $\mathcal{A}$ is monotonically rationalizable iff it obeys the congruence axiom and the budget identity. By contrast, Richter’s Theorem says that $c$ is rationalizable iff it obeys the congruence axiom.

**4.7 On the Structure of Rationalizability.** With the exception of some trivial situations, there are a multitude of complete preference relations that (weakly) rationalize a given choice correspondence as in (4). Part (d) of the Rationalizability Theorem I points to a particular type of rationalization which, as we shall now demonstrate, is linked to the revealed preference relation induced by the choice correspondence in a tightest possible way.

Let $((X, \geq), \mathcal{A})$ be a choice environment and $c$ a choice correspondence on $\mathcal{A}$. We say that a complete preorder $\succsim$ on $X$ is $\geq$-**monotonic** if $x \geq y$ implies $x \succsim y$ for every $x, y \in X$. (Notice that this property is weaker than $\succsim$ being an extension of $\geq$.) In turn, we say that $\succsim$ is a **rationalization for** $c$ if it is $\geq$-monotonic and (4) holds. Clearly, a rationalization for $c$ may be too coarse to be useful. For instance, if $\succsim$ declares every alternative in $X$ as indifferent (that is, $\succsim$ equals $X \times X$), then it is, trivially, a rationalization for $c$. Indeed, Afriat type theorems look for particular types of rationalizations. In particular, we wish to choose a rationalization for $c$ in a way that is tightly linked to the dominance relation of the environment, as well as the observed choices of the agent. Then, it seems desirable that when $x > y$, or when $x$ is revealed to
be strictly preferred to \( y \) by \( c \), the rationalization for \( c \) should declare \( x \) strictly better than \( y \). Part (d) of the Rationalizability Theorem I says that this can be done, provided that \( c \) satisfies generalized cyclical consistency. Our next result demonstrates the precise way in which one can view the preference relation found in that part of the theorem as “minimal” among all possible rationalizations for \( c \).

**Proposition 2.** Let \( ((X, \succeq), \mathcal{A}) \) be a choice environment and \( c \) a choice correspondence on \( \mathcal{A} \). Let \( \succeq \) be a complete preorder satisfying the properties in part (d) of the Rationalizability Theorem I. Then,

\[
\max(A, \succeq) = A \cap c(A)^\uparrow,\text{tran}(R(c) \cup \succeq) \subseteq \max(A, \succeq) \tag{5}
\]

for every \( A \in \mathcal{A} \) and every rationalization \( \succeq \) for \( c \).

**Proof.** Fix an arbitrary rationalization \( \succeq \) for \( c \) and put \( R := R(c) \cup \succeq \). Let us first prove that

\[
\text{tran}(R) \subseteq \succeq \tag{6}
\]

(but note that \( \succeq \) need not be an extension of \( \text{tran}(R) \)). To this end, take any distinct \( x, y \in X \) with \( x \text{ tran}(R) y \). Then, there is a positive integer \( k \) and \( x_0, \ldots, x_k \in X \) such that \( x = x_0 \sim R x_1 \sim R \cdots R x_k = y \). If \( x_{i-1} \sim R(c) x_i \) for any \( i \in [k] \), then \( (x_{i-1}, x_i) \in c(A) \times A \) for some \( A \in \mathcal{A} \), and hence \( x_{i-1} \succeq x_i \) because \( c(A) \subseteq \max(A, \succeq) \). If, on the other hand, \( x_{i-1} \succeq x_i \) for any \( i \in [k] \), then \( x_{i-1} \succeq x_i \) because \( \succeq \) is \( \succeq \)-monotonic. Therefore, \( x = x_0 \succeq x_1 \succeq \cdots \succeq x_k = y \), so, by transitivity of \( \succeq \), we find \( x \succeq y \), as we sought.

