

# Turning resource wealth into sustainable and equitable development: International Experiences\*

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- Overview the research literature; what does international experience tell us?
- Sketch the policy implications

\* Presentation to the Government of Ghana conference on oil wealth, Accra, 25/26 Feb 2008

The summary of international experience:

- ***On average:***
- Growth: each 1% point increase in the share of natural resources in GDP reduces growth by 0.09% per annum
- Resource booms are short-lived: An increase in resource prices has a short-run positive and long-run negative effect on the income of a resource exporter.
- Resource rich economies have low investment rates and ***very*** low real savings rates:
- Savings adjusted for change in 'natural wealth';
  - Nigeria, -30% GDP
  - Central Asia, approximately 0% GDP

- ***But – plenty of exceptions:***
- Role of resources in history – UK, Germany, US.
- 4 resource rich developing economies had long term investment rates  $> 25\%$  GDP and growth rates  $> 4\%$  pa (Botswana, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand).
  
- ***Effects are conditional:***
- Countries with 'good institutions' do not have the resource curse.
  
- ***What are the mechanisms?*** Economic and political:
- Crowding out
- Volatility and sustainability
- Institution building

**1: Crowding out:** Natural resources can reduce the return to doing other activities:

- The 'Dutch disease':
  - Resource revenues crowd out other exports (via appreciated real exchange rate)
  - The lost export sectors may be 'dynamic sectors' – with increasing returns, learning, foreign direct investment, technology transfer
  - Exports from these 'dynamic sectors' matters for growth:  
In a 'growth acceleration' the share of exports to GDP is 11% higher, real exchange rate 22% lower than previously.
  - Evidence that around 10% of resource curse effect due to Dutch disease (?).
  
- Entrepreneurship:
  - Talent diverted into unproductive rent seeking

## Crowding out

- Education: Increase in natural capital share of wealth by 5 percentage points associated with secondary enrolment 10 percentage points lower.



Fig. 2. Expenditure on education and natural capital.

### ***2: Volatility and sustainability:***

- Resource booms are short-lived: An increase in resource prices will have a short-run positive and long-run negative effect on the income of a resource exporter.
  - Direct effect of price boom such as 2006-07:
  - Additional short run growth effect, raises GDP 2.5%
  - Additional long run (25 year) effect, reduces GDP 26%.
- Resource rich countries borrow excessively – evidence of debt overhang from the 1970s.
- Resource rich countries embark on unsustainable social programmes (Netherlands, 1970s)
- Resource rich countries have high levels of public consumption and this slows down growth.

### ***2: Volatility and sustainability (continued):***

- Countries with exports concentrated in natural resources are more volatile according to most indicators.
- Plenty of evidence that volatility is bad for investment and growth, particularly in countries where the financial sector is weak.
- Statistical evidence that volatility is one of the most important channels through which the resource curse operates.

### ***3: Retarded institutional reform***

'Weak institutions' amplify the negative effects we have seen so far.

What sorts of institutions mitigate the resource curse?

- Democracy is good for growth ***except*** in resource rich countries
- In resource rich countries, parliamentary democracy is better than presidential democracy
- In resource rich countries, democracy ***plus*** strong checks and balances (measured by the power of groups to constrain government) overcomes the resource curse.

## ***3: Retarded institutional reform (continued)***

Weak institutions amplify negative effects **AND** resource abundance weakens institutions:

- Increased opportunities for corruption
- State is able to use funds to:
  - Postpone reform
  - Buy-off opposition: -- public sector jobs
- Checks and balances are weakened by resource abundance:  
A hypothetical country with resource rents worth 30% GDP and average income would see declines (over 30 years) of:
  - checks and balances score drops from the 22<sup>nd</sup> percentile to the 34<sup>th</sup> percentile.
  - Democracy score drops from 25<sup>th</sup> percentile to 50<sup>th</sup> percentile.
- Conflict:
  - No resources, probability of civil conflict 0.5% pa
  - Resources > 25% GDP, probability of conflict 23% pa.

There are **choices** -- policy levers for all of these mechanisms:

## ***1: Crowding out***

- Trade liberalization to depreciate exchange rate:
  - Evidence that open trade policies particularly important in resource rich economies.
- Use of resource revenues to support economic activity elsewhere in the economy.

### ***Choices:***

- *Timing of expenditure:* Depletion rate / foreign investment (funds) / domestic investment
- *Composition of expenditure:* Consumption / investment
- *Quality of expenditure:*
  - Honest and efficient (Botswana)
  - Investment to increase the rate of return of other productive activities.

### ***2: Volatility***

- Macro-stability:
- Expenditure smoothing
  - Domestic expenditure/ foreign assets
  - Facilitate domestic supply response – construction sector
  - Facilitate smoothing by private sector – financial sector development

### ***3: Institutions***

- The importance of commitment to good practise:
  - Transparency
  - International codes
  - Fiscal constitutions
  - Institution building
    - checks and balances
    - human and social capital, as well as physical

## References:

### References:

A useful survey of the economic research is:

Rick van der Ploeg, 'Challenges and opportunities for resource rich economies'

This and other papers are at:

<http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/index.php/research/>

The political economy material draws on Paul Collier's work, at:

<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/politicaconomy.htm>