Official Fellow in Economics, Nuffield College
Incentives in organisations, information order & auction theory.
Summary: Many of the classical results in auction theory are predicated on two technical assumptions, symmetry and affiliation. The symmetry assumption makes the allocation an invariant with respect to auction form: this feature is crucial to the proof of the revenue equivalence and revenue ranking theore Affiliation makes all information “substitutes” and limits the application of the theory to what is essentially a special case. This research relaxes these assumptions. The affiliation assumption is relaxed in a way which maintains tractability but admits the analysis of auctions in which information complementary to bidders’ private information may be disclosed. The symmetry assumption is explored in a class of common value environments and is shown to be stronger than required even for allocation invariance. Using these devices, we establish that in a central class of environments, information is essentially two dimensional: aggregated market information about the value of the object and individual information about other bidders’ information. Examples are given.
- MPhil Public Economics
- UG Public Economics