We now move to prove (5). Fix an arbitrary \( A \) in \( \mathcal{A} \), and take any \( x \in A \) with \( x \text{ tran}(R) y \) for some \( y \in c(A) \). Then, by (6), \( x \succeq y \) while \( y \in \max(A, \succeq) \) because \( c(A) \subseteq \max(A, \succeq) \). It follows that \( x \in \max(A, \succeq) \), establishing the second part of (5). Next, notice that \( \succeq \) is obviously a rationalization for \( c \), so the second part of (5) entails the \( \succeq \) part of the asserted equality in (5). To complete our proof, then, take any \( x \) in \( \max(A, \succeq) \). Now pick any \( y \) in \( c(A) \) and notice that, by (4), we must have \( x \sim y \). On the other hand, as \( (y, x) \in c(A) \times A \), we have \( y \sim R(c) x \), and hence, \( y \text{ tran}(R) x \). As \( \succeq \) extends \( \text{tran}(R) \) by hypothesis, and \( x \sim y \), therefore, \( y \text{ tran}(R) x \) cannot hold strictly, that is, we have \( x \text{ tran}(R) y \), which means \( x \in c(A)^\uparrow,\text{tran}(R) \), as we sought.

In words, given any feasible set \( A \) in the choice environment, any element in \( c(A) \), or any element in \( A \) that is revealed preferred to at least some chosen alternative in \( A \), has to be declared optimal with respect to every rationalization of \( c \). Furthermore, it is precisely the set of all such elements that the rationalization identified in part
(d) of the Rationalizability Theorem I declares optimal. It is in this sense that this preference relation is “minimal” among all possible rationalizations for $c$. The elements that are declared optimal by this relation are the only ones that an observer can robustly conclude to be optimal by the “true” preference relation of the decision maker (which can, in general, only be partially identified). We will show in the next section that the classical construction of the preference relations in Afriat’s Theorem are not robust in this sense.

4.8 A Non-Finite Version of Afriat’s Theorem. Let $((X, \succeq), \mathcal{A})$ be a choice environment, and $c$ a choice correspondence on $\mathcal{A}$. Consider the RP framework $((X, \succeq), \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C})$, where

$$
\mathcal{C} := \{C \in \mathcal{C}(X, \mathcal{A}) : C \supseteq c\}.
$$

(This framework generalizes the Afriat-type RP frameworks as we have introduced them in Example 3.) The equivalence of the statements (c) and (e) of the Rationalizability Theorem I says that $c$ satisfies the generalized cyclical consistency if, and only if, there is a complete preorder $\succeq$ on $X$ that extends $\succeq$ and that satisfies

$$
c(A) \subseteq \max(A, \succeq) \quad \text{for every } A \in \mathcal{A}.
$$

To demonstrate the power of this observation, let us specialize it to the context of Afriat (1967), but note that precisely the same argument can be made in, say, the context of Forges and Minelli (2009).

Example 3.a. [Continued] Consider the RP-framework $((X, \succeq), \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C})$ we introduced in Example 3.a, and define $P$ and $x$ as in that example, but allowing both $P$ and any $x(p)$ to be infinite sets. By definition, $x$ satisfies the generalized cyclical consistency iff, for every $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $p^1, ..., p^k \in P$, and $x^1, ..., x^k \in x(p)$,

$$
p^2x^1 \leq p^2x^2, ..., p^kx^{k-1} \leq p^kx^k \quad \text{and} \quad p^1x^k \leq p^1x^1
$$

imply that every one of these inequalities hold as equalities. In turn, by the Rationalizability Theorem I, this property holds iff there is a strictly monotonic preference relation $\succsim$ on $\mathbb{R}_+^n$, that is, a complete preorder on $\mathbb{R}_+^n$ that extends $\succeq$, such that $x(p) \subseteq \max(B(p, px(p)), \succsim)$ for each $p \in P$. Clearly, this is very much the choice-theoretic gist of Afriat’s Theorem.

It is important to note, however, that the nature of rationalization obtained here is markedly different from that obtained in Afriat’s analysis (even in the finite case).
Indeed, the rationalization obtained through the famous Afriat inequalities is convex (indeed, it has a concave utility representation, see Fostel et al. (2004)), so the preference obtained through that procedure can have a set of optimal bundles in a given budget set that is strictly larger than that according to the rationalization found in the Rationalization Theorem I. (Recall (5).) In fact, depending on the nature of the data, Afriat’s rationalization may be unduly coarse. To wit, suppose we have choice data about an individual at the same prices $p$ at two different times, say, $x_1$ and $x_2$, with $px_1 = px_2$. Suppose also that $x_1 \neq x_2$, so, what we observe is precisely two distinct elements in $x(p)$. Afriat’s rationalization would then entail that every bundle on the line segment between $x_1$ and $x_2$ is also optimal for the individual at prices $p$, even though there is absolutely no choice data to support this contention. By contrast, the rationalization found in the Rationalization Theorem I would declare only $x_1$ and $x_2$ as optimal at prices $p$.

