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Employment

Junior Research Fellow, The Queen's College, University of Oxford, October 2018-present

Education

PhD, Economics, University of Vienna (with distinction), 2013-2018
MSc, Economics, Institute for Advanced Studies and TU Wien (with distinction), 2011-2013
BSc, Economics, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, (with distinction) 2007-2011
Erasmus semester, Utrecht University, 2009-2010

References

Professor Maarten Janssen Department of Economics University of Vienna maarten.janssen@univie.ac.at Tel.: +43 1 4277 37438	Professor Paul Klemperer Department of Economics University of Oxford paul.klemperer@nuffield.ox.ac.uk Tel.: +44 1865 278588
Professor Karl Schlag Department of Economics University of Vienna karl.schlag@univie.ac.at Tel.: +43 1 4277 37437	

Research and Teaching Fields

Primary fields: Applied Microeconomic Theory
Secondary fields: Industrial Organization, Market Design

Publications

"On the Clock of the Combinatorial Clock Auction" (with Maarten Janssen), **Theoretical Economics**, 14 (4), 1271–1308, 2019

"Budget Constraints in Combinatorial Clock Auctions" (with Maarten Janssen, and Vladimir Karamychev), **Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design**, Martin Bichler, and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017

Job Market Paper

"An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics"

Auctions are ubiquitous as they have the potential to quickly find efficient market-clearing prices. However, in many interesting settings, buyers face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. I analyze this issue for first-price auctions. In my model, bidders do not know the entire distribution of the other bidders' bids but only a finite number of its moments. Because of this strategic uncertainty, Bayes-Nash equilibrium and standard expected utility maximization do not apply. Instead, I assume that bidders aim to minimize their maximal loss. I characterize the optimal bidding strategies when bidders know the mean bid of the other bidders. I show that the model provides a better explanation than Bayes-Nash equilibrium both in laboratory experiments and for highway procurement auctions.

Working Papers

"Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Others are Doing"

(with Karl Schlag)

We show how to bid in first-price auctions when a bidder knows her value but not how others will bid. To do this, we introduce a novel method for how to make choices in strategic settings without assuming common knowledge or equilibrium behavior. Accordingly, first eliminate environments that are believed not to occur and then find a robust rule that performs well in the remaining environments. We test our bids using data from laboratory experiments and the field. We find that our bids outperform those made by the real bidders.

"When Can Auctions Maximize Post-Auction Welfare?"

I study auctions in which firms bid for licenses that reduce their marginal costs in a post-auction downstream market. When there are three or more firms, I show that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction maximizes consumer surplus in dominant strategies if and only if it maximizes producer surplus in dominant strategies. With two firms, the effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous. When the VCG auction does not maximize consumer surplus, I show that consumer surplus can be maximized by adding the right caps, i.e., restricting the number of licenses a bidder can win. This might lower producer surplus.

Conference Presentations and Invited Seminars

- 2020 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (online), University of Vienna (online), Berlin Behavioral Economics Seminar (online), INFORMS Annual Conference (online), European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (online, scheduled)
- 2019 NOeG Winter Workshop (Vienna), INFORMS Annual Conference (Seattle), EEA-ESEM (Manchester), Vfs Annual Conference (Leipzig), Nuffield Economic Theory Workshop (Oxford)
- 2018 45th EARIE Annual Conference (Rising Star Session, Athens), NOeG Annual Meeting (Vienna), NOeG Winter Workshop (Vienna)
- 2017 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (Barcelona), Vfs Annual Conference (Vienna), 44th EARIE Annual Conference (Rising Star Session, Maastricht), 19th ZEW Summer Workshop for Young Economists (Mannheim), Conference on Economic Design (York), NOeG Annual Meeting (Linz), QED Jamboree (Paris), ZEW Workshop on Market Design (Mannheim), Postdoctoral & DPhil Research Workshop (Oxford)
- 2016 Vienna Workshop on Auction and Market Design

2015 42nd EARE Annual Conference (Munich), 11th World Congress of the Econometric Society (Montreal), Conference on Economic Design (Istanbul), NOeG Annual Meeting (Klagenfurt), QED Jamboree, Cardiff

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2017 Heinz-König-Young-Scholar-Award from ZEW Mannheim
2017 6th Lindau Meeting on Economic Sciences

Research Stays

Jan.-March 2017 Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Junior Visiting Scholar

Teaching Experience

Lecturer

Fall 2019 Economics of Industry (undergraduate), University of Oxford

Teaching Assistant

Winter 2020 Game Theory (undergraduate), The Queen's College, University of Oxford
Winter 2019 Game Theory (undergraduate), The Queen's College, University of Oxford
Spring 2018 Game Theory and Information Economics (graduate), University of Vienna
Winter 2017 Advanced Microeconomics (graduate), University of Vienna
Spring 2017 Game Theory and Information Economics (graduate), University of Vienna
Winter 2016 Advanced Microeconomics (graduate), University of Vienna
Spring 2015 Intermediate Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Vienna
Spring 2013 Microeconomics II (graduate), Institute for Advanced Studies
Winter 2012 Mathematics I (graduate), Institute for Advanced Studies
2009-2011 International Macroeconomics (undergraduate), WU Vienna

Professional Service

Referee

Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economics, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Cambridge University Press, Group Decision and Negotiation, International Transactions in Operational Research

Conference and Seminar Organization

2020-2021 Learning, Games, and Networks Seminar, University of Oxford
Aug. 2016 Vienna Workshop on Auction and Market Design (with Maarten Janssen)

Personal Information

Citizenship: Austria
Languages: German (native), English (fluent), French (beginner), Dutch (beginner)