

Advances in the Social Sciences: A Conference in Honor of Peyton Young

25 - 27 June 2015, Manor Road Building



Thursday, June 25			
19:00 - 22:00	dinner @ Nuffield College ("jacket and tie")		
Friday, June 26			
	Lecture theatre	Seminar room A	Seminar room C
9:00 - 9:45	ROGER MYERSON: Sequential equilibria of multi-stage games with infinite sets of types and actions (with Philip Reny)	BEZALEL PELEG: Choosing k from m : Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered (with Hans Peters)	SALVADOR BARBERA: Ordinal relative satisficing behavior (with Alejandro Neme)
9:50 - 10:35	VINCENT CRAWFORD: Efficient mechanisms for level- k bilateral trading	WILLIAM THOMSON: On the adjudication of conflicting claims	PRADEEP DUBEY: Money as minimal complexity (with Siddhartha Sahi and Martin Shubik)
10:35 - 11:00	coffee / tea break		
11:00 - 11:45	PAUL KLEMPERER: In honour of Peyton's earliest papers: geometry and equilibrium (with Elizabeth Baldwin)	INGELA ALGER: Evolution leads to Kantian morality (with Jörgen Weibull)	FRANCOISE FORGES: Cheap talk and commitment in Bayesian games (with Ulrich Horst and Antoine Salomon)
11:50 - 12:35	PAUL GLASSERMAN: Hidden illiquidity with multiple central counterparties (with Ciamac Moallemi and Kai Yuan)	SAMUEL BOWLES: The origin of private property: Archaeology meets evolutionary modelling (with Jung-Kyoo Choi)	BERNHARD VON STENGEL: Index and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria (with Anne Balthasar)
12:35 - 13:45	lunch		
13:45 - 14:30	FERNANDO VEGA-REDONDO: Bargaining and arbitrage in endogenous trading networks (with Arnold Polanski)	YAIR TAUMAN: Attacking the unknown weapons of a possible provocateur: How intelligence affects the strategic interaction (with Artyom Jelnov and Richard Zeckhauser)	PAUL MILGROM: Equilibrium selection in multi-player games with auction applications (with Josh Mollner)
14:35 - 15:20	RAKESH VOHRA: Network formation and systemic risk (with Selman Erol)	BRIAN SKYRMS: Dynamics of signaling games	DAVID SCHMEIDLER: An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information (with Gary Charness and Dan Levin)
15:20 - 15:45	coffee / tea break		
15:45 - 17:00	PANEL: Michel Balinski, Kenneth Binmore, Larry Samuelson, Thomas Schelling, Jörgen Weibull (chair) (Lecture theatre)		
17:00 - 19:00	walk to and surprise @ Magdalen College		
19:00 - 22:00	dinner @ Magdalen College ("jacket and tie")		

Saturday, June 27

	Lecture theatre	Seminar room A	Seminar room C
9:00 - 9:45	SHMUEL ZAMIR: Representation of constitutions under incomplete information (with Bezalel Peleg)	DEAN FOSTER: Partial monitoring - classification, regret bounds, and algorithms (with Gabor Bartok, David Pal, Alexander Rakhlin and Csaba Szepesvari)	HERVE MOULIN: One dimensional mechanism design
9:50 - 10:35	BARRY O'NEILL: Apportioning an intergovernmental organization's cost by virtual taxation	JOSHUA EPSTEIN: Agent_Zero and generative social science	EHUD LEHRER: On the failures of bonus plans (with David Lagziel)
10:35 - 11:00	coffee / tea break		
11:00 - 11:45	RIDA LARAKI: Majority measures (with Michel Balinski)	MARY BURKE: Body weight norms across time and place	JOSEF HOFBAUER: Coarse correlated equilibria
11:50 - 12:35	HERBERT GINTIS: Homo Ludens: Social rationality and political behavior	JACK EDMONDS: The trouble with game theory	SERGIU HART: Complexity of correlated equilibria, and smooth and leaky calibration (with Noam Nisan and Dean Foster)
12:35 - 13:45	lunch		
13:45 - 14:30	CHRIS WALLACE: Information use and acquisition in price-setting oligopolies (with David Myatt)	JEFF SHAMMA: Stochastic stability selections	THOMAS SCHELLING: Prisoner's dilemma, and the limitations of game theory
14:35 - 15:20	EDI KARNI: Awareness of unawareness: A theory of decision making in the face of ignorance (with Marie-Louise Vierø)	WILLIAM SANDHOLM: Large deviations and stochastic stability (with Mathias Staudigl and Michel Benaim)	ABRAHAM NEYMAN: Learning with finite memory
15:20 - 16:05	IAIN MCLEAN: Peyton Young's seminal contribution to recovering the lost history of social choice	SYLVAIN SORIN: Finite composite games: equilibria and dynamics (with Cheng Wan)	ERAN SHMAYA: Bayesian learning in slowly changing environments (with Ehud Kalai)
16:05 - 16:30	coffee / tea break		
16:30 - 17:15	PEYTON YOUNG: What precisely is game theory? (Lecture theatre)		
17:15 - open	The King's Arms pub and departure		

Information


Scientific committee: Ehud Kalai, Jörgen Weibull **Organizers:** Bary Pradelski, Heinrich Nax, Thomas Norman, Yuval Heller (hpyoung70@gmail.com)

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