5 RATIONALIZABILITY OF CHOICE DATA (with finite data sets)

The classical statement of Afriat’s Theorem seems to deliver more information about the structure of rationalization. Indeed, in that theorem, one not only finds a monotonic preference relation that rationalizes the choice data, but also the fact that this relation can be chosen to have a continuous utility representation. This fact owes, obviously, to the particular choice domain that is adopted by Afriat which possesses a well-behaved topological structure. However, even if we impose such a structure on $X$ in the context of Richter’s Theorem, we would not be able to guarantee the continuity of the rationalizing preference relation. The real force behind Afriat’s Theorem is, in fact, the fact that this result works in a choice environment with only finitely many choice problems. This is actually quite pleasant because the “finiteness” hypothesis is unexceptionable from an empirical point of view. The objective of this section is to prove that, given this hypothesis, the additional structure that Afriat’s Theorem delivers would also obtain in the context of any well-behaved RP framework. It turns out that the very special structure of Afriat’s Theorem is not at all needed for this fact.

5.1 Rationalizability by a (Continuous) Utility Function. Where $((X, \geq), \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C})$ is an RP framework, we say that the choice data $\mathcal{C}$ is rationalizable by a utility function if there is at least one $c$ in $\mathcal{C}$ and a (utility) function $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$c(A) = \arg \max_{x \in A} u(x) \quad \text{for each } A \in \mathcal{A}.$$
It is natural to ask for \( u \) to be strictly increasing in \( \geq \) and, when \( X \) is a topological space, we would also like \( u \) to be continuous.

5.2 Characterizations of Continuous Rationalizability. We now show that, in finite environments, that is, when the set \( \mathcal{A} \) of all choice problems to be observed is finite, rather basic assumptions allows restating the Rationalizability Theorem I in terms of continuous utility functions.

The Rationalizability Theorem II. Let \(((X, \geq), \mathcal{A})\) be a choice environment such that \( X \) is a locally compact and separable metric space, \( \geq \) a continuous partial order on \( X \), and \( \mathcal{A} \) a finite collection of compact subsets of \( X \). Let \( c \) be a closed-valued choice correspondence on \( \mathcal{A} \). Then, the following are equivalent:

a. \( c \uparrow \) satisfies the monotone congruence axiom;

b. \( c \uparrow \) is rationalizable by a function \( u : X \to \mathbb{R} \) that is continuous and strictly increasing in \( \geq \);

c. \( c \) satisfies generalized cyclical consistency;

d. There is a function \( u : X \to \mathbb{R} \) that is continuous, strictly increasing in \( \text{tran}(R(c) \cup \geq) \) and \( \geq \), and satisfies

\[
  c(A) \subseteq \arg \max_{x \in A} u(x) \quad \text{for each } A \in \mathcal{A};
\]

(7)

e. There is a function \( u : X \to \mathbb{R} \) that is continuous in \( \geq \), and satisfies (7).

5.3 Continuous Versions of Richter’s Theorem. It is not a priori obvious how one may obtain a utility representation in the context of Richter’s theorem, for the arbitrariness of \( \mathcal{A} \) makes it difficult to ensure the continuity of the rationalizing preference relations. However, at least when \( \mathcal{A} \) is finite, this sort of a difficulty does not arise. Just as Proposition 1 follows from Rationalizability Theorem I, so by an analogous argument we know that the following characterization follows from Rationalizability Theorem II: Let \(((X, \geq), \mathcal{A})\) be a choice environment obeying the conditions in Rationalizability Theorem II and suppose that \( 
\mathcal{C} \) is a collection of closed-valued choice correspondences on \( \mathcal{A} \). Then \( \mathcal{C} \) is monotonically rationalizable by a continuous and strictly \( \geq \)-increasing utility function if, and only if, it satisfies the monotone congruence axiom. When \( \mathcal{C} \) consists of just a single correspondence, we obtain the following result.

Proposition 3. Let \(((X, \geq), \mathcal{A}, \{c\})\) be an RP framework such that \( X \) is a locally compact and separable metric space, \( \geq \) a continuous partial order on \( X \), \( \mathcal{A} \) a finite
collection of compact subsets of $X$, and $c$ a closed-valued choice correspondence. Then, $c$ satisfies the (monotone) congruence axiom if, and only if, it is rationalizable by a utility function on $X$ that is continuous (and strictly increasing in $\geq$).

This result provides a continuous, and continuous and monotonic version, of Richter’s Theorem, under the condition that we observe the agent’s choice only in finitely many instances. Where $((X, \geq), \mathcal{A}, \{c\})$ stands for the RP-framework of Example 2.a, with $\mathcal{A}$ being a finite subset of $\{B(p, I) : (p, I) \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_{++}\}$ and $c$ being closed-valued, Proposition 3 says that $c$ is rationalizable by a continuous (and strictly increasing) utility function on $\mathbb{R}_+$ iff it obeys the congruence axiom (and the budget identity).\(^{14}\)

5.4 Afriat’s Theorem, Revisited. Consider the RP-framework $((X, \geq), \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C})$ of Example 3.a (with $P$ being finite set). In this context, the equivalence of the statements (c) and (d) in the Rationalizability Theorem II means that, $x$ obeys generalized cyclical consistency if, and only if, there is a continuous and strictly increasing utility function $u : \mathbb{R}_n^+ \to \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$x(p) \subseteq \operatorname{arg \, max}\{u(y) : y \in B(p, px(p))\} \quad \text{for every } p \in P.$$ 

In other words, requiring $P$ to be finite allows us to strengthen the conclusion we obtained in Section 4.8: here we find a monotonic preference rationalizing the data that is also representable by a continuous utility function. Note that this result is stronger than the standard Afriat’s Theorem (as stated in the Introduction) since we do not require $x(p)$ to be finite. Moreover, for the reasons outlined in Section 4.8, the utility function we find here is not the same as the concave utility function constructed from the classical Afriat inequalities.

6 CONCLUSION

We have introduced in this paper a framework for revealed preference theory in which the grand alternative space is modeled as a partially ordered set and the traditional role of a “choice correspondence” is replaced with what we call “choice data” which is simply a set of choice correspondences. This framework allows us to formulate generalized versions of the fundamental rationality postulates of Richter (1966) and Afriat (1967).

\(^{14}\)To the best of our knowledge, both parts of this finding are new. We note, however, that Chiappori and Rochet (1987) have a related result where they characterize finite data sets that are rationalizable by strictly quasi-concave, strictly increasing, and differentiable utility functions.
While this is not immediately transparent from the original formulations of these axioms, it is shown here that they are in fact closely connected, thereby pointing to a way of seeing the main rationalizability results of these two seminal papers, as well as numerous other “rationalizability by a preference relation” type theorems obtained in the earlier literature, as special cases of a single rationalizability result. Furthermore, introducing some basic topological structure and presuming that we can observe an agent making choice decisions only finitely many times allow us to formulate this result in the “rationalizability by a utility function” form, extending the work of Afriat (1967) to arbitrary choice domains.

The rationalizability results we have reported in this paper demonstrate the unifying nature of the choice framework we have introduced. This framework also has the important advantage of allowing us to model choice data availability constraints explicitly, regardless of the nature of choice problems. We hope that this framework will prove useful for modeling any type of choice situation, be it rational or boundedly rational.\footnote{For boundedly rational choice theories, however, there is the added difficulty of checking whether or not one can extend a representation on a given (observable) collection of feasible sets to a larger (potentially unobservable) collection of feasible sets. This important point, which is readily formalized in terms of RP frameworks, has recently been made forcefully by de Clippel and Rozen (2013).}

\section*{APPENDIX}

\textbf{Proof of the Rationalizability Theorem I.} (a)⇒(b) Assume that (a) is valid. Then, there is a choice correspondence \(d\) on \(\mathcal{A}\) such that (i) \(d \supseteq c\) and (ii) \(d\) satisfies the two requirements of the monotone congruence axiom. Put \(\mathcal{B} := \mathcal{A} \cup \{\{x, y\} \in 2^X : x \geq y\}\), and define \(e : \mathcal{B} \to 2^X\) as:

\[
e(B) := \begin{cases} 
  d(B), & \text{if } B \in \mathcal{A}, \\
  \max(B, \geq), & \text{if } B \in \mathcal{B}\setminus\mathcal{A}.
\end{cases}
\]

Obviously, \(e\) is a choice correspondence on \(\mathcal{B}\). Moreover, \(e\) satisfies the congruence axiom. (To see this, take any \(x, y \in X\) such that \(x \ \text{tran}(R(e))\ y\ and \(y \in e(B)\) for some \(B \in \mathcal{B}\) with \(x \in B\). But it is readily checked that \(R(e) = R(d) \cup \geq\). Consequently, if \(B \in \mathcal{A}\), the monotone congruence axiom yields \(x \in d(B) = e(B)\), and if \(B \in \mathcal{B}\setminus\mathcal{A}\), then \(B = \{x, y\}\) and \(y \geq x\) (by definition of \(e\)), so again by the monotone congruence axiom, we find \(x = y \in e(B)\).)

We now use Szpilrajn’s Theorem to find a complete preorder \(\succeq\) on \(X\) that extends \(\text{tran}(R(e))\). Given an arbitrarily fixed \(B \in \mathcal{A}\), notice that if \(x \in e(B)\) and \(y \in B\), then...
There is an \( x \in \text{max}(B, \succcurlyeq) \). Conversely, suppose there is an \( x \in \text{max}(B, \succcurlyeq) \). Then, pick any \( y \in e(B) \) so that \( y \in R(e) x \), and hence, \( y \in R(e) x \). The reverse of this relation cannot hold, because, otherwise, we would get \( x \in e(B) \) by the congruence axiom (on \( e \)). Thus, \( y \in R(e) x \) holds strictly, that is, \( y \in R(e) x \). As \( \succcurlyeq \) extends \( R(e) \), therefore, we find \( y \succ x \), contradicting \( x \) being a \( \succcurlyeq \)-maximum in \( B \). Conclusion:

\[
e(B) = \text{max}(B, \succcurlyeq) \quad \text{for every } B \in A.
\]

Obviously, this implies that \( d(A) = \text{max}(A, \succcurlyeq) \) for each \( A \in A \). It remains to show that \( \succcurlyeq \) extends \( \geq \). To this end, take any \( x, y \in X \) with \( x > y \). If \( \{x, y\} \in A \), then \( y \in d\{x, y\} \) cannot hold due to the monotone congruence axiom, and hence \( \{x\} = d\{x, y\} \), while if \( \{x, y\} \notin A \), we trivially have \( \{x\} = d\{x, y\} \). Consequently, \( \{x\} = \text{max}(\{x, y\}, \succcurlyeq) \), that is, \( x > y \), as we sought.

(b) \( \Rightarrow \) (c) Assume that (b) is valid. Then, there is a complete preorder \( \succcurlyeq \) on \( X \) and a \( d \) in \( c \) such that \( \succcurlyeq \) extends \( \geq \) and \( d(A) = \text{max}(A, \succcurlyeq) \) for each \( A \in A \). It follows that

\[
c(A) \subseteq \text{max}(A, \succcurlyeq) \subseteq \text{MAX}(A, \geq) \quad \text{for every } A \in A.
\] 

Now take any \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), \( A_1, \ldots, A_k \in A \), and \( (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in c(A_1) \times \cdots \times c(A_k) \) such that \( x_1 \in A_2^i, \ldots, x_{k-1} \in A_k^i \) and \( x_k \in A_1^i \). Then, there exists a \( (y_1, \ldots, y_k) \in A_1 \times \cdots \times A_k \) such that \( x_2 \succcurlyeq y_2 \geq x_1, \ldots, x_k \succcurlyeq y_k \geq x_{k-1} \) and \( x_1 \succcurlyeq y_1 \geq x_k \). As \( \succcurlyeq \) extends \( \geq \), therefore, \( x_1 \succcurlyeq x_2 \succcurlyeq \cdots \succcurlyeq x_1 \), so, by transitivity of \( \succcurlyeq \), we find \( x_{i-1} \in \text{max}(A_i, \succcurlyeq) \) for each \( i \in [k] \) and \( x_k \in \text{max}(A_0, \succcurlyeq) \). In view of (8), then, \( x_{i-1} \in \text{MAX}(A_i^i, \geq) \) for each \( i \in [k] \) and \( x_k \in \text{MAX}(A_1^i, \geq) \), as sought.

(c) \( \Rightarrow \) (d) Assume that (c) is valid. Define

\[
\succcurlyeq' := \text{tran}(R(c) \cup \geq),
\]

where \( R \) is the direct revealed preference relation induced by \( c \) (Section 4.1). Clearly, \( \succcurlyeq' \) is a preorder on \( X \). We use Szpilrajn’s Theorem to find a complete preorder \( \succcurlyeq \) on \( X \) that extends \( \succcurlyeq' \). As \( R(c) \subseteq \succcurlyeq \), we have \( x \succcurlyeq y \) if there is an \( A \in A \) with \( (x, y) \in c(A) \times A \). It follows that \( c(A) \subseteq \text{max}(A, \succcurlyeq) \) for every \( A \in A \). It remains to show that \( \succcurlyeq \) extends \( \geq \), and for this, it is enough to show that \( > \subseteq >' \). To this end, take any two elements \( x \) and \( y \) of \( X \) such that \( x > y \). By definition of \( \succcurlyeq' \), we have \( x \succcurlyeq' y \). To derive a contradiction, suppose \( y \succcurlyeq' x \) holds as well. Then, there exist a positive integer \( k \) and \( x_0, \ldots, x_k \) in \( X \) such that

\[
y = x_0 (R(c) \cup \geq) \cdots (R(c) \cup \geq) x_k = x.
\]
Put \( I := \{ i \in [k] : x_{i-1} \ R(c) \ x_i \} \). If \( I = \emptyset \), then transitivity of \( \geq \) and (9) yield \( y \geq x \), a contradiction. If \( I \) is a singleton, say, \( I = \{ i \} \), then again by transitivity of \( \geq \), we get \( x_i \geq x > y \geq x_{i-1} \), while \( x_{i-1} \ R(c) \ x_i \). But then there is an \( A \in \mathcal{A} \) such that \( x_{i-1} \in c(A) \) and \( x_i \in A \), while \( x_A \notin \text{MAX}(A, \geq) \), and this contradicts (c). Finally, suppose \( I := |I| \geq 2 \), and enumerate \( I \) as \( \{ i_1, \ldots, i_l \} \), where \( i_l > \cdots > i_1 \). By definition of \( I \), for each \( j \in [l] \) there is an \( A_j \in \mathcal{A} \) such that \( x_{i_j-1} \in c(A_j) \) and \( x_{i_j} \in A_j \). On the other hand, again by definition of \( I \), we have \( x_{i_{j-1}} \geq x_{i_j} \) for each \( j = 2, \ldots, l \), while

\[
x_{i_j} \geq x_k = x > y \geq x_{i_{j-1}},
\]

Consequently, \( x_{i_2} \in A_{i_1}^1, \ldots, x_{i_l} \in A_{i_{l-1}}^1 \) and \( x_{i_1} \in A_{i_1}^1 \). It then follows from (c) that \( x_{i_1} \in \text{MAX}(A_{i_1}^1, \geq) \), but as \( x_{i_l} \in A_l \), this contradicts (10).

(d)\(\Rightarrow\)(e) This is obvious.

(e)\(\Rightarrow\)(a) Assume that (e) is valid. Where \( \succ \) is as given in the statement of (e), define \( d : \mathcal{A} \to 2^X \) as \( d(A) := \text{max}(A, \succ) \). As \( \text{max}(A, \succ) \) contains \( c(A) \), it is nonempty for any \( A \in \mathcal{A} \), so \( d \) is a choice correspondence on \( \mathcal{A} \) such that \( c \subseteq d \), that is, \( d \in c' \). Take any \( x \) and \( y \) in \( X \) with \( x \ \text{tran}(R(d) \cup \geq) \ y \). Then, there is a positive integer \( k \), elements \( A_0, \ldots, A_k \) of \( \mathcal{A} \), and \( (x_0, \ldots, x_k) \in A_0 \times \cdots \times A_k \) such that \( x = x_0, (x_{i-1}, x_i) \in d(A_i) \times A_i \) for each \( i \in [k] \), and \( y = x_k \). It follows from the definition of \( d \) that \( x = x_0 \succ \cdots \succ x_k = y \), so, by transitivity of \( \succ \), we find \( x \succ y \). As \( \succ \) extends \( \geq \), therefore, we cannot have \( y > x \). Furthermore, if \( y \in d(A) \) for some \( A \in \mathcal{A} \) with \( x \in A \), then \( x \succ y \succ z \) for all \( z \in A \), and hence, \( x \in d(A) \). Thus: \( C \) satisfies the monotone congruence axiom.

**Proof of the Rationalizability Theorem II.** It is plain that (b) and (e) are equivalent, and (d) implies (e). From Rationalizability Theorem I we know that (a) implies (c) and that (e) implies (a). We will complete the proof of the theorem by showing that (c) implies (d). Let us denote the direct revealed preference induced by \( c \) as \( R \), that is, we put \( R := R(c) \). We first show that \( \succ^R : = \text{tran}(R \cup \geq) \) is a closed preorder on \( X \). We couch the argument in a few easy steps.

**[Step 1]** If \( S \) and \( T \) are two compact binary relations on \( X \), then \( S \circ T \) is compact as well. As \( X \) is a metric space, we may work with sequential compactness instead of compactness. Let \( (x_m) \) and \( (y_m) \) be two sequences in \( X \) with \( x_m \ S \circ T \ y_m \) for each \( m \). Then, there is a sequence \( (z_m) \) in \( X \) such that \( x_m \ S \ z_m \ T \ y_m \) for each \( m \). As \( S \) is compact, there is a strictly increasing sequence \( (m_k) \) of positive integers such that \( (x_{m_k}, z_{m_k}) \to (x, z) \) for some \( (x, z) \in S \). As \( z_{m_k} \ T \ y_{m_k} \) for each \( k \), and \( T \) is compact,
there is a subsequence \((m_{k_i})\) of \((m_k)\) such that \((z_{m_{k_i}}, y_{m_{k_i}}) \to (z', y)\) for some \((z', y) \in T\). As \((z_{m_k})\) is a subsequence of \((z_{m_k})\), we must have \(z' = z\), and it follows that \(x S y \in T\), that is, \(x S \circ T y\).

[Step 2] \(R^k\) is a compact subset of \(X \times X\) for each \(k = 1, 2, \ldots\). To prove this, observe first that

\[
R = \bigcup\{c(A) \times A : A \in \mathcal{A}\}.
\]

As \(X\) is compact and \(c\) is closed-valued, \(c(A)\) is a compact subset of \(X\) for any \(A \in \mathcal{A}\). Therefore, \(R\) is the union of finitely many compact sets in \(X \times X\) (relative to the product topology), so it is compact. Applying what we have found in Step 1 inductively, therefore, yields our claim.

[Step 3] \(\text{tran}(R)\) is a compact subset of \(X \times X\). The key observation here is:

\[
\text{tran}(R) = R^1 \cup \cdots \cup R^{|\mathcal{A}|+1}.
\]  

(11)

To see this, take any integer \(k > |\mathcal{A}| + 1\), and any \(x, y \in X\) with \(x R^k y\). Then, there exist \(x_0, \ldots, x_{k+1} \in X\) such that \(x = x_0 R x_1 R \cdots R x_k R x_{k+1} = y\). This means that there exist \(A_0, \ldots, A_k \in \mathcal{A}\) such that \((x_{i-1}, x_i) \in c(A_{i-1}) \times A_i\) for each \(i \in [k]\). As \(k > |\mathcal{A}| + 1\), there must be an \(i \in [k]\) such that \(A_i = A_j\) for some \(j \in \{i + 1, \ldots, k\}\) here. Let \(i\) be the smallest such index. Then, \(x = x_0 R x_1 R \cdots R x_i R x_{i+1} R \cdots R x_{k+1} = y\), that is, \(x R^{k-(j-i)} y\). This proves that \(R^k \subseteq R^1 \cup \cdots \cup R^{|\mathcal{A}|+1}\) for every \(k > |\mathcal{A}| + 1\), and hence follows (11). But then, in view of what we have found in Step 2, we see that \(\text{tran}(R)\) is the union of finitely many compact subsets of \(X \times X\), and hence, it is itself compact in \(X \times X\).

Now, for any \(x\) and \(y\) in \(X\), we have \(x \text{ tran}(\text{tran}(R) \cup \geq) y\) iff there exist \(x_0, \ldots, x_k \in X\) such that

\[
x = x_0 \text{ tran}(R) \cup \geq \cdots \text{ tran}(R) \cup \geq x_k = y.
\]

As both \(\text{tran}(R)\) and \(\geq\) are transitive, it is without loss of generality to take \(k = 2l + 1\) for some positive integer \(l\) here to write

\[
x = x_0 \geq x_1 \text{ tran}(R) x_2 \geq \cdots \text{ tran}(R) x_{2k} \geq x_{2k+1} = y.
\]  

(12)

For any positive integer \(l\), we next define the binary relation \(S^l\) on \(X\) by \(x S^l y\) iff (12) holds. Consequently:

\[
\text{tran}(\text{tran}(R) \cup \geq) = S^1 \cup S^2 \cup \cdots.
\]  

(13)
[Step 4] \( \text{tran}(R) \cup \geq = S^1 \cup \ldots \cup S^{|A|+1} \). Indeed, we can show that \( S^l \subseteq S^1 \cup \ldots \cup S^{|A|+1} \) for every \( l > |A| + 1 \), exactly as we have done this for \( R \) in Step 3. In view of (13), therefore, we have \( \text{tran}(\text{tran}(R) \cup \geq) = S^1 \cup \ldots \cup S^{|A|+1} \). Our claim thus follows from the obvious observation that \( \text{tran}(R) \cup \geq = \text{tran}(\text{tran}(R) \cup \geq) \).

[Step 5] \( S^l \) is a closed subset of \( X \times X \) for each \( l = 1, 2, \ldots \). Take any two sequences \((x^m)\) and \((y^m)\) in \( X \) such that \( x^m \to x \) and \( y^m \to y \) for some \((x, y) \in X \times X\). Then, for each \( m \), there exist \( z_0^m, \ldots, z_{2l+1}^m \in X \) such that

\[
x^m = z_0^m \geq z_1^m \text{tran}(R) z_2^m \geq \ldots \text{tran}(R) z_{2l}^m \geq z_{2l+1}^m = y.
\]

As \( z_i^m \text{tran}(R) z_{i+1}^m \) for each odd \( i \in [2l + 1] \), and \( \text{tran}(R) \) is compact in \( X \times X \) (Step 3), there exists a strictly increasing sequence \((m_k)\) of positive integers such that \( (z_i^{m_k}) \) and \( (z_{i+1}^{m_k}) \) converge for each \( i \in [2l + 1] \). Since both \( \text{tran}(R) \) and \( \geq \) are closed in \( X \times X \), taking the subsequential limits in (14) yields

\[
x \geq \lim z_1^{m_k} \text{tran}(R) \lim z_2^{m_k} \geq \ldots \text{tran}(R) \lim z_{2l}^{m_k} \geq \lim z_{2l+1}^{m_k} = y.
\]

Thus \( x \ S^l y \), as we sought.

We are now ready to complete the proof that \( (c) \) implies \( (d) \). Combining what is established in Steps 4 and 5, we see that \( \succ' := \text{tran}(R \cup \geq) \) is a continuous preorder on \( X \). We may thus apply Levin’s Theorem to find a continuous real map \( u \) on \( X \) such that \( u \) is strictly increasing with respect to \( \succ' \). From the proof of Rationalizability Theorem I, we know that \( \succ' \) is an extension of \( \geq \). Therefore, \( u \) is also strictly increasing with respect to \( \geq \). Lastly, since \( R \subseteq \succ' \), for any \( A \in \mathcal{A} \) with \( x \in c(A) \) we have \( x \succ' y \), and hence, \( u(x) \geq u(y) \), for all \( y \in A \). Our proof is complete.